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Abstract 
The recent global financial crisis has added fuel to the heated debate on 
whether boards of directors in general and audit committees in particular are 
effective in curtailing aggressive financial reporting practices and maintaining a 
transparent audit process. Specifically, UK regulators raised widespread concerns 
about the criteria of revenue recognition and the role of external auditors during and 
after the crisis, and re-emphasize the crucial role that audit committees could play in 
ameliorating financial reporting quality and safeguarding the quality of external audit. 
Despite this intense emphasis on the financial reporting and external audit oversight 
roles of internal governance mechanisms, there is still no empirical evidence 
confirming the effectiveness of these roles after the financial crisis. As such, this 
thesis contributes to the literature by using a sample of FTSE 350 firms listed on the 
London Stock of Exchange during the period between 2008 and 2010 to address two 
main empirical questions in two investigations. The first empirical investigation 
deals with the impact of audit committee and board characteristics on financial 
reporting quality. Two measures are employed to serve as surrogates for financial 
reporting quality. The first measure, which contributes to the uniqueness of this 
study, is discretionary revenues used to address misleading revenue recognition 
concerns by UK regulators, and discretionary accruals employed to account for the 
possibility of firms shifting from one earnings management method to another. The 
results reveal significant associations between a number of governance 
characteristics and discretionary revenues, but not discretionary accruals. This 
suggests that in response to UK intense regulatory scrutiny over the criteria of 
revenue recognition, firms’ revenue recognition process was subject to increased 
monitoring by boards in general and audit committees in particular, leading to better 
quality financial reporting. The second empirical investigation of this thesis 
examines the association between audit committee and board characteristics on the 
one hand and audit fees and non-audit fees on the other. The findings reveal that 
audit fees are positively related to governance mechanisms indicating that the 
oversight roles of audit committees and boards have positive impact on enhancing 
audit quality through demanding wider audit scope from external auditors. However, 
non-audit fees are also found to be positively related to audit committee meetings 
and board size, suggesting that the committee and the board support the 
simultaneous provision of audit services and non-audit services to facilitate a 
beneficial knowledge spill-over between the two services which in turn results in a 
better audit quality. Comparing the main results with those obtained from an 
additional analysis of a sample of firms listed in the pre-financial crisis period 
between 2005 and 2007 indicates that the effectiveness of governance mechanisms 
in enhancing financial reporting quality differs between regular and recession 
periods. Overall, most of the findings are consistent with the agency perspective. 
Those which are not consistent open avenues for future research to explore a multi-
theoretical approach which takes into consideration the complexities of firms and 
their environmental circumstances. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Background   
 The oversight roles of audit committees and boards of directors over a firm’s 
financial reporting and external audit processes have been given considerable 
attention by regulators, practitioners and researchers all over the world, especially 
after the high-profile corporate financial debacles of Enron and WorldCom.  
 For instance, in the United States (hereafter US), following the collapse of 
Enron and WorldCom in the onset of the second millennium, standard setters went 
for more reforms and updates of the existing provisions. The Sarbanes-Oxley 
(hereafter SOX) Act that was passed by the US Congress in the aftermath of Enron’s 
scandal, made several amendments to enhance the effectiveness of boards of 
directors in general and audit committees in particular. In addition to re-emphasizing 
the independence of each member in the committee, it is the first legal Act to 
mandate the establishment of audit committees and address their responsibilities 
(Brian 2003). 
Specifically, the Act requires audit committees to be: 
established by and amongst the board of directors of an issuer for the 
purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial reporting processes 
of the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the issuer (SOX 
2002b, SEC.2(a)(3)(A)). 
 Moreover, one of the remedies suggested by the SOX Act in order to enhance 
US financial reporting quality is addressed by requesting the Security and Exchange 
Commission (hereafter SEC) to “conduct a study on the adoption by the United 
States financial system of a principles-based accounting system” (SOX 2002b, 
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SEC.108;( d)(1)(A)). Attempting to adopt a principles-based accounting system is 
due to the belief that the current US rules-based system with its bright-line tests and 
its focus on the form of the rule rather than its substance invites executives to behave 
opportunistically (Agoglia et al. 2011).  
 Congruently in the United Kingdom (hereafter UK), although such financial 
failures were not expected to happen1 (Hayward 2002), improvements and reforms 
of the existing standards had been made as they were essential to restore global 
confidence and public trust2. Standard setters revised the combined code in 2003 and 
incorporated the recommendations of the Smith and Higgs reports, dealing with 
audit committees’ responsibilities and the effectiveness of non-executive directors 
respectively3. 
 The Smith report addresses the concerns of regulators and investors over the 
role of audit committees in the financial reporting and external audit processes. 
Specifically, the report defines the main roles of audit committees as “monitor[ing] 
the integrity of the financial statements of the company”, recommending to the board 
on the appointment of the external auditors, “approving the remuneration and terms 
of engagement of the external auditor” and monitoring “the external auditor’s 
independence, objectivity and effectiveness (Smith 2003, (2.1)). In terms of 
membership and procedures, the report recommends that: audit committees should 
be composed of at least three independent non-executive directors (3.1); the 
company’s chairman should not be a member of the audit committee (3.2); the 
                                                          
1 Expectations stemmed from two factors: first, the UK accounting system being principles-based and 
second, UK exposure to similar failures in the early 1990s where corrective actions had been taken 
(Kershaw 2005). 
2  The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Patricia Hewitt MP; speech delivered to the 
University of Cambridge Faculty of Law (July 2002). Available from: 
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2002/jul/05/politics.economicpolicy1 [Accessed 30 April 2014]. 
3 The UK Combined Code (currently the UK Corporate Governance Code) was issued in 1998 and 
has been subject to several revisions since then. Major changes were made in 2003 by incorporating 
the Higgs (Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors) and Smith (Audit 
Committees Combined Code Guidance) reports.  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
4 
 
committee should meet at least three times during the year (3.5); and, at least one of 
the committee members should have recent and relevant financial expertise (3.16). 
These recommendations are “designed to strengthen the effectiveness of audit 
committees, clarify and enhance their oversight roles, and enhance their 
accountability over the financial reporting process” (ACI 2006, p.1). 
 In parallel to this, the Higgs report gives the board the responsibility to 
scrutinize the transparency of audit committees in discharging their financial 
reporting role and the extent to which they are having an appropriate relationship 
with external auditors (Higgs and Britain 2003, D.3). In addition to holding the 
board accountable for presenting a “balanced and understandable assessment” of the 
firm’s financial reporting position (D.1) and “maintaining an appropriate relationship 
with the company’s auditors” (D.3), the report recommends that: the chairman and 
chief executive roles should be separated (5.3); non-executive directors should meet 
at least once a year without the presence of the chairman or executive directors (8.8); 
and, at least half of the board members should be independent non-executive 
directors (9.5).  
 Recently, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, UK standard setters and 
commentators have raised wide-ranging concerns about corporate financial reporting 
quality as well as external audit quality. Particularly, financial reporting concerns 
were about revenue recognition criteria and were derived from the belief that the 
recession would lead companies to manipulate revenues aggressively for the purpose 
of improving earnings quality. On the other hand, the integrity of the external audit 
process has become questionable after the crisis. Although external auditors were not 
directly blamed for causing the crisis, their role and performance were subject to 
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criticism that they have not been up to the acceptable level for preventing it (HOL 
2011) .  
1.2 Research Motivation 
 This thesis is motivated by calls to enhance the effectiveness of audit 
committees in a period where wide ranging concerns were raised about the quality of 
financial reporting as well as external auditing.  
 In the post-financial crisis period between 2008 and 2010, regulators have put 
intense emphasis on the oversight roles of the board of directors in general and the 
audit committee in particular, and intend to strengthen the role of audit committees 
and increase their responsibilities (Beattie et al. 2012).  
 Specifically, in the above mentioned period, the UK financial reporting 
‘watchdog’, the Financial Reporting Review Panel (hereafter FRRP), have put 
intense emphasis on the corporate reporting of revenue recognition criteria and 
investigated the adequacy of disclosures in order to enable users to understand how 
significant revenue streams were recognized by management (FRRP 2008, 2009). In 
the same vein, the Financial Reporting Council (hereafter FRC) issued a report in 
2009 arguing that as companies suffered from insolvency problems after the 
recession, managers would face more difficulties, which might boost the risk of non-
transparent financial reports with manipulations, errors and omissions (FRC 2009). 
Moreover, the report shed light on the constructive and transparent application of the 
UK principles-based accounting and reporting standards with reliable judgements, 
rather than just the minimum necessary compliance to laws and regulations. In 
addressing these issues, the report recommends that audit committees should take 
into consideration key questions while discharging their roles. For instance, 
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questions include the following: “has the audit committee considered how it should 
respond to any heightened risk of errors, omissions or manipulation of reporting 
financial results or balance sheet presentation?” (p.6); “if sales terms and conditions 
have been changed has the company’s revenue recognition policy been reviewed and 
does it need to be amended?”(p.6); and, “has the committee considered whether the 
audited financial statements describe fairly all the key judgements about the 
application of accounting policies and the estimation uncertainties inherent in assets 
and liabilities?” (p.3).  
 In parallel to this, and during the same period (2008 to 2010), auditors 
(particularly the Big four) were put under fire for their performance in the financial 
crisis. Politicians’ and commentators’ arguments of ‘low-balling’ practices by audit 
firms have come up again after they first arose following the early 1990s recession 
and then the Enron-Andersen scandal 4  (ACCA 2011). The House of Commons 
Treasury Committee (hereafter HCTC) published a report on 15 May 2009 
expressing their concerns about auditor independence and arguing that “investor 
confidence, and trust in audit would be enhanced by a prohibition on audit firms 
conducting non-audit work for the same company, [and recommending] that the FRC 
consult on this proposal at the earliest opportunity” (HCTC 2009, Sec. 2.1). The 
Auditing Practices Board (hereafter APB) of the FRC responded to the HCTC’s 
recommendation by issuing a report in July 2010 on “The Provision of Non-Audit 
Services by Auditors”. The report proposed an enhancement of the role of audit 
committees encouraging the latter to consider the level of non-audit services to be 
purchased, relative to audit fees, and to provide an explanation of the reasons for 
purchasing such services as well as of the external auditor’s policy related to them. 
                                                          
4 Low-balling occurs when “audit firms cut their audit fees in order to get a foot in the door for more 
lucrative non-audit work” (ACCA 2011, p.6). 
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In the same vein, a report by the UK House of Lords followed to raise widespread 
concerns about the role of auditors during the crisis (HOL 2011). The report accused 
the big four of complacency and “dereliction of duty”, emphasizing the crucial role 
that audit committees could play in choosing auditors and maintaining their 
independence, and recommended restrictions on the auditors’ provision of non-audit 
services to the FTSE 350 firms. 
 In essence, “[E]ffective audit committees have never been more important in 
[2008] of unprecedented turmoil in global financial markets” (ACI 2008a, p.5). 
Similarly, the practitioners’ focus on the crucial oversight role that audit committees 
could play in the financial reporting and audit processes after the financial crisis was 
consistent with that of standard setters: 
While audit committees will continue to focus on refining their 
oversight of financial reporting, internal controls, and risk 
management in 2008, they also will be paying close attention to 
‘recession-related risks’- and there may be many (ACI 2008b, p.1). 
 Some of the ‘recession-related risks’ identified by the ACI report are 
“liquidity, access to capital, and increased risk of earnings management during an 
economic down-turn” (ACI 2008b, p.1). 
 In the same vein, and in response to the HCTC request from the APB to 
consult on the prohibition on audit firms to provide non-audit services to their audit 
clients, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland issued a report in January 
2010 recommending that the APB should rather take other actions than the complete 
prohibition of non-audit services (ICAS 2010). Some of the major actions suggested 
by the report require the audit committee to publish the extent to which the provision 
of non-audit services by the external auditor will impair the latter’s independence 
and “to pre-approve all non-audit services above a set fee level” or those which have 
an internal audit nature (p.8).  
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1.3 Research Contribution 
According to the UK Corporate Governance Code, the main oversight 
responsibilities of audit committees are generally related to financial reporting, 
external auditing and internal auditing. Regulators and practitioners have put intense 
emphasis on the first two areas especially following several high-profile financial 
reporting and auditing scandals (e.g. Enron, Arthur Andersen etc.) where the 
transparency of financial reports has become questionable, and some doubt has been 
cast upon the independence and objectivity of auditors. Eventually, the increased 
emphasis on the oversight roles of the board and the audit committee has led to an 
increase in the latters’ responsibilities. However, there is still lack of empirical work 
on the effectiveness of these roles in the UK. Specifically, “the complementary roles 
of boards and audit committees in monitoring both audit and financial reporting 
quality” (Zaman et al. 2011, p.192) have not been investigated yet. In this pursuit, 
this thesis investigates in the first empirical model the effectiveness of some internal 
governance characteristics in enhancing financial reporting quality. Then in the 
second model it examines how auditor fees (audit and non-audit) are affected by 
these characteristics.  
Moreover, this thesis makes potential contributions to extant literature in a 
number of ways. First, despite the increasing emphasis of UK regulatory bodies and 
practitioners on the effective role that audit committees could play in curtailing 
aggressive financial reporting and determining appropriate levels of audit and non-
audit service fees, the author is not aware of any study examining these relationships 
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after the global financial crisis in the UK. Particularly, there is not even any 
published research on the association between audit committees and financial 
reporting quality in the post- Enron era (Zaman et al. 2011). Moreover, most of the 
research done pre-Enron, in addition to its paucity, examines the impact of audit 
committee existence on financial reporting quality, rather than the effectiveness of 
audit committees in discharging their financial oversight role (e.g., Peasnell et al. 
2005, 2000). In contrast, the vast majority of studies tackling this association are 
conducted in the US where a rules-based accounting system exists (e.g., Agoglia et al. 
2011; Ghosh et al. 2010; Farber 2005; Xie et al. 2003; Bedard et al. 2004; Klein 
2002a; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008).  
Similarly, post-Enron UK literature suffers from lack of research on the 
association between corporate governance and both audit fees and non-audit fees. As 
Zaman et al. (2011) examine these relationships in the period between 2001 and 2004, 
their sample accounts for only a period of one year after the major changes in the UK 
Corporate Governance Code which have taken place through the incorporation of the 
Smith and Higgs reports in 2003. Moreover, Zaman et al. (2011) focus on audit 
committee effectiveness while controlling for the board variables.  
In a more recent investigation, a thesis by Basiruddin (2011) examining the above 
association on a sample of 674 FTSE 350 firm-year observations listed during the 
period 2005 to 2008 uses both sets of board and audit committee variables in the 
same empirical model and reveals inconsistent results with those of Zaman et al. 
(2011). Basiruddin (2011) results are mainly based on the pre-crisis period and are 
not robust to the usage of separate regressions for each of the board and audit 
committee sets of variables. Most recently, Nehme (2013) uses a sample of 908 
FTSE 350 firm-year observations listed during the period 2007 to 2010 and examines 
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the impact of some audit committee and board variables on audit fees. However, his 
results are questionable as he does not investigate non-audit fees and account for their 
joint determination with audit fees.  
The second empirical model (auditor remuneration) also contributes to the 
literature by providing evidence on the complementary roles of boards and audit 
committees. The results reveal that the size of an audit committee does not play an 
incremental role in determining audit fees in the presence of the board. Moreover, in 
regular time periods and in the presence of effective boards, audit committees are not 
found to play an incremental role in determining the level of non-audit services to be 
purchased from auditors.  
Interestingly, by examining the impact of corporate governance on financial 
reporting quality and auditor remuneration during the 2008 to 2010 period, the author 
does not only make a unique contribution to the literature, but also addresses the 
regulatory concerns mentioned in the previous section.   
Second, prior research tackling the association between audit committees and 
financial reporting quality has used three main earnings quality measures (properties 
of earnings, investor responsiveness to earnings and external indicators of earnings 
misstatements) as surrogates for financial reporting quality 5 . Extending prior 
literature centring on the properties of earnings measure, this study uses two models 
to proxy for financial reporting quality: the revenue discretionary model as being 
“more likely than accrual models to detect an equal combination of revenue and 
expense manipulation” (Stubben 2010, p.710), and the performance-adjusted 
modified Jones discretionary accrual model as it reduces the measurement error 
associated with alternative accrual models (Kothari et al. 2005). Employing these 
                                                          
 
5 The author adopts the Dechow et al. (2010) categorization of earnings quality proxies. 
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measures, this thesis contributes to the literature in two ways. First, unlike the vast 
majority of studies that have used discretionary accrual models to proxy for financial 
reporting quality, this is the first study of its kind to use the discretionary revenue 
model to proxy for financial reporting quality while examining the latter’s 
association with corporate governance6. Second, Zang (2011) provides evidence that 
there is a “direct substitutive relation between real activities manipulation and 
accrual-based earnings management” and focusing on either type alone “does not 
fully explain earnings management activities” (pp.700-701). Knowing that the 
discretionary revenue model is capable of detecting real activities manipulation (Stubben 
2010), in employing the above two measures the author seeks to generalize the 
results and account for the possibility for firms to shift from one earnings 
management method to another.  
 Third, given the current lack of confidence in the rules-based accounting 
systems, the concerns raised about its accountability for high-profile financial 
reporting failures, and lack of evidence for the association between audit committees 
and financial reporting quality in principle-based environments (Agoglia et al. 2011), 
this thesis makes a potential contribution through providing evidence for the impact 
of audit committee effectiveness on financial reporting quality in the UK principles-
oriented context. This implies that in steady state conditions, principle-based 
accounting standards lessen the burden on audit committees to curtail managers’ 
aggressive financial reporting practices (Agoglia et al. 2011). Given the same 
standards, however, higher levels of regulatory monitoring in recession periods may 
propel larger audit committees, comprising of greater proportions of independent 
directors to ensure better financial reporting quality. 
                                                          
6  Refer to chapter three for a detailed justification behind the author’s adoption of earnings 
management measures. 
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 Fourth, it has been argued that corporate governance mechanisms would 
operate differently in regular periods than in recession periods (Van Essen et al. 2013; 
Dowell et al. 2011). This thesis contributes to the literature by investigating the 
effectiveness of governance mechanisms in the post-financial crisis period 2008 to 
2010 as well as in the period 2005 to 2007 before the financial crisis. Specifically, it 
provides evidence suggesting that some governance characteristics would operate 
more effectively in recession periods to enhance financial reporting quality.  
 Fifth, the vast majority of studies in the corporate governance literature have 
used agency theory as a theoretical underpinning. Others have used management-
based theories including stakeholder, resource dependency and institutional theory. 
Despite that, the agency theory is the main theoretical base of this research; the 
author has also discussed the applicability of a multi-theoretical approach and 
provided evidence suggesting that the effectiveness of internal governance 
mechanisms to enhance financial reporting quality may depend “upon organizational 
and environmental circumstances” (Van Essen et al. 2013), while more than one 
theoretical perspective is needed to capture “the greater complexity” in organisations 
(Eisenhardt 1989). 
 Finally, prior studies have used various definitions to measure audit 
committee financial expertise. For instance, Defond et al. (2005) find that market 
participants favour the appointment of accounting financial experts (versus non-
accounting ones) to the audit committee. Unlike the vast majority of studies that 
have used financial literacy, accounting/financial qualifications, or previous auditing 
and financial reporting experience to proxy for audit committee financial expertise 
(e.g., DeZoort and Salterio 2001; Agrawal and Chadha 2005; Nehme 2013), this 
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study defines financial experts as those members with relevant financial experience 
as stipulated in the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
 This chapter has presented the background and the motivation behind 
conducting this research. Potential contributions to the literature have been also 
reported. The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:  
 Chapter two presents a critical discussion of the prevalent theoretical 
foundations within corporate governance research, namely, agency, stakeholder, 
resource dependence and institutional. A multi-theoretical approach suggesting the 
integration of two or more of these approaches to better explain organizational 
complexities is also discussed. The main discussion is based on the agency theory 
and how it links between corporate governance variables on the one hand and 
financial reporting quality and auditor remuneration on the other. The chapter then 
concludes with the reasons behind adopting the agency perspective from among its 
rivals. 
 Chapter three reviews the literature on earnings management. First, it 
discusses the most commonly used earnings management definitions as well as the 
types and methods that firms might use to manage earnings. The incentives that 
might trigger firms to engage in earnings management practices are then presented, 
followed by a critical discussion of the alternative techniques used by researchers to 
detect earnings management. Finally, the chapter concludes with a reasoned 
justification on the adoption or rejection of each technique. 
 Chapter four presents a critical review of the literature on the association 
between corporate governance variables (audit committee and board of directors) 
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and both financial reporting quality (proxied by earnings management measures) and 
auditor remuneration (audit fees and non-audit fees). Prior studies on the impact of 
corporate governance on financial reporting quality are reviewed based on the 
different categories of earnings quality proxies. Studies on the impact of corporate 
governance on audit fees and non-audit fees are reviewed based on the different sets 
of audit committee and board variables. Gaps in the literature are identified in each 
of these strands and the proposed contributions to fill these gaps are highlighted. 
 Chapter five outlines the hypotheses of the research and explains the relevant 
research design. Specifically, after developing the hypotheses for each of the 
empirical models examined in this thesis, this chapter explains the measurement of 
the dependent and control variables as well as the specification of the empirical 
models employed. Then the period of the study and the sample selection procedures 
are presented followed by a justification of the analytical procedures and methods. 
 Chapters six and seven present the results and discussion of the empirical 
findings of the impact of corporate governance on financial reporting quality and 
auditor remuneration (audit fees and non-audit fees) respectively. Each of these 
chapters encompasses descriptive analyses, correlation analyses and multivariate 
analyses. Then robustness tests along with additional tests for the pre-crisis period 
from 2005 to 2007 are presented in the additional analyses before concluding with a 
summary of the findings.  
 Finally, chapter eight concludes the thesis with an overall summary. It 
synthesizes the findings of the research and highlights the research implications as 
well as the limitations and the avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
 After identifying the objectives of the research in the first chapter, this 
chapter demonstrates an overview of corporate governance and an understanding of 
the relevant research theoretical underpinnings. Several theories have been used in 
the research of corporate governance including stewardship, managerial hegemony, 
agency, stakeholder, resource dependence, institutional etc... This chapter focuses 
specifically on the last four theories as they have been particularly used by 
researchers in investigating the oversight roles of audit committees (Beattie et al. 
2012). Other theories, like stewardship or managerial hegemony are not tackled in 
this thesis as they are not consistent with the monitoring role of audit committees 
and their scepticism. For instance, managerial hegemony view audit committees as 
week and controlled by management (Beasley et al. 2009). Similarly, stewardship 
assumes that managers are honest and work in the best interests of shareholders to 
increase their value (Beasley et al. 2009). A limited number of studies have also 
suggested integration among agency, stakeholder, resource dependence and 
institutional perspectives (e.g. Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Lynall et al. 2003; Young 
and Thyil 2008; Christopher 2010) to overcome the limitation of using one 
theoretical framework and to better address the wider complexities in organizations 
(Christopher 2010). The agency theory which assumes conflicting interests between 
management and shareholders is the main theory used in this study. The board of 
directors and its audit committee are two monitoring mechanisms employed by 
shareholders to help align managers’ actions with shareholders’ interests through 
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ensuring transparent financial reporting and overseeing the management-external 
auditor relationship. Each of the mentioned theoretical frameworks, along with the 
multi-theoretical approach, is critically discussed. Finally, the chapter concludes with 
the main reasons for using the agency theory as a theoretical base for this research. 
2.2 Corporate Governance Overview 
 It has been suggested that the idea of corporate governance has arisen 
because of the problems related to the separation of ownership and control. In his 
seminal study “The Wealth of Nations” dated 1776, Adam Smith argued that: 
Being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it 
cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which the [people] watch over their own. 
Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in 
the management of the affairs of such a company (Smith 2010, pp.606-
607). 
 Berle and Means (1932) provide a similar view and argue that as the 
incentives of firms’ managers may not align with those of the owners, the separation 
between ownership and control will lead to the creation of what is called “Quasi-
public Corporation” where the power and control are not in the hands of the 
shareholders. Although there is a long history of governance issues, however, 
conflicts of interest between principals (owners) and agents (managers), and the best 
ways to reduce these conflicts and reduce their effects on the firm’s value were 
brought to the forefront in 1976 by Jensen and Meckling (Baker and Anderson 2010).  
 Although the term ‘Corporate Governance’ has been used frequently by 
researchers, regulators and the general public, there has not been a general agreement 
on its definition (Brickley and Zimmerman 2010). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
survey research on corporate governance and note that: 
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Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. 
How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profits 
to them? How do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital 
they supply or invest it in bad projects? How do suppliers of finance 
control managers? (p.737)   
 As such they use the agency perspective to investigate how can investors get 
back their money from managers or prevent their funds from being expropriated or 
wasted on barren projects. Congruently, La Porta et al. (2000) define corporate 
governance as “a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect 
themselves against expropriation by the insiders” (p.4). They identify the different 
forms of expropriation that might be conducted by insiders and note that all of these 
forms are related to the agency problem where insiders rather work to maximize 
their own wealth than that of outside investors. 
 Regulators’ definitions were also consistent with the agency perspective. For 
instance, the Cadbury report (1992), which represents the initial version of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, defines corporate governance as “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled” (FRC 2012). The board of directors and the 
audit committee are two major mechanisms in the system responsible for supervising 
the roles and actions of executive management.  
 Recently, Brickley and Zimmerman (2010) identify what they called “six 
common myths about corporate governance”, with the first being that “a common 
definition of corporate governance exists”. They argue that the choice of definitions 
is crucial as it can affect how the research is focused, structured and interpreted. 
Emphasizing the inclusion of all the three firm’s top-level decision makers 
(shareholders, board of directors and key executives) in the definition, Brickley and 
Zimmerman (2010) note that their preferred definition “includes all significant 
formal and informal contracts that affect the behaviour of top-level decision makers, 
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not just those between debt holders and the firm but also between the firm and senior 
managers” (p.237). They shed light on the challenging task of considering all of a 
firm’s contracts in empirical research, and cast doubt on the validity of results of 
those studies that have just focused “on a narrower set of agency conflicts” arguing 
that these studies suffer from the “potential correlated omitted variables problem”. 
 In essence, “there is no general agreement on the definition of corporate 
governance” (Brickley and Zimmerman 2010, p.236), and the agency theory has 
been the main theory applied in corporate governance research (Beattie et al. 2012). 
Recently, theoretical perspectives from management have also been introduced in an 
attempt to provide a clearer and more complete interpretation of practical 
observations (Beattie et al. 2012). These theories which “serve to better explain the 
behavioural mechanisms present in agency interactions and the influence of the 
external environment include stakeholder theory, resource dependency theory and 
institutional theory” (Beattie et al. 2012, p.353). The following sections present a 
critical discussion of these theories as well as of a multi-theoretical approach which 
provides a holistic view for capturing the wider complexities in corporations. 
2.3 Agency Theory 
 Agency theory is a broadened view of the 1960-1970 literature on “risk 
sharing among individuals and groups” (Eisenhardt 1989). As the risk-sharing 
problem occurs when collaborative “parties have different attitudes toward risk”, the 
agency problem occurs when those parties have conflicting interests and goals. 
Specifically, the agency theory suggests a contractual relationship between two 
parties (agent and principal) by whom one party (agent) is given decision making 
authority to perform some services on behalf of the other (principal) (Jensen and 
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Meckling 1976). As such, agency conflicts arise when the incentives of the agent 
diverge from those of the principal and the former start behaving in a self-serving 
manner trying to achieve personal gains at the expense of the latter’s wealth. Yet 
“agency theory is founded on the triad of agent opportunism, information, and risk” 
(Sharma 1997, p.760). 
 Eisenhardt (1989) identifies two problems that might occur in the principal-
agent relationship. The first problem happens when there are principal-agent 
conflicting interests and goals, and it is hard for the principal to assert or monitor the 
actions of the agent. The second is the risk-sharing problem which appears when the 
actions of the agent are not aligned with the interests of the principal because of the 
conflicting risk preferences. Sharma (1997) notes that resolving such conflicts is 
difficult “because of information asymmetry favouring agents and because of 
potentially differing attitudes toward risk held by the two contracting parties” (p.760). 
 Broadly speaking, the literature refers to two main aspects of agency conflicts 
that are caused by information asymmetry, namely, moral hazard and adverse 
selection (Eisenhardt 1989). “Moral hazard refers to the lack of effort on the part of 
the agent” or in other words it occurs when managers shirk their responsibilities 
(Eisenhardt 1989, p.61). On the other hand “adverse selection refers to the 
misrepresentation of ability by the agent” (Eisenhardt 1989, p.61). This is the case 
when managers claim to possess a certain level of ability or knowledge that 
shareholders are unable to observe or verify. In both cases, shareholders cannot 
prevent such actions if they are unable to monitor managerial behaviour directly, 
however, they may use governance tools such as managerial ownership to help align 
their incentives with those of managers (Baker and Anderson 2010).    
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 As the agency relationship is based on a contract, proponents of the agency 
theory have focused their research to determine the most effective and efficient 
contract governing this relationship (Eisenhardt 1989). Moreover, they emphasise 
determining the cases in which conflicting goals between the agent and the principal 
arise, and how governance mechanisms are expected to limit the self-serving 
behaviour of agents. Outcome-based contracts and information systems were the 
proposed governance mechanisms involved in curtailing the opportunism of agents. 
 An example of outcome-based contracts is how increasing managerial 
ownership of shares will decrease management opportunism (Jensen and Meckling 
1976), and co-align the interest of the agent with that of the principal. Similarly, 
information systems can reduce the opportunities of the agent to deceive the 
principal through conveying information to the principal about the agent’s actions. 
Examples about such systems are efficient capital markets and labour markets (Fama 
1980), as well as board of directors (Fama and Jensen 1983). Yet, the agency theory 
contributed to organizational thinking through introducing information as a 
commodity which has a cost and can be purchased (Eisenhardt 1989). This implies 
that information systems such as board of directors can be considered by 
organizations as investments used to restrain agents’ opportunism. 
 In the same vein, Fama and Jensen (1983) evince that there are four steps of 
an organization’s decision process: initiation, implementation, ratification and 
monitoring. They theorize that the importance of control over agency problems 
increases when managers who are responsible for initiating and implementing 
decisions are not the major shareholders and thus “do not bear a major share of the 
wealth effects of their decisions” (p.344). In such a case, managers are expected to 
take decisions that are not in the interest of shareholders and effective control 
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systems are needed to monitor and assure alignment of interests between managers 
and shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) define the effective control system as a 
system that assures that those who are delegated to take key managerial decisions in 
the organization are not those who have the “control rights over the same decisions”. 
 The board of directors and its committees are at the top of this control system 
where they are delegated by the owners (shareholders) to ratify and monitor key 
decisions taken by top managers who initiate and implement, thus ensuring that 
decision management and decision control are separated. 
 The costs associated with the monitoring roles of the board of directors and 
its committees as well as with the appointment of external auditors, represent part of 
the monitoring agency costs incurred by shareholders “to limit the aberrant activities 
of [managers]” (Jensen and Meckling 1976, p.308)7.  
2.3.1 The Board and its Audit Committee 
 From an agency perspective, the role of the board and its audit committee is 
to monitor management actions and assure their alignment with the interests of 
shareholders. The board and its audit committee will not be considered as an 
effective monitoring mechanism unless they are able to limit the discretionary 
decisions of top-level managers (Fama and Jensen 1983).  
 “The board is empowered by the shareholders to exercise ultimate control 
over top management” (Bathala and Rao 1995, p.59). They can play a crucial role in 
co-aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders and consequently 
                                                          
7 Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that agency costs constitute monitoring costs, bonding costs 
and residuals loss. Bonding costs could be related to the compensation of managers to ensure that the 
latter will act in the best interests of shareholders. Residual loss represents the costs incurred by 
shareholders because of the failure of monitoring and bonding to fully align the interests of 
shareholders and managers. 
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reduce agency conflicts through either altering “the incentives of the managerial 
team or [dismissing] them” (Sharma 1997, p.767).  
 Boards include both inside and outside directors. Although insiders are 
considered to be most influential due to their possession of more firm-specific 
valuable information, proponents of the agency theory have emphasized the crucial 
role of outside board members arguing that outsiders are more likely to exert 
effective separation between decision management and decision control and not 
collude with management in expropriating shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
Moreover, they contend that outside members on the board are more likely to 
provide crucial monitoring functions to reduce agency problems (Bathala and Rao 
1995). One of the purposes of outsiders’ focus on providing functional monitoring is 
to sustain a good reputation as effective decision controllers (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
Narrowly speaking, the audit committee is the main sub-committee of the board 
responsible for overseeing a firm’s financial reporting process and ensuring a 
transparent relationship with the external auditors. Pincus et al. (1989) theorize that 
equity agency costs arise when incentives of managers diverge from those of 
shareholders and managers find the opportunity to increase their wealth at the 
expense of shareholders. Therefore, audit committees are employed as monitoring 
mechanisms to ensure transparent reporting between managers (agents) and 
shareholders (principals) and consequently reduce agency costs. Further, they argue 
that effective monitoring by audit committees is indicated by their ability to reduce 
information asymmetries between managers and the board of directors.  
 Congruently, Eisenhardt (1989) articulates that the purpose of the audit 
committee financial reporting oversight role is to reduce information asymmetry 
between the agent and the principal. She argues that audit firms will also benefit 
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from the effectiveness of audit committee as the latter will enhance the auditor 
independence from management and therefore protect the auditor from fraud 
allegations. 
 Menon and Williams (1994) contend that a decrease in managerial ownership 
should be accompanied by an increase in the level of monitoring through enhancing 
the activity of the audit committee. Similarly, Collier (1999) argues that companies 
with high agency costs will increase audit committee monitoring activity to reduce 
these costs. 
 Agency theorists have also emphasized the presence of financial expertise in 
the audit committee. They argue that for audit committees to discharge their 
financial reporting oversight role effectively they should be equipped with financial 
knowledge and skills, to be able to review management’s financial reporting 
judgments, and thus mitigate agency conflicts between managers and shareholders 
(Davidson et al. 2004). This is consistent with the audit committee recommendations 
of the UK Corporate Governance Code which required that at least one of the 
members of the audit committee have “recent and relevant financial experience”. 
2.3.2 Financial Reporting Quality 
 This study uses earnings management as a proxy for financial reporting 
quality. Earnings management, however, can be either beneficial or opportunistic. 
From an agency perspective, when managers’ incentives diverge from those of 
shareholders, managers tend to use the flexibility provided in the accounting 
principles to manipulate earnings opportunistically and therefore distort financial 
reports (Jiraporn et al. 2008). Hence, this study suggests that any increase in the level 
of earnings management would lead to a lower quality of financial reporting. 
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 Several incentives to manage earnings have been identified in the literature. 
Davidson et al. (2005) categorise these incentives into “agency costs, information 
asymmetries and externalities affecting non-contracting parties” (p.243).  
For instance, Jiraporn et al. (2008) contend that agency conflicts are directly related 
to earning management and that firms with high agency costs are expected to have 
higher levels of earnings management because of the opportunistic behaviours of 
their managers. Further, they argue that managers may engage in earnings 
management practices in an attempt to enhance their own compensation. This is 
especially the case when some of the compensation components (such as bonuses) 
are dependent on firm performance.  
 In the same vein, Beatty and Harris (1999) articulate that earnings 
management could emerge in response to information asymmetry and agency 
problems. They theorize that information asymmetry, which occurs when managers 
have superior information in comparison to shareholders, “may make external 
financing costly and may lead managers to forgo positive net present value projects” 
(Beatty and Harris 1999, p.299). On the other hand, agency problems emerge when 
there is superior information for managers along with opportunities to achieve self-
serving goals “at the shareholders’ expense”.  
 Moreover, Beatty and Harris (1999) demonstrate that accounting earnings 
tend to be less informative when managers engage in earnings management practices 
“to circumvent accounting-based contracts designed to mitigate agency problems” 
(p.299). 
 Agency literature has also suggested that contracts between managers and 
lenders include covenants that restrict the behaviour of managers (Duke and Hunt 
1990). Given the fact that these contracts are heavily reliant on the accounting 
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figures reported in financial statements (Duke and Hunt 1990), they may create 
incentives for managers to manage earnings (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994), through 
choosing “accounting procedures that increase assets and revenues and decrease 
liabilities and expenses” (Duke and Hunt 1990, p.47). 
 Warfield et al. (1995) articulate that the agency theory predicts an increase in 
managers’ incentives to shirk and consume perquisites “when managers hold less 
equity in the corporation” (p.62). Shareholders face difficulty in monitoring 
managers as the level of asymmetric information increase, thus managers become 
more able to behave opportunistically and “abuse their discretion over earnings” 
(Jiraporn et al. 2008, p.628). Earnings management, therefore, is considered an 
agency problem as the financial information that managers provide to shareholders 
does not reflect the real economic substance of underlying transactions and prevent 
shareholders from making informed decisions. Proponents of the agency theory 
suggest that such problems could be reduced through the board of directors (and its 
committees), being the apex of the internal governance system of the firm (Fama and 
Jensen 1983). The board is responsible for overseeing the financial discretion of 
management and ensuring the validity of managerial accounting choices (Davidson 
et al. 2005). 
2.3.3 Audit Function 
 An audit is one of the several monitoring mechanisms which have a positive 
impact on the value of the firm (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Conducting the audit by 
someone who is independent of management is expected to reduce agency conflicts 
that result from the divergence of incentives between managers and shareholders 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1983). Watts and Zimmerman (1983) argue that as contracts 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
27 
 
are used between agents and principals to reduce the former’s opportunism, their 
enforcement is done through auditors who monitor the activities of management. The 
auditor, thus, is said to be successful in reducing the opportunistic behaviour of 
managers only if they are independent or in other words they are expected to report 
“some discovered breaches of contract”. 
 Similarly, Colbert and Jahera (2011) contend that external audits exist 
because of the agency relationship between managers and shareholders. Auditors are 
considered as one of the governance mechanisms used by shareholders to monitor 
management’s activities and provide reasonable assurance on the fairness and 
accuracy of the financial reports. For instance, managers compensated based on 
performance may tend to manipulate reported earnings to increase their 
compensation. Hence, shareholders support the purchase of audit services in an 
attempt to ensure alignment of their interests with those of management, reduce 
information asymmetry and ensure that transparent information is conveyed to them. 
 Recently, Hope et al. (2012) have examined how the level of agency conflicts 
would influence a firm’s selection of auditors and the degree of audit effort (proxied 
by audit fees) to be supplied. In general, their main thesis was that auditor’s efforts, 
and thus audit fees, increase as the level of agency conflicts increases. They argue 
that in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection problems, auditors tend to 
supply more audit effort in an attempt to preclude misstatements associated with 
such problems. Further, they contend that firms facing higher agency costs tend to 
select “a higher-quality auditor to provide a credible signal of their commitment to 
higher-quality reporting” (Hope et al. 2012, p.500). 
 The results of Hope et al. (2012) reveal that audit fees increase with the 
increase of agency costs and that firms facing higher agency costs are more likely to 
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attempt higher audit quality of their financial statements through hiring a Big 4 audit 
firm. Moreover, they find a negative relationship between board independence and 
audit fees. Specifically, they find that audit fees decrease as the number of directors 
on the board who are related to the major shareholder increases; however, it 
increases when the number of directors who are related to the CEO increases. These 
results suggest that shareholders are more likely to have agency conflicts with CEOs 
but less likely to have such conflicts with independent board of directors. 
 Colbert and Jahera (2011) argue that one of the factors that may affect the 
level of audit to be demanded, or in other words the level of audit effort to be 
supplied, is the percentage of ownership held by management. The increase in the 
percentage of ownership held by insiders will help align the latter’s incentives with 
those of shareholders thus lessening the need for higher monitoring levels and 
therefore fewer audits will be demanded. The empirical results of Hope et al. (2012) 
are consistent with this argument and reveal a negative association between audit 
fees and CEO ownership. 
 Overall, the agency theory provides a justified theoretical explanation of the 
oversight roles of the audit committee and the board of directors over the financial 
reporting process and the auditor-management relationship. Vigilant oversight by the 
board in general and the audit committee in particular tend to reduce agency costs, 
resolve agency conflicts and alleviate information asymmetry. 
2.4 Stakeholder Theory 
 The term stakeholders dates back to 1963 where it was defined by an internal 
memorandum at the Stanford Research Institute as “those groups without whose 
support the organization would cease to exist”, and include shareholders, suppliers, 
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customers, employees, lenders and society (Freeman and Reed 1983, p.89). In 1968 
a study by Igor Ansoff discussed what he called “stakeholder theory” stating that 
“this theory maintains that the objectives of the firms should be derived by balancing 
the conflicting claims of the various “stakeholders” in the firms: managers, workers, 
stockholders, suppliers, vendors”. (Freeman and Reed 1983, p.89). 
 Despite this history of the stakeholder concept, stakeholder theory was first 
publicized and brought to the forefront of the management field in 1984 by Edward 
Freeman (Stoney and Winstanley 2001), who was later called the father of the 
stakeholder theory (Laplume et al. 2008). Freeman and Reed (1983), in their seminal 
work, argue that the Stanford Research Institute definition of stakeholders is too 
general and proposed a definition which includes both friendly and hostile groups: 
Any identifiable group or individual who can affect the achievement of an 
organization’s objectives or who is affected by the achievement of an 
organization’s objectives (p.91). 
 According to Freeman and Reed (1983), these groups or individuals could 
include government agencies, unions, competitors, shareholders, customers, protest 
groups, trade associations etc. Despite this specification of the stakeholder 
constituencies,  the stakeholder theory does not provide guidance on who are the 
appropriate groups or individuals who should be included in the term stockholders 
(Sternberg 1999). If stakeholders include all those who are affected or can affect the 
organization, this would result in an infinite number of groups whose benefits are to 
be considered (Sternberg 1999). 
 Freeman and Reed (1983) differentiate between the broadly used stockholder 
model and their proposed stakeholder model and discuss the implications of the shift 
from the first view to the second. Particularly, they argue that in contrast to the 
stockholder model which put intense emphasis on managers to achieve the ultimate 
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goal of maximizing shareholders’ wealth or value, the stakeholder model develops a 
wider view of corporate life and operations which focuses on addressing the 
responsibility of the firm not only towards owners, but also towards a broader group 
of constituencies “who have a stake in the actions of the corporation”: the 
stakeholders (Freeman and Reed 1983, p.89). Further, they contend that in a 
stakeholder model, public policy questions should be taken into consideration to 
provide an understanding of how the organization-stakeholders relationships would 
change in the light of implementing certain policies. 
 In a more recent study, Donaldson and Preston (1995) criticize the 
stakeholder literature arguing that it has failed to differentiate among the various 
aspects of the model, namely, descriptive, instrumental, normative and managerial.  
They define the first aspect as descriptive by which the theory “describes the 
corporation as a constellation of cooperative and competitive interests possessing 
intrinsic value” (p.66). This aspect was used by researchers to describe specific 
behaviours and characteristics of corporations such as their nature, how they are 
managed and how their boards perceive stakeholders’ interests.  
 The instrumental aspect views the theory as a base for examining the links 
between how stakeholders are managed and how different corporate objectives, 
whether they are financial, economic or societal, are achieved. In other words, 
proponents of this aspect suggest that adhering to stakeholder practices and 
principles would help corporations achieve their corporate objectives.  
 From a normative perspective, the theory was used “to interpret the function 
of the corporation, including the identification of moral or philosophical guidelines 
for the operation and management of corporations” (Donaldson and Preston 1995, 
p.71). Stakeholders are viewed as ends in themselves and not means to other ends, 
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“and therefore must participate in determining the future direction of the firm in 
which it has a stake” (Donaldson and Preston 1995, p.73). Donaldson and Preston 
(1995) conclude that “the three aspects of stakeholder theory are mutually supportive 
and that the normative base of the theory – which includes the modern theory of 
property rights – is fundamental” (p.65).  
 Finally, using the managerial aspect the theory helps managers solve 
practical problems through offering prescriptive solutions and through 
recommending “attitudes, structures, and practices that, taken together, constitute 
stakeholder management” (Donaldson and Preston 1995, p.70). Managers are 
expected to respond to the various stakeholder interests “within a mutually 
supportive framework”, in an attempt to adhere to “the legitimacy of the 
management function” (Donaldson and Preston 1995, p.87). 
 Interestingly, Freeman and Reed (1983) demonstrate how the roles and tasks 
of the board of directors can be understood from a stakeholder perspective. They 
articulate that as stakeholders are encouraged to be involved in the governance and 
decision-making process, the board of directors is expected to “set the tone for how 
the company deals with stakeholders” and consider how their decision would impact 
key stakeholder groups (p.96). Yet, the board will not just monitor how managers 
are managing the firm, but also whether the latter is assessing each stakeholder 
group in terms of stake and power. 
 In the same vein, Wang and Dewhirst (1992) contend that the board’s role to 
“manage stakeholders and enhance corporate social performance” is more important 
than the other roles that the board is expected to discharge such as spanning 
boundaries (resource dependence perspective) and monitoring agents (agency 
perspective). “A firm’s objectives to identify various key stakeholders concerned, 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
32 
 
balance conflicting interests of and manage all key stakeholder groups, and enhance 
corporate social performance [are achieved] through the board of directors who 
represent various constituency groups” (p. 116). 
 Wang and Dewhirst (1992) argue that similar to the agency and resource 
dependence perspectives, the stakeholder approach considers non-executive directors 
on the board as crucial instruments to a firm’s performance. Such directors serve as 
delegates and guardians of a wide range of stakeholder groups and their role is to 
enhance corporate social performance rather than just to promote the financial 
performance of the firm.  
 Examining the association between the board of directors and stakeholder 
orientations, Wang and Dewhirst (1992) find that boards of directors perceive 
stakeholders distinctly and that stakeholders’ orientations differ between CEO 
directors and non-CEO directors as well as between inside directors and outsiders. 
Moreover, their results were consistent with the call of stakeholder proponents and 
reveal that boards of directors have perceived that their responsibilities include a 
wider group of constituencies than shareholders and that they have moved their 
belief from “the traditional management for stockholders to the management for 
stakeholders” (p.120). Finally, Wang and Dewhirst (1992) find that CEO’s are more 
concerned about issues related to customers and government regulations and less 
concerned about those related to shareholders than non-CEO’s. 
 Unlike agency theory, the stakeholder theory undermines private property 
and agency (Sternberg 1999). It undermines the former through denying owners the 
right to choose how they want to use their property; whether their choice is 
consistent with maximizing their own value or that of stakeholders (Sternberg 1999). 
On the other hand, it undermines agency through denying “the duty that agents owe 
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to principals”, and being that the agent is accountable to all stakeholders means that 
he is effectively accountable to no one (Sternberg 1999, p.32). 
 Despite all the theoretical contributions of the stakeholder theory, it is still 
“incompatible with corporate governance” (Sternberg 1999, p.20). That is because it 
rather destroys than support firm’s conventional accountability which is the 
fundamental concept in corporate governance 8  (Sternberg 1999). Moreover, the 
theory provides no guidance on how to choose among multiple inconsistent and 
competing interests of different stakeholders (Jensen 2002). Which stakeholder 
group to prioritize? Do firms focus on customers who want high quality and low 
prices or employees who want fringe benefits and high salaries? These are some of 
the questions which the stakeholder theory is not able to answer. 
2.5 Resource Dependency Theory 
 From a resource dependency perspective, the organization represents an 
integration of resources with a main goal of achieving a competitive advantage over 
rivals (Reitz 1979). The organization is viewed as an open system influenced by 
factors from the outside environment (Preffer and Salancik 1978). These external 
factors can impact the organizational behaviour, at the time that “managers can act to 
reduce environmental uncertainty and dependence” (Hillman et al. 2009, p.1404).   
According to the seminal study by Preffer and Salancik (1978) on resource 
dependence theory, there are five options for a firm to reduce environmental 
uncertainty, one of which is the board of directors. The board can benefit the firm 
through providing: access to information through counsel and advice, links to 
                                                          
8  Accountability involves an agent who is accountable to his principal for a return. The former 
account to the latter for their practices and use of resources, and a firm and the agents cannot be 
accountable to all stakeholder groups (Sternberg 1999). 
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channels of information from the external environment, access to critical resources 
and legitimacy. 
 Resource dependence theorists have viewed boards as viable entities which 
contribute through inter-organizational relationships to increase coordination with 
other firms, reduce transaction costs, facilitate access to critical resources and 
consequently reduce uncertainty of a firm’s operations (Zahra and Pearce 1989). In 
other words, they theorize that boards of directors supply firms with scarce resources 
such as information, skills and knowledge (Boyd 1990; Hillman and Dalziel 2003), 
and play a crucial role in reducing uncertainty through linking the firm to its outside 
environment (Hillman et al. 2000; Boyd 1990). As Zahra and Pearce stated: “boards 
are important boundary spanners that make timely information available to 
executives” (Zahra and Pearce 1989, p.297). 
 Reviewing the functions that a board of directors is expected to fulfil, 
Johnson et al. (1996) identified three types of roles: control, service and resource 
dependence. They argue that the resource dependence role of the board is illustrated 
in helping the firm acquire resources which are very important for its survival and 
prosperity. Specifically, they have emphasized several board characteristics such as 
board size, percentage of non-executive directors and aspects of interlocks among 
firms from diverse economic sectors, arguing that these characteristics are used as 
facilitators for a firm to gain access to critical resources. 
 Consistent with the agency perspective, the resource dependence role of the 
board supports the need for non-executive directors to sit on the board. The 
percentage of non-executive directors on the board was used by researchers as an 
indicator of this role (Johnson et al. 1996). Such directors are expected to help the 
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firm gain resources for successful operations through their popularity and status in 
their professions and societies (Zahra and Pearce 1989).  
 Classifying directors based on an agency perspective as insiders and outsiders, 
however, is different from a classification based on resource dependence. Arguing 
that this agency classification is considered ineffective from a resource dependence 
point of view, Hillman et al. (2000) categorize directors into insiders, business 
experts, support specialists and community influentials.   
 They define insiders as those who are current or previous employees in the 
firm and are expected to supply the firm with firm-specific information necessary for 
its operation and strategies. 
 With respect to business experts, they are directors who serve in decision 
making positions in other firms, and bring with them their knowledge and experience. 
They can provide the firm with a variety of solutions to its internal issues through 
their experience gained from similar problems that they have faced in other firms 
(Hillman et al. 2000). 
 In congruence with business experts, support specialists bring to the firm 
their knowledge and experience, however, they lack general management skills, and 
their experience is more specialized and is for the purpose of helping management in 
certain areas like law, finance and capital markets.  
 Finally, community influentials are outsiders coming from non-business 
organizations and other community constituencies, providing their knowledge and 
experience to the firm aimed at precluding unintentional conflicts with community 
groups, rather than for gaining competitive advantage over rivals.    
 Another board characteristic used to support the resource dependence role of 
the board is the board size (Johnson et al. 1996). Larger boards are expected to better 
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oversee the CEO and evaluate the performance of the firm than their smaller 
counterparts, because they can provide the firm with wider channels of information 
and are less likely to be dominated by the management.  
 Research suggests that several factors affect board composition and its size, 
among which are environmental uncertainty and financial performance (Johnson et 
al. 1996). Johnson et al. (1996) argue that the resource dependence role would be 
crucial for firms facing unhealthy financial conditions or “trying to emerge from 
bankruptcy”. For instance, research evidence reveals that in comparison to survivor 
firms, bankrupt firms have smaller boards “before and after bankruptcy” and that the 
number of bankrupt firms’ board members decreases in the two-year period before 
bankruptcy. Further, they contend that appointing directors of interdependent 
organizations to the board would be more beneficial to the organization in terms of 
performance than directors who are completely independent as the former provide 
the firm an access to resources which are crucial to its success. 
 In the same vein, resources can be accessed through board interlocks which 
occur when directors serve on the boards of directors of two firms. Board interlocks 
are one of the examples of the resource dependency role that could be discharged by 
the directors on the board (Johnson et al. 1996). For instance, such interlocks of a 
firm’s board with financial institutions will help the firm to gain access to important 
resources such as cash. Interlocks are of two types: direct and indirect (Zahra and 
Pearce 1989). Direct interlock occurs when directors of a firm sit as directors on the 
board of a second firm. Indirect interlock, however, occurs “when directors of two 
different companies serve on the board of a third company, often with the intention 
to coordinate the activities of the firms involved” (Zahra and Pearce 1989, p.297). 
 Zahra and Pearce (1989) argue that although board interlocks were seen 
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theoretically identical to the resource dependence role of the board, a fundamental 
difference exists between the two approaches. That is, board interlocks emphasize 
the firm’s relation or link with its competitors at the time that the resource 
dependence approach extends this link to the general environment of the firm.  
 Although the resource dependence theory assumes that the board plays an 
important resource provision role through interlocking directories, the theory does 
not account for the possibility of infiltration through board interlocks (Mizruchi and 
Stearns 1988; Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Palmer 1983). Mizruchi and Stearns (1988) 
find that “financial institutions may attempt to infiltrate the decision-making 
structures of firms that are experiencing difficulty” (p.206). They suggest that during 
financial crisis periods, financial institutions may attempt to monitor the investments 
of non-financial firms through gaining positions on the latters’ boards. Similarly, 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) note that firms may become infiltrated in that the 
monitoring role that the board is expected to play on behalf of shareholders is rather 
played on behalf of the linked organization. 
 The resource dependence theory is considered a strong theoretical 
underpinning for corporate governance, however, there is still not much research on 
how it can enhance governance practices and frameworks (Zahra and Pearce 1989). 
The theory does not theorize on the role that directors play in linking the firm and its 
environment (Zahra and Pearce 1989). Moreover, it has been subject to criticism that 
it “ignores the dynamics of power associated with board composition and change” 
and that it does not make clear how different environmental settings would impact 
on board characteristics and composition (Zahra and Pearce 1989, p.299). 
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2.6 Institutional Theory 
 After reviewing four sociological conceptions proposed to reflect the 
institutional perspective, Scott (1987) remarks that definitions for the concept of 
institution or institutionalization are diverse and the ways by which they are 
approached are also varied. He notes that institutional theorists have suggested that 
organizational structures are acquired or deliberately chosen “by organizational 
actors” who are expected to adopt these structures “because of mimetic or normative 
mechanisms”. 
 Scott (1987) adopts Selznick (1957)’s argument that institutionalization is a 
process “that happens to the organization over time” and the structure of 
organizations is shaped in response to the characteristics of participants and 
influences from the outside environment (p.16). In the same vein, institutional 
theorists have contended that organizational structures are not only shaped by their 
transactions and technologies but have “directed attention to the importance of 
symbolic aspects of organizations and their environments” (Scott 1987, p.507). They 
raise awareness that organizations are not just production systems, nor do their 
environments represent just “task environments: as stocks of resources, sources of 
information, or loci of competitors and exchange partners” (Scott 1987, p.507). 
 Greenwood and Hinings (1996) examine how organizations change within 
their institutional context. They differentiate between two changes in organizations: 
a convergent change which occurs within the parameters of the existing template and 
radical change which occurs when organizations adopt a template different from the 
one in use. Furthermore, Greenwood and Hinings (1996) hypothesize that 
“organizations are structured in terms of archetypes (templates of organizing), which 
are institutionally derived”, and remark that rather than studying how organizations 
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change, the institutional theory deals with how organizations maintain stability and 
similarity (isomorphism) with other organizations of their field in terms of 
organizational arrangements and structures (p.1028). They identify several reasons 
for the resistance of organizations to radical change. The first main reason is because 
they are normatively embedded in their institutional contexts. This suggests that 
regularized behaviours of organizations are the output of “ideas, values, beliefs that 
originate in the institutional context” (p.1025). In order to survive, organizations 
“must accommodate institutional expectations”, even if these expectations are not 
much related to performance achievements. This view is consistent with Powell and 
DiMaggio (1983) who argue that changes occur in organizations in response to 
processes that increase similarity rather than efficiency. Second, Greenwood and 
Hinings (1996) pose that for any radical change to occur in an organization, its 
incidence must “vary across institutional sectors” and specifically “in the extents to 
which sectors are tightly coupled and insulated from ideas practised in other sectors” 
(p.1023). Finally, they suggest that institutional changes may vary across sectors as 
“organizations vary in their internal organizational dynamics” (p.1023).  
 Powell and DiMaggio (1983) provide a time pace for changes to occur within 
organizations. They argue that although organizations may show diversity in their 
structures and forms at their early stages of their lifecycle, these forms tend to be 
more homogeneous in the long-run. This is because organizational decision makers 
build in their field an environment that limits their ability to change existing “goals 
or develop new practices” in later years. Powell and DiMaggio (1983) use the term 
‘isomorphism’ for this homogeneous process that took place in the long-run of an 
organization’s lifecycle, identifying two corresponding types: competitive 
isomorphism which focuses on “market competition, niche change and fitness 
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measures”, supplemented by institutional isomorphism which extends the 
competitive view from customers and resources to “political power and institutional 
legitimacy”. According to Powell and DiMaggio (1983), the institutional 
isomorphism is considered “a useful tool for understanding the politics and 
ceremony that pervade much modern organizational life” (p.150). 
 Powell and DiMaggio (1983) theorize that isomorphic change may occur 
through three processes: coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism and normative 
isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism stems from the effects of politics and the 
legitimacy problem. Organizations may face pressures (formal or informal) either 
from other organizations in their field or from cultural expectations in the 
environment within which they operate. For instance, changes may occur in response 
to mandates from governments: adoption of “new pollution control technologies to 
conform to environmental regulations” or maintaining accounts by non-profit 
organizations “in order to meet tax law requirements” (p.150). Mimetic isomorphism 
is an output of “standard responses to uncertainty”. So organizations may tend to 
adopt other organizations’ structures and forms when they do not possess a good 
understanding of their technologies or when their goals are obscure. As such, 
institutions tend to shape themselves based on similar institutions that they consider 
more legitimate and prosperous. This adoption could be done either through 
employee transfer or by the help of consulting firms. Finally, normative 
isomorphism deals with professionalism. Professionals within organizations tend to 
be similar to their counterparts in other organizations. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) 
theorize that organizational behaviours not only reflect responses to pressures from 
the market, but also to pressures from professions where “templates for organizing” 
are provided by the institutional context leading organizations “to adopt the same 
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organizational form”. Powell and DiMaggio (1983) articulate that similar to 
organizations, professions are also subject to coercive and mimetic pressures. For 
instance, the accounting profession has “mimicked the law and adopted the 
partnership organizational form” providing a professional view of independence and 
autonomy (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). Powell and DiMaggio (1983) remark that 
filtering personnel is considered an important process for promoting normative 
isomorphism. This could be done through recruiting staff from organizations 
working in the same industry or asking for skill-level requirements for specific jobs. 
Unlike the agency theory, which suggests that discretionary actions of management 
are curbed by the oversight roles of the board of directors in general and the audit 
committee in particular, the institutional theory presumes that the actions are 
constrained by the systematic behaviour of organizations (Fogarty and Rogers 2005). 
Using an institutional perspective, Spira (1999) adopts the “translation” concept 
from the actor-network theory, and argues that the ritualistic activities of audit 
committees help enhance the ceremony of the financial reporting process. 
Interestingly, she notes that such ceremonial activities give the audit committee a 
protection reliant upon image, leading to an independent reporting by the external 
auditor free from management intervention. 
 In the same vein, Cohen et al. (2008) consider the institutional environment 
and the ceremonial structures of organizations and articulate that through 
institutional isomorphism organizations tend to adapt to other organizations in their 
institutional context and thus similarity increases over time. They contend that under 
the institutional theory and in obscure environments audit committees may perform 
their roles and responsibilities ceremonially and symbolically. For instance, they 
argue that the role assigned to the audit committee (instead of management) to 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
42 
 
appoint or remove the external auditor is a ceremonial role that is expected to 
improve the independent and objective image of the relationship between the auditor 
and the client. Similarly, companies may seek for independent directors in their 
boards to improve their objectivity image and ranking instead of doing that which 
best fits their operations and industry. Yet, the audit committee, as part of the board 
of directors and the whole organization, will tend throughout the lifecycle of the 
organization to be more similar to other audit committees within the same 
institutional context. 
 As far as this study is concerned, the perspectives of isomorphism and 
ceremonial behaviours are not valid for answering the research questions. That is 
because “[o]rganizations whose structures become isomorphic with the myths of the 
institutional environment – in contrast with those primarily structured by demands of 
technical production and exchange – decrease internal coordination and control in 
order to maintain legitimacy” (Meyer and Rowan 1977, p.340). This is not the case 
in this study which suggests that internal governance mechanisms enhance internal 
coordination and control to ensure high quality financial reporting, and a transparent 
relationship between the firm’s management and the external auditors. 
2.7 Multi-theoretical Approach 
 The most prevalent theory in the literature of corporate governance is the 
agency theory (Beattie et al. 2012), however, a growing strand of research has raised 
concerns about the use of this theory as a sole underpinning for governance 
(Christopher 2010). Eisenhardt (1989) argues that the agency theory should be used 
with complementary theories. She stated that agency theory is subject to the criticism 
that it “presents a partial view of the world that, although it is valid, also ignores a 
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good bit of the complexity of organizations” (p.71). Similarly, Christopher (2010) 
contends that agency theory does not capture the broader environmental affecting 
forces that have an impact on organizations. Clarke (2005) criticizes agency theory 
stating that it only tackles the economic relation between management and 
shareholders and thus fails to sufficiently encompass all the main factors influencing 
corporate governance good practices as well as the wider range of corporate 
relationships’ complexities that take place under different environmental market 
changes. The environmental influencing forces that might affect the organization 
include: legal issues, social issues, behavioural issues, ethical issues, regulatory 
issues and human resource issues (Christopher 2010). These forces are arguably 
“external and internal forces not normally captured in the contractual obligations 
between management and shareholders in an agency-oriented paradigm” 
(Christopher 2010, p.686).  
 To reach what is called an “extended governance paradigm”, Christopher 
(2010) argues that the agency-oriented model should be augmented through 
including two things. First, researchers should consider the wider environmental 
forces affecting firm’s operations and recognize “a wider set of contractual 
arrangements between management, the shareholders and an extended stakeholder 
base” (Christopher 2010, p.686). Second, the governance paradigm should be 
considered as “being a cycle that extends from the directional and monitoring role of 
the board, to the management and operational role of the chief executive officer and 
his management team, and to the assurance role of the external and internal auditor” 
(Christopher 2010, p.686). 
 In the same vein, Eisenhardt (1989) addresses the criticism of agency theory 
and remarks that researchers should use a multi-theoretical approach to capture the 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
44 
 
broader environmental forces that would impact on an organization. The need for 
considering such forces arises from “the increased sophistication and complexity of 
operations of organizations” (Christopher 2010, p.693). 
 Few studies have discussed the applicability of a multi-theoretical approach 
in the field of corporate governance. For instance, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) 
combines resource dependence and agency theories in an attempt to provide a better 
interpretation of how directors function in governance. They argue that theoretically 
combining agency and resource dependence theories in an integrative approach is 
important in order to capture the practical roles of the board in terms of monitoring 
and providing resources. This implies that using either of the theories separately 
would not provide a complete understanding of a board’s practices and its effective 
monitoring role. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) further contend that an integrative 
approach of these two theories would “help overcome a current myopia” within the 
literature of the two theories, where researchers have tackled one theory 
(agency/resource dependence) at the expense of the other in explaining the functions 
(monitoring/providing resources) of the board (p.383). Similarly, Lynall et al. (2003) 
integrate the resource dependence, agency, institutional and power theories in a 
multi-theoretical view to explain how board’s composition is likely to be shaped 
throughout the lifecycle stages of organizations. Young and Thyil (2008) propose a 
holistic model of governance which is able to incorporate internal along with other 
environmental factors (ethical, behavioural, legal, corporate strategic, sociological 
etc.) in an attempt to provide an understanding and explanation of the occurrence of 
certain behaviours and practices. Above all, Christopher (2010) proposes a multi-
theoretical approach that encompasses in addition to the economic-based agency 
theory, the three management-based theories: resource dependence, stakeholder and 
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stewardship. Whilst retaining agency theory as the main theory, he suggests that any 
shortcoming of one of the theories “can be complemented with another theory or 
group of theories” (Christopher 2010, p.690). 
 By the same token, some studies have suggested the integration of 
management-based theories with the agency theory to overcome the limitation of 
using one theoretical framework (Christopher 2010).  
 For instance, some have proposed integrating agency and stakeholder 
theories. Hill and Jones (1992) suggest that the agency theory could be 
reconceptualised from a nexus of contracts between an agent and a principal to a 
wider nexus between stakeholders. Others suggest that the agency theory should be 
“subsumed within a general stakeholder model of the firm” (Culpan and Trussel 
2005, p.65). Examining the failure of Enron, Culpan and Trussel (2005) argue that 
both of the agency and stakeholder theories are valid theoretical underpinnings for 
this debacle. Specifically, they argue that in the case of Enron, agency theory would 
only be able to explain the opportunistic behaviours of managers and the 
consequences of such behaviours on shareholders; however, it has nothing to do with 
addressing the consequences for stakeholders and how their interests could be 
protected. In other words, agency theory is not able to provide a complete 
understanding of the Enron debacle as its main focus is on the agent-principal 
relationship between managers and shareholders. Culpan and Trussel (2005) added 
that the importance of using stakeholder theory along with agency theory, is because 
of the fact that more constituents than only managers and shareholders have either 
effected or been affected by the failure of Enron. For instance, Arthur Andersen, the 
external auditor of Enron, is one of the stakeholders of the firm and had “allegedly 
colluded with Enron officials and destroyed some financial documents related to its 
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audit” (Fernando 2009, p.230). On the other hand, the management of Enron have 
not only hurt the interests of shareholders but also those of other stakeholders 
comprising employees, creditors, competitors, etc. (Culpan and Trussel 2005). 
 Cohen et al. (2008) suggest the integration of agency and institutional 
theories contending that a board and its committees might be fulfilling their 
regulatory requirements of monitoring (agency perspective), and “are merely 
fulfilling symbolic roles” (institutional perspective) (p.193). They argue that using 
the agency theory alone may not reflect the true and effective role that audit 
committees may play in the oversight process, as its perspective focuses on the 
outward form of the board and audit committee, such as independence, number of 
meetings, number of financial experts, etc. Institutional theory, however, “suggests 
that it is insufficient to focus on isolated audit committee or board surface 
characteristics in determining the driving factors that affect reporting quality. Rather, 
it is also necessary to consider the nature of the relationship between management 
and other corporate governance players” (p.195).  
 In the same vein, Hillman et al. (2000) argue that agency and resource 
dependence theories must be examined simultaneously for better understanding of 
the composition of boards and role of directors. Similarly, Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) articulate that using any of these theories alone is insufficient and represents a 
theoretical weakness. They argue that agency theory focuses on the purposes of the 
board and its committees for monitoring without taking into consideration their 
capability of doing so. As such they contend that the effective monitoring role of the 
board will not be fully understood if their ability to monitor is not taken in 
consideration.  
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 In essence, there are a limited number of studies which have examined the 
integration of the theories of corporate governance, and the validity of the integration 
propositions suggested by these studies even need to be determined through testing 
real life organizational settings (Christopher 2010). 
2.8 Conclusion 
 Several theories have been used in the literature of corporate governance. 
What is important is to know when a certain theory should be used and whether it 
needs to be complemented with any other theory. Lynall et al. (2003) theorize that 
what matters, rather than choosing one of the theoretical approaches over another, is 
the applicability of each of the approaches given the phenomena of interest.  
As far as this study is concerned, there are four main theoretical frameworks which 
have been used in the relevant literature: agency, stakeholder, resource dependence, 
and institutional. This is in addition to a multi-theoretical approach which has been 
lately introduced to capture the wider complexities in organizations. The agency 
theory has been the main theory applied in corporate governance research (Beattie et 
al. 2012), because its “model leads to a higher degree of mathematical tractability 
than do the competing theoretical perspectives” (Cohen et al. 2008, p.188).  
 Unlike agency theory which suggests that all of a manager’s decisions must 
align with the sole objective of the firm of maximizing shareholders wealth, the 
stakeholder theory presumes the alignment of managers’ decisions with all the 
interests of different stakeholder groups. In other words, the stakeholder perspective 
suggests that managers act as fiduciaries for “the interests of all of a firm’s 
stakeholders” trying to address them equally (Marcoux 2003, p.2). However, the 
stakeholder theory is unable to achieve this objective of balancing the benefits of all 
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its stakeholders because different stakeholders have different interests by which what 
benefits a certain group may harm the other (Sternberg 1999). For instance, 
increasing the benefits for employees through higher salaries may harm customers 
who will be paying higher prices. As such this theory provides no guidance on how 
to balance conflicting interests and which benefits are to be preferred (Sternberg 
1999). Moreover, it is considered an unrealistic approach, as it does not set a single-
valued objective for managers to attain and leaves for the latter the freedom “to 
exercise their own preferences in spending the firm’s resources” (Jensen 2002, 
p.237). Finally, the stakeholder theory does not account for the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviours by managers who may “use stakeholder claims as a 
smokescreen to obscure what is really their inability to deliver value to the 
company’s shareholders” (Healy 2003, p.24). 
 Similar to the stakeholder theory, resource dependence theory also does not 
account for the possibility of managerial opportunistic behaviours to mislead 
shareholders. However, it is narrowly focused on the boundary spanner role of the 
board of directors who provide management with timely information to enhance 
performance. Moreover, resource dependence theorists have been subject to criticism 
that they have mainly emphasized how the board of directors could facilitate “the 
provision of resources to the firm” without taking into account the incentives of the 
directors themselves (Hillman and Dalziel 2003, p.384).  
 In the same vein, the institutional theory does not account for the self-serving 
behaviour of managers and their deliberate intentions of hiding the real performance 
of the firm. It rather deals with the social and political factors that may affect the 
organization within its institutional context. Neither is the relationship between 
management and the external auditors delineated by these factors, nor are the 
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discretionary actions of management constrained by the systematic behaviour of 
organizations. 
 Recently, a limited number of studies have suggested a multi-theoretical 
approach. More research is needed in this area to provide a clear view of the 
interrelationships of theories and how they might complement each other. The 
proposed integrative models are simplified and might not be applicable in real life 
situations where “there might well be complexities that could prevent a clear 
alignment of the complementary effects” (Christopher 2010, p.693). 
 This study mainly draws on agency theory to address the research questions 
and test whether an association exists between corporate governance mechanisms on 
the one hand and financial reporting quality and auditor remuneration on the other. 
In contrast to all alternative theories, the agency theory provides better justification 
of managers’ incentives to manage earnings and better explanation of the 
relationship between auditors and their clients. Figure 2.1 illustrates the agency 
perspective of the oversight role of the board and the audit committee which is 
adopted in this study. Earnings management is considered an agency cost. Given the 
concerns raised about misleading revenue recognition practices during the sample 
period of this study, earnings are considered to be managed opportunistically to hide 
poor performance and prevent shareholders from making informed decisions. As 
such, vigilant oversight from the board of directors in general and the audit 
committee in particular will enhance the integrity of financial statements, ensure 
reliable financial reporting judgements and proper revenue recognition and 
disclosure, and in turn reduce agency costs. On the other hand, simultaneous 
provision of audit services and non-audit services is more likely to cause moral 
hazard agency conflicts (Quick et al. 2013), and impair the objectivity and 
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independence of the external auditors. An attentive oversight from the board and the 
audit committee is also expected to reduce agency conflicts through monitoring the 
effectiveness of the audit process while taking into account the provision of non-
audit services by the audit firm and its impact on auditors’ independence. 
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Figure 2.1: An Agency Perspective of the Oversight Roles of Internal 
Governance Mechanisms 
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Chapter 3 
Earnings Management 
3.1 Introduction  
 After setting up the theoretical framework, and before reviewing the 
literature on the association between earnings management and corporate 
governance, it is necessary to understand what we mean by earnings management 
and why firms engage in such practices. There have been several definitions for 
earnings management. The literature has identified different incentives to manipulate 
earnings, and various techniques have been developed to detect earnings 
management. This chapter provides a general overview of earnings management and 
demonstrates various incentives for managing earnings. Then, alternative techniques 
for detecting earnings management are critically discussed with reasoned 
justification on the adoption or rejection of each technique.  
3.2 Overview of Earnings Management 
 One of the main roles of financial reports is to convey information about a 
firm’s financial position and performance to owners and stakeholders. To fulfil this 
role, and given their knowledge about the firm and its operations, managers are 
given the flexibility to select estimates, disclosures and reporting methods which (as 
they believe) best reflect the business economics of the firm and potentially increase 
the value of the financial information communicated. However, from an agency 
perspective, divergence in interests between managers and shareholders along with 
imperfect auditing may create opportunities for managers to engage in earnings 
management practices through opportunistically choosing estimates and reporting 
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methods that do not reflect the economic reality of the business operations (Healy 
and Wahlen 1999).  
 Loosely speaking, there are two perspectives of earnings management that 
have been examined in the earnings management literature: information and 
opportunistic. The information perspective views accounting discretion as beneficial 
for investors and holds when managers use accounting discretion to either “smooth 
reported earnings relative to the underlying cash flows” (Dechow and Skinner 2000, 
p.238), or “reveal to investors their private expectations about the firm’s future cash 
flows” (Beneish 2001, p.5). Specifically, managers may use their accounting 
discretion to increase the informative-ness of financial reports through credibly 
estimating net receivables and providing reliable forecasts of cash collections (Healy 
and Wahlen 1999). On the other hand, the opportunistic perspective holds when 
managers use accounting discretion to mislead shareholders (Beneish 2001), through 
choosing accrual decisions that result in excessive smoothing (Dechow and Skinner 
2000). 
 Studies tackling these two perspectives have been conducted since the 1970s, 
and are generally categorized into two main eras (Beneish 2001). In the first era 
between the 1970s and early 1980s, studies were more focused on the information 
perspective where they “provided evidence consistent with managers’ incentives to 
choose beneficial ways of reporting earnings in regulatory and contractual contexts” 
(Beneish 2001, p.3). However, in the second era starting from the mid-1980s, 
researchers’ emphasis has been more focused on the opportunistic perspective and 
the investigation of earnings manipulation through accruals. Beneish (2001) provides 
several reasons for this “explosive growth” in the accrual-based earnings 
management literature. He claims that the great emphasis on accruals is because the 
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latter are the main product of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (hereafter 
GAAP), and that earnings are more likely to be manipulated through accruals than 
through cash flows. Moreover, he argues that if earnings management occurs 
through an unobservable accrual, it is less likely to be unravelled by investors. To 
date, several regression accrual models have been developed and modified in an 
attempt to improve the power of these models in detecting earnings management9.    
 Whether managers’ discretion is beneficial or opportunistic depends on 
managerial intent. For example, accrual decisions which fall within GAAP “are 
considered to be earnings management if they are used [with intent] to obscure or 
mask true economic performance” (Dechow and Skinner 2000, p.240). The vast 
majority of research done on earnings management has predicated their arguments 
and conclusions on the opportunistic perspective (Beneish 2001), especially in the 
aftermath of several high-profile earnings management scandals such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Tyco and Global Crossing. 
3.2.1 Definition 
 The literature has not revealed a general agreement on a single definition of 
earnings management; however, the definitions provided “differ depending on the 
instruments of manipulation, on the purpose of the earnings management behaviour 
and the timing of earnings management” (Goncharov 2005, p.20). The most 
commonly used definitions in the literature are those provided by Schipper (1989) 
and Healy and Wahlen (1999) respectively:  
 [Earnings management is] a purposeful intervention in the external 
financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private 
gain (as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of 
the process)…A minor extension to the definition would encompass 
                                                          
9 The main models are discussed in the detection of earnings management section. 
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“real” earnings management, accomplished by timing investment or 
financing decisions to alter reported earnings or some subset to it 
(Schipper 1989, p.92). 
 
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” (Healy and 
Wahlen 1999, p.368). 
 Schipper (1989) notes that her definition focuses on the external reporting 
role and that it does not include managerial accounting activities that could be used 
to change or affect GAAP. Moreover, she adds that her definition views accounting 
numbers as general information and does not depend on any concept or type of 
earnings.  
 Unlike the definition of Healy and Wahlen (1999), Schipper (1989)’s 
definition provides the possibility of earnings management to occur through real 
activities management. However, both of the definitions refer to an intervention in 
the financial reporting process which could be facilitated through the use of 
managers’ judgements.   
 Judgment in financial reporting refers to the opportunistic use of estimates 
and accounting choices that are adopted by managers “to mislead stakeholders (or 
some class of stakeholders) about the underlying economic performance of the 
firm”10, rather than to provide informative reports and credible signals about the 
financial performance of the firm (Healy and Wahlen 1999, p.369).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Stakeholders are misled through information asymmetry and manager’s favourable access to 
information. 
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Table 3.1 An Overview of Earnings Management Methods11 
Earnings 
management type 
Specific method Example 
Accounting 
decisions: Within-
GAAP earnings 
management. 
Exploiting the 
available flexibility 
within GAAP 
- LIFO vs. FIFO 
- Accelerated vs. straight line 
depreciation. 
- Change in useful life of asset 
- Recording/taking back 
provisions 
Accounting 
decisions: Out-of-
GAAP earnings 
management 
Not applying/violating 
GAAP 
- Early recognition of revenue 
(for example, before goods are 
shipped) 
Real transactions Managing earnings by 
managing real 
transactions 
- Timing of asset disposals, R&D 
and maintenance expenses, 
purchases of inventory (in the 
case of application of LIFO) 
 
 Table 3.1 presents the types of earnings management along with methods and 
examples about how they are practised. Through within-GAAP earnings 
management, several accounts, including non-current assets, inventory, receivables, 
etc. could be managed by managers’ choice of estimates and accounting methods. 
For instance, estimates are required to be taken for the useful life and salvage value 
of non-current assets. Similarly, the use of estimates involves bad debt expenses and 
asset impairment losses. In the same vein, judgement is required in choosing from 
among accounting methods to report for depreciation (straight line or accelerated), 
and inventory valuation methods (LIFO, FIFO, weighted-average). For example, 
during inflationary periods, valuing inventory under LIFO will result in less reported 
earnings than when they are valued under FIFO. Similarly, switching between 
                                                          
11 Adopted from (Goncharov 2005, p.21). 
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depreciation methods can result in an increase or decrease in reported earnings12 
(Goncharov 2005). 
 Extreme forms of earnings management could be also practised through out-
of-GAAP activities or fraudulent reporting (Dechow and Skinner 2000). Financial 
fraud is “the intentional, deliberate, misstatement or omission of material facts, or 
accounting data, which is misleading and, when considered with all the information 
made available, would cause the reader to change or alter his or her judgment or 
decision” (Dechow and Skinner 2000, p.238). Fraud activities are therefore 
deliberate manipulations of accounting figures affecting reported earnings. These 
activities include recording unrealized and fictitious sales, backdating sales invoices, 
and “overstating inventory by recording fictitious inventory” (Dechow and Skinner 
2000, p.239). 
 Finally, managers can manage real activities to achieve a certain reported 
earnings target. Rather than affecting accruals, real activities affect cash flows and 
encompass both operating and investing decisions. Operating decisions might be 
through the timing of advertising costs, maintenance costs and product shipments to 
customers, whilst investing decisions are through the timing of sale of non-current 
assets “and the timing of investing or disinvesting in research and development” 
(Goncharov 2005, p.23). The conventional perspective in the earnings management 
literature is that accrual-based earnings management is more prevalent than its real 
activities counterpart as the latter decisions are more costly (Goncharov 2005), and 
more likely to be unravelled by auditors (Beneish 2001). 
 Dechow and Skinner (2000) contend that academics perceive earnings 
management differently to practitioners and regulators. They argue that the latter 
                                                          
12 In first periods, lower depreciation expenses are reported under the straight-line depreciation 
method than under its accelerated counterpart. 
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have more aggressive views of earnings management. In order to know whether 
firms’ managers are engaged in earnings management, Dechow and Skinner (2000) 
argue that the emphasis should be on managerial incentives. Similarly, Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) articulate that in order to identify whether a firm is managing 
earnings, “researchers first have to estimate earnings before the effects of earnings 
management” (p.370). Describing this as a difficult task, Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
suggest a common approach where researchers should first identify managers’ 
incentives and motivations to manage earnings and then “test whether patterns of 
unexpected accruals (or accounting choices) are consistent with these incentives” 
(p.370). The following sections tackle the motivations for earnings management 
followed by the most prevalent techniques used in the literature for detecting 
earnings management. 
3.3 Motivations for Earnings Management 
 Healy and Wahlen (1999) identify three main incentives for earnings 
management. These incentives are categorized into: Capital market, Contracting and 
Regulatory. 
3.3.1 Capital Market Incentives 
 Healy and Wahlen (1999) argue that the wide usage of accounting figures by 
investors and analysts for stock valuation can create incentives for managers to 
manage earnings “in an attempt to influence short-term stock price performance” 
(p.371). Several studies reveal that earnings could be manipulated for stock market 
purposes (e.g., Teoh et al. 1998; Aharony et al. 2010; Burgstahler and Eames 2006). 
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 For instance, Teoh et al. (1998) argue that managers of firms issuing initial 
public offerings (hereafter IPOs) tend to make discretionary accrual choices to report 
high earnings and raise the selling price of their firm’s share. Further, they argue that 
IPO firms have incentives to manage earnings before and after IPOs. In the pre-IPO 
period, firms tend to borrow high reported earnings “from either the past or the 
future” in an attempt to achieve a higher offering price. In the post-IPO period, 
however, they tend to report high earnings to maintain a high price of the share in the 
market. There is also another reason that may trigger firms to manage earnings in the 
post-IPO period. Given the unusual legal and regulatory scrutiny activities which 
take place in the post-IPO period, issuers who aggressively manipulate earnings prior 
to IPOs tend also to “manage their first post-IPO earnings” as the immediate reversal 
of accruals may clearly signal earnings management practices and prompt lawsuits 
against management and the firm (Teoh et al. 1998, p.1936). Teoh et al. (1998) 
conclude that issuers of IPOs are more likely to have higher discretionary current 
accruals around the issue than non-issuers. 
 Recently, Aharony et al. (2010) used a sample of 185 IPO Chinese firms 
issuing shares on the Shanghai Stock of Exchange for the period between 1999 and 
2001. Unlike the majority of studies that have examined discretionary accruals as a 
proxy for earnings management, Aharony et al. (2010) investigate related party 
transactions (purchases and sales of goods and services) as an earnings management 
instrument during the IPO process. They find that in the pre-IPO period, firms may 
use related party sales opportunistically to manipulate earnings upwards. As such, 
they suggest that firms may tend to boost earnings in the pre-IPO period with the 
intention of grasping “opportunities for tunnelling in the post-IPO period” (p.24). 
That is, in the post-IPO period, minority shareholders who have bought in at the IPO 
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will be exploited through not repaying back their debts, which are “in the form of 
related party corporate loans”, to the newly established IPO firms. 
 In the same vein, existing research finds evidence that firms may engage in 
earnings management practices to meet management or financial analysts’ 
expectations. Burgstahler and Eames (2006) contend that firms’ managers may tend 
to manage earnings to avoid reporting negative earnings surprises. Managers would 
exercise such practices through reporting higher earnings than those forecast by 
analysts. The results of Burgstahler and Eames (2006) are consistent with this 
argument and find that firms may engage in both “upward management of reported 
earnings and downward management of analysts’ forecasts to achieve zero and small 
positive earnings surprises” (p.633). They suggest the presence of at least two 
reasons for beating analyst forecasts and reporting positive earnings surprises. The 
first reason is because of the incremental benefits which may result from exceeding 
forecasts. Second, due to the uncertainty of earnings outcomes, firms may aim at 
achieving positive earnings surprises to mitigate the risk of reporting negative ones. 
Finally, Burgstahler and Eames (2006) conclude that components of both 
discretionary accruals (bookkeeping activities) and cash flows (real operating 
activities) could be used to manage earnings for the purpose of achieving zero 
earnings surprises.  
 Roychowdhury (2006) provides evidence consistent with that provided by 
Burgstahler and Eames (2006). Arguing that meeting earnings targets may create 
incentives for managers to manage earnings through real activities manipulations13, 
Roychowdhury (2006) finds that firms may engage in real activities earnings 
management, through price discounts, overproduction, and discretionary 
                                                          
13 “Real activities manipulation is defined as management actions that deviate from normal business 
practices, undertaken with the primary objective of meeting certain earnings thresholds” 
(Roychowdhury 2006, p.336). 
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expenditures, to avoid reporting negative earnings surprises and meet zero earnings 
and annual analyst forecasts14. He suggests that although providing sales discounts 
and reducing discretionary expenditures could be optimal choices in certain 
circumstances, the extensive engagement in such activities “with the objective of 
meeting/beating an earnings target” is considered to be real activities manipulation 
(p.337). 
3.3.2 Contracting Incentives 
 It has been argued that managers who receive earnings-based bonuses may 
make accounting choices to boost income with the intention of increasing their 
payoff. This argument suggests that managers’ endeavours to meet bonus earning 
targets incentivize them to engage in income-increasing earnings management. 
However, Healy (1985) theorizes that if earnings are too low that they cannot reach 
the target, no matter what the accounting choices, managers will also have incentives 
to “take a bath” and aim to achieve future earnings’ targets. This implies that 
managers may engage in income-decreasing earnings management and further 
decrease current earnings in an attempt to meet or beat future targets. In other words, 
if managers found that bonuses will not be awarded because earnings do not exceed 
the lower bound, they may have incentives to take income-decreasing discretionary 
choices so that they can maximize their expected future awards by deferring current 
earnings. 
 In the same vein, share ownership and stock-based compensations are some 
of the tools used to help align the incentives of managers with those of shareholders. 
However, some have argued that such tools may also serve as incentives for 
                                                          
14 Price discounts and overproduction are managed for a temporary increase in revenues and for 
reporting lower cost of sales respectively. 
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managers to manage earnings. For instance, Cheng and Warfield (2005) examine the 
association between earnings management and managers’ equity incentives 
emerging from stock ownership and stock-based compensation. In contrast to agency 
theory proponents who argue that equity incentives could help align managers’ 
incentives with those of shareholders and lead to a reduction in agency costs, Cheng 
and Warfield (2005) contend that equity incentives might also prompt managers “to 
increase the short-term stock price through earnings management” (p.442). 
Specifically, they evince that managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings and 
increase short-term stock price arise from their attempt to diversify the increased risk 
of stock-based compensation and ownership. Further, they stated that for risk 
diversification reasons, managers tend to sell their own shares. As their wealth will 
become more dependent on the short-term price of stock, they tend to use their 
discretion to manipulate earnings and sustain a high short-term stock price. As a 
result, and consistent with their hypothesis, Cheng and Warfield (2005) find that 
equity incentives (ownership and stock-based compensations) are valid incentives 
for earnings management, and that managers can benefit from managing earnings 
through increasing the short-term price of shares they are willing to sell. 
 Similarly, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) articulate that large options 
packages may also increase managers’ incentives to manage firm’s reported earnings. 
Given the significant increase in accruals along with the increased exposure of “CEO 
wealth to firm stock prices” during the period 1980 to 2000, they examine whether 
the increase in accruals is one of the earnings management mechanisms used by 
CEOs to boost their stock-based compensation. Trying to support their argument, 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) provide examples about several firms like Enron, 
Tyco, Waste Management, and Xerox which have evidenced inflated earnings along 
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with significant increase in share sales and options exercises at the same time. 
During the 1990s, Xerox was one of the firms whose managers were found to have 
managed reported earnings and to have exercised large quantities of stock options 
and sold large quantities of shares. In 2002, Xerox was forced by the SEC to restate 
reported earnings for the period between 1997 and 2001 by reducing “revenues by 
$2.1 billion” and “net income by $1.4 billion” (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006). 
During the same period, Xerox’s CEO exercised over $20 million of options “almost 
three times the value of options exercised over the prior five years” (Bergstresser and 
Philippon 2006, p.513). The results of Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) reveal that 
equity incentives are positively related to abnormal accruals and that high accrual 
years evidence the exercise of large quantities of options by CEOs as well as the sale 
of large numbers of shares.  
 Lending contracts are another type of contractual incentive. Here income-
increasing earnings management could be practised either before or after debt is 
granted. In the first case, firms exercise such type of earnings management to 
facilitate financing; however, after debt is granted companies may engage in income-
increasing earnings management to avoid debt covenant violations (Goncharov 
2005). For instance, Sweeney (1994) examines the association between “managers’ 
accounting responses” and debt covenant violations. She finds that as firms come 
closer to debt default, their managers may use the accounting flexibility given to 
them to boost earnings. Her result is consistent with the debt hypothesis conjecturing 
that: “Ceteris paribus, the larger a firm’s debt-equity ratio, the more likely the firm’s 
manager is to select income-increasing accounting procedures” (Sweeney 1994, 
pp.281-282). 
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3.3.3 Regulatory Incentives 
 Several studies have provided evidence that firms tend to manipulate their 
reported earnings in an attempt to influence the decision making process by 
regulators (e.g., Jones 1991; Key 1997; Magnan et al. 1999). Results of these studies 
were consistent with the political cost hypothesis. Based on the political cost theory, 
firms subject to significant wealth transfers during a political process are expected to 
make accounting choices or use accounting procedures that mitigate the transfer 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  
 Jones (1991) examines whether benefits from import relief would create 
incentives for relevant firms to manipulate earnings downwards during “import relief 
investigations by the United States International Trade Commission” (p.193). As 
managers engage in the manipulation of several accruals to decrease reported 
earnings, she uses the discretionary component of total accruals, instead of single 
ones, to detect earnings management. Consistent with her argument, Jones (1991) 
finds that the use of accounting numbers (profitability) in import relief determination 
motivates managers to manipulate earnings to obtain or even increase such relief.  
 In the same vein, Key (1997) examines the impact of political costs on firms’ 
accounting choices in the cable television industry during a period of political 
scrutiny. Using discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management, Key 
(1997) finds that managers have incentives to engage in earnings management 
practices to reduce the impact of political scrutiny and industry re-regulation. 
Specifically, the results reveal the existence of income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals during the period of political scrutiny (1989-1990). She further finds that 
firms that are expected to be more influenced by the proposed regulations have 
greater levels of income-decreasing earnings management. 
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 Magnan et al. (1999) examine whether “Canadian firms lodging antidumping 
complaints against foreign competitors” engage in income-decreasing earnings 
management “to obtain favourable rulings from the Canadian External Trade 
Tribunal” (p.160). The financial condition presented in the financial statement of the 
plaintiff is one of the factors that the tribunal considers when evaluating if foreign 
competition is causing harm to domestic producers (Magnan et al. 1999). As such, 
Magnan et al. (1999) argue that firms which have launched antidumping complaints 
have incentives to practise income-decreasing earnings management during the 
period of investigation. The results of Magnan et al. (1999) were consistent with 
their argument and reveal that Canadian firms manipulated their reported earnings 
downward by a considerable amount of 6.3% of lagged assets throughout the year of 
investigation by the tribunal. 
 In a more recent study, Garrod et al. (2007) examine how political costs can 
create incentives for managers to manage earnings. Specifically, they use a sample of 
25,740 Slovenian private firms for the year 2002 and argue that firms may adopt 
accounting choices and procedures that will delay their payment of corporate tax. 
The results of Garrod et al. (2007) reveal that profitable firms tend to manage 
earnings downwards to reduce, but not completely eliminate, present-period tax 
obligations.  
 Most recently, Cheng et al. (2011) examine the association between earnings 
management and CEO’s equity incentives in the banking regulated industry. They 
provide evidence that regulatory intervention is more likely to motivate, rather than 
reduce, earnings management emerging from equity incentives. Although higher 
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regulatory intervention is expected to curb earnings management15, Cheng et al. 
(2011) argue that such intervention may also create an incentive for managers to 
manipulate earnings. They contend that that regulatory intervention could be costly 
to managers and could result in a decrease in compensation, decrease in the value of 
stock ownership, or even job loss. To avoid such costs, and avoid regulatory 
intervention, incentives for managers are created to manipulate earnings or capital. 
The results of Cheng et al. (2011) reveal that upward earnings management 
emerging from equity incentives is more likely to be practised by managers of banks 
with high regulatory intervention. 
3.4 Detection of Earnings Management  
 Reported earnings could be managed through one or both of their accruals 
and cash flow components (Goncharov 2005). In general, researchers have used two 
main statistical approaches for detecting earnings management, namely, cash flow 
models and accrual models (Goncharov 2005). Figure 3.1 presents these two 
approaches along with a classification of the most common earnings quality 
measures in the literature of earnings management. Cash flow models are used to 
detect cash flow manipulations resulting from operational and investing decisions. 
Accrual models are classified into aggregate and specific accrual approaches and are 
used to detect the accrual portion of earnings which is subject to discretion. Accrual 
models are to be used to detect irregularities when the research question is related to 
the correct application of an accounting policy16(Goncharov 2005). 
  
                                                          
15 Earnings management is more likely to be detected when there is monitory intervention from 
regulators. 
16 This is the case in this study where a specific accrual model (discretionary revenues) is used to 
detect expected misleading revenue recognition practices. 
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Figure 3.1 Earnings Management Statistical Models 
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This section critically discusses the two categories of models illustrated in 
Figure 3.1 and justifies the study’s adoption or rejection of each of the models’ 
relevant earnings proxies. 
3.4.1 Cash Flow Models 
 Healy and Wahlen (1999) and Dechow and Skinner (2000) speculate that 
earnings management could also be practised through operational and investing 
decisions rather than just via accounting methods and estimates. Examples of these 
decisions are: accelerating or delaying sales and accelerating or delaying research 
and development and advertising expenditures. 
Naming these activities as real activities manipulation, Roychowdhury (2006) 
defines the latter as: 
[D]epartures from normal operational practices, motivated by 
managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing 
certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of 
operations (p.337). 
 Roychowdhury (2006) contends that in certain economic circumstances, real 
activities management of those involving discretionary expenditures and sales 
discounts are possibly considered optimal actions; however, in such cases the 
extensive engagement in these activities is considered real activities manipulation. 
Furthermore, Roychowdhury (2006) evinces that there are several costs associated 
with the engagement of firms in real activities manipulations and which can have a 
negative impact on the value of the firm. For instance, a firm which provide 
aggressive price discounts to increase its current period sales can suffer from lower 
cash flows in future periods where the firm will seek to meet customers’ 
expectations of the discounts in similar previous periods. Similarly, overproduction 
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would result in higher inventory holding costs due to the excessive amounts of 
inventory produced and have to be sold in later periods (Roychowdhury 2006).  
 There are a limited number of studies which have examined earnings 
management through operating and investing activities (Goncharov 2005). The most 
important activities investigated in the literature are: sales manipulation, 
overproduction and reduction of discretionary expenditures (Roychowdhury 2006). 
Roychowdhury (2006) develops empirical models to detect these activities arguing 
that these models are better detectors of the effect of real operations than accruals. 
3.4.1.1 Sales Manipulation 
 Developing a model to detect sales manipulation, Roychowdhury (2006) 
defines the latter as “accelerating the timing of sales and/or generating additional 
unsustainable sales through increased price discounts or more lenient credit terms” 
(p. 339).  
 Although offering price discounts and lenient credit terms will boost current 
period reported earnings, it will result in lower net cash flows per sale due to the fall 
in margins. Following Dechow et al. (1998), Roychowdhury (2006) estimates sales 
manipulation through cross-sectionally regressing operating cash flow as a function 
of revenues and change in revenues as follows: 
OCFit/TAit-1 = 0 + 1(1/TAit-1) + 2(REVit/TAit-1) + 3(ΔREVit/TAit-1) + it   (1) 
where 
OCFit is cash flow from operations for firm i in year t. 
TAit-1 is total assets for firm i in year t-1. 
REVit is revenue for firm i in year t. 
ΔREV is the difference between revenues in year t and revenues in year t-1 for firm i. 
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it is the error term for firm i in year t. 
 The error term in equation (1) represents abnormal cash flows from operation 
or sales manipulations. It is computed as the difference between actual cash flow 
from operations and innate (non-discretionary) cash flow from operations using the 
estimated coefficients from the industry year model in equation (1). 
3.4.1.2 Overproduction 
 Firms may tend to use overproduction strategies in an attempt to manage 
earnings upward through reporting lower cost of goods sold (COGS) 
(Roychowdhury 2006). With the increase in production, COGS are reduced as fixed 
overheads will be spread over a larger amount of units17. Following Dechow et al. 
(1998),  Roychowdhury (2006) develops a model for estimating the level of 
overproduction assuming that production costs constitute COGS and change in 
inventory (inventory growth). As such, the level of overproduction is estimated using 
the following model: 
Prodit/TAit-1 = 0 + 1(1/TAit-1) + 2(REVit/TAit-1) + 3(ΔREVit/TAit-1) +  
4(ΔREVit-1/TAit-1) + it                  (2) 
where, 
Prodit are production costs for firm i in year t. 
TAit-1 is total assets for firm i in year t-1. 
REVit is revenue for firm i in year t. 
ΔREVit is the difference between revenues in year t and revenues in year t-1 for firm 
i. 
                                                          
17 A reduction in COGS is achieved as long as the increase in marginal cost per unit is not larger than 
that in the fixed cost per unit. 
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ΔREVit-1 is the difference between revenue in year t-1 and revenue in year t-2 for 
firm i. 
it is the error term for firm i in year t. 
 Revenues (REVit) are included in equation (2) to control for the COGS 
portion of the productions costs. However, the current change in revenues (ΔREVit) 
and the lagged change in revenues are used to account for the change in the 
inventory portion of production costs. The overproduction level represents the 
difference between the actual production costs and the normal estimated levels of 
COGS and the change in inventory. 
3.4.1.3 Reduction of Discretionary Expenditures 
 Discretionary expenditures include research and development, advertising 
and selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A)18 (Roychowdhury 2006). 
Firms may tend to boost current period reported earnings through deliberately 
reducing these expenses, especially “when such expenditures do not generate 
immediate revenues and income” (Roychowdhury 2006, p.340).  
 Bange and De Bondt (1998) develop a model for detecting the discretionary 
portion of only one type of expenditures, which is research and development. A 
more comprehensive model was developed by Roychowdhury (2006), who considers 
estimating the discretionary component of R&D, advertising, and SG&A expenses 
through regressing these discretionary expenses as a function of lagged sales19. The 
                                                          
18 Although selling, general and administrative expenses are generally non-discretionary, they are 
included as they may consist of discretionary components such as maintenance, travel and employee 
training (Roychowdhury 2006). 
19 Lagged sales are included instead of sales as the model will result in “unusually low residuals” if 
firms engage in income-increasing earnings management through boosting sales (Roychowdhury 
2006). 
Chapter 3: Earnings Management 
 
73 
 
reduction of discretionary expenditures represents the error term estimated using the 
following model: 
Discexpit/TAit-1 = 0 + 1(1/TAit-1) + 2(REVit-1/TAit-1) + it                          (3) 
where 
Discexpit are the discretionary expenditures including R&D, advertising and SG&A 
expenses. 
TAit-1 is total assets for firm i in year t-1. 
REVit-1 is revenue for firm i in year t-1. 
it is the error term for firm i in year t. 
 In summary, studies examining earnings management through real activities 
manipulations are less prevalent in the earnings management literature. 
Roychowdhury (2006) finds that this type of earnings management is more likely to 
be constrained by institutional investors. He argues that “institutional investors have 
a greater ability to analyse the long-term implications of current managerial actions” 
and therefore they are more likely to distort managers’ incentives to engage in real 
activities earnings management (p.343). As far as this study is concerned, sample 
firms are not expected to manipulate earnings through real activities as 
“[i]nstitutional investors are the largest owners of firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange”20 (Goergen and Renneboog 2001, p.264). Therefore, this study does not 
adopt cash flow models to detect earnings management. 
3.4.2 Aggregate Accrual Approach 
 Those who have used the aggregate accrual approach in measuring earnings 
management consider that accounting accruals are comprised of two parts: abnormal 
                                                          
20 As of 31 December 2003, institutional investors owned about 80 percent of UK equity (Mallin et al. 
2005).  
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accruals which are determined based on the discretion of management, and non-
discretionary or normal accruals which are determined by the firm’s actual economic 
events. In order to isolate the discretionary part of accruals from the non-
discretionary one, total accruals should first be computed. Hence, before discussing 
the models used in this approach to detect earnings management, it is necessary to 
highlight the ways of computing total accruals used in the literature. The most 
widely used aggregate models are then critically discussed and include the Jones 
(1991) model, Modified Jones model and Performance Matched model. The last two 
models represent modifications to the original Jones (1991) model and were 
developed in an attempt to improve the power of the original Jones (1991) model. 
3.4.2.1 Computing Total Accruals 
 Total accruals are computed using two methods, the balance sheet approach 
(e.g., Healy 1985; Jones 1991) and the cash flow approach (e.g.,Xie et al. 2003; 
Klein 2002a). According to the balance sheet approach, total accruals are computed 
as follows: 
TACCit = ΔCAit – ΔCLit – ΔCashit + ΔDebtit - DEPit                (4) 
where: 
TACCit is total accruals for firm i in year t. 
ΔCAit is the change in current assets for firm i in year t. 
ΔCLit is the change in current liabilities for firm i in year t. 
ΔDebtit is the change in debt included in current liabilities for firm i in year t. 
DEPit is the depreciation and amortization expense for firm i in year t. 
All variables in equation (4) “are deflated by lagged total assets (TAt-1) to control for 
scale differences” (Hribar and Collins 2002, p.107).  
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 The vast majority of studies have been using the balance sheet approach until 
the latter was criticised for resulting in “measurement error in accruals estimates” 
(Hribar and Collins 2002, p.105). Moreover, the balance sheet approach was subject 
to criticism that it accounts only for the depreciation and amortization expense 
portion of non-current accruals (Habbash 2010). 
 Unlike the balance sheet method, the cash flow approach considers both 
current and non-current accruals. Under this approach, total accruals are computed as 
follows: 
TACCit = EBXDit - OCFit                  (5) 
where 
TACCit is total accruals for firm i in year t. 
EBXDit is earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations for firm i 
in year t. 
OCFit is cash flow from operations for firm i in year t. 
 According to Hribar and Collins (2002), the cash flow approach is better than 
its balance sheet counterpart and the application of the latter to estimate accruals 
would result in biased estimates and would likely lead researchers to “erroneously 
conclude that earnings management exists when there is none” (p.105). As such, the 
author measures total accruals as the difference between earnings before 
extraordinary items and cash from operations.  
3.4.2.2 Original Jones (1991) Model 
 The Jones (1991) model is the most commonly used aggregate accrual model 
and suggests that managerial discretion and changes in firms’ economic conditions 
are the two determinants of accounting accruals (Beneish 2001). Controlling for the 
“changes in the economic circumstances of the firm”, the Jones (1991) model 
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regresses total accruals as a function of the change in revenues and the level of gross 
property, plant and equipment as follows: 
TACCit/TAit-1 = (1/TAit-1) + 2(ΔREVit/TAit-1) + (PPEit/TAit-1) + it             (6) 
where:  
TACCit are total accruals for firm i in year t. 
TAit-1 is total assets for firm i in year t-1. 
ΔREVit is the difference between revenues in year t and revenues in year t-1 for firm 
i. 
PPEit are gross property, plant and equipment for firm i in year t. 
it is the error term for firm i in year t. 
 All variables in equation (6) “are scaled by lagged assets to reduce 
heteroskedasticity” (Jones 1991, p.212). The change in revenues and the level of 
property, plant and equipment are included to control for changes in economic 
conditions and thus for the changes in non-discretionary accruals. Change in 
revenues affect to some extent changes in working capital accounts that are included 
in total accruals such as inventory, accounts receivable and accounts payable. Gross 
property, plant and equipment are used to “control for the portion of total accruals 
related to non-discretionary depreciation expense” (Jones 1991, p.212). The level of 
gross property, plant and equipment is included, rather than the change, as the total 
accrual measure includes total depreciation expense. 
 The error term in equation (6) represents discretionary accruals (DA). To 
calculate non-discretionary accruals (NDA), ordinary least square estimation method 
is used to obtain estimates a1, a2 and a3 of 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
NDAit = a (1/TAit-1) + a2 (ΔREVit/TAit-1) + a3 (PPEit/TAit-1)                         (7) 
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 Theoretically, the sign of a2 in equation (7) could be either positive or 
negative21, however, empirical evidence reveals a strong tendency for a positive sign 
(Goncharov 2005).  
As such, discretionary accruals (DA) are computed as follows: 
DAit = TACCit/TAit-1 – NDAit                   (8) 
 Despite its simplicity and common usage by researchers, the Jones (1991) 
model considers revenues as non-discretionary and therefore it is unable to detect 
revenue manipulations. Given the sample period of this study and the concerns 
raised about misleading revenue recognition practices during this period, employing 
the Jones (1991) model will lead to misspecification of discretionary accruals.  
3.4.2.3 Modified Jones Model 
 In an attempt to address the shortcomings of the Jones (1991) model, 
Dechow et al. (1995) modified the latter model to be able to detect revenue 
recognition earnings management as well. Unlike Jones (1991), who assumes total 
revenues as non-discretionary, Dechow et al. (1995) presume that collected revenues 
are the only non-discretionary part, and that managerial discretion is exercised over 
the credit sales part of revenues. As such, the Modified Jones model computed non-
discretionary accruals as follows: 
NDAit = a1i (1/TAit-1) + a2i [(ΔREVit - ΔARit)/TAit-1] + a3i (PPEit/TAit-1)              (9) 
 
where 
NDAit are non-discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
TAit-1 is total assets for firm i in year t-1. 
ΔREVit is the difference between revenues in year t and revenues in year t-1 for firm 
i. 
                                                          
21 Revenue may cause both increase and decrease in working capital accruals. 
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ΔARit is the difference between accounts receivable in year t and accounts 
receivable in year t-1 for firm i. 
PPEit are gross property, plant and equipment for firm i in year t. 
 Comparing the Modified Jones model with that of the original Jones (1991) 
model, if a firm’s change in credit sales is only attributed to earnings management 
activities, the Modified Jones model is expected to be a better tool to measure 
earnings management (Goncharov 2005). If this is not the case, the Jones (1991) 
model would perform better.  
 Dechow et al. (1995) evaluate five alternative accrual-based models, 
including the Jones (1991) and the Modified Jones, in terms of their ability to detect 
earnings management 22 . Their results reveal that the Modified Jones model 
“provides the most powerful tests of earnings management” (p.223). However, 
despite its superiority, the Modified Jones model is “mis-specified when applied to 
samples experiencing extreme performance” (Kothari et al. 2005, p.166).  
3.4.2.4 Performance Matched Model 
 Extensive research has suggested a correlation between accruals and a firm’s 
past and contemporaneous performance (e.g., Healy 1996; Barth et al. 2001; Dechow 
et al. 1998). In contrast to the Jones (1991) and Modified Jones models, the 
performance matched model controls for firm’s performance and was developed to 
overcome the misspecification and measurement error that would result when 
discretionary accruals are estimated using the former two models without controlling 
for performance. Reviewing the literature on earnings management, McNichols 
(2000) states: 
                                                          
22 The evaluated models are: Healy (1985) model, DeAngelo (1986) model, Jones (1991) model, 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) industry model, and the modified Jones model developed by Dechow et al. 
(1995). 
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[R]esearchers comparing firms that differ in earning performance or 
growth characteristics may well observe (or not observe) differences 
in estimated discretionary accruals that relate to the performance 
characteristics of these firms rather than their incentives to manage 
earnings (p.333). 
 Performance influences the estimation of discretionary accruals because 
abnormal performance may lead to erroneous classification of normal accruals as 
discretionary and the relationship between performance and accruals as non-linear 
(Ronen and Yaari 2008).   
 Kothari et al. (2005) are the first to thoroughly discuss and examine the 
power and specification of performance matched discretionary accrual models. They 
test the specification and power of their developed performance matched model as 
well as of the Jones (1991) and the Modified Jones models. Kothari et al. (2005) find 
that the latter two are not able to estimate discretionary accruals accurately and that 
they are severely mis-specified. Moreover, they remark that the Modified Jones 
model would erroneously conclude earnings management practices if the researcher 
is not confident of accrual manipulation through credit sales. 
 Matching performance studies have used several variables to proxy for 
performance, including earnings growth, size, market to book, earnings yield etc. 
(Kothari et al. 2005). However, Kothari et al. (2005) use the ROA variable and 
justify their choice of this variable with two reasons. First, they evince that, by 
definition, ROA represents earnings scaled by total assets and in turn measures 
performance. Second, using ROA as a matching variable was found to result in more 
powerful and better specified tests (relative to other matching variables) in prior 
literature analysing abnormal operating performance and long run abnormal stock 
return performance. The choice of ROA as a performance variable by Kothari et al. 
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(2005) is consistent with the evidence provided by Kasznik (1999) and McNichols 
(2000) who find a significant and positive relationship between discretionary 
accruals (estimated using the Jones and Modified Jones models) and ROA. 
 Kothari et al. (2005) propose two methods to control for performance on 
estimated discretionary accruals. They suggest that controlling for performance 
could be done either through matching both of the treatment and control firms based 
on ROA, or by adding the ROA variable to the accrual model as an additional right-
hand variable. Kothari et al. (2005) find that performance matching performs better 
than adding ROA to the accrual estimation model. However, an advantage of the 
latter is that it could be applied in relatively small samples as data availability for 
control firms is not required. The efficacy of whether to match firms based on ROA 
or to include ROA in the discretionary accrual model is an empirical issue (Kothari 
et al. 2005). 
 The performance matched discretionary accrual model is found to be the least 
biased and most powerful accrual model to detect earnings management. This study 
employs this model as an additional measure to its cardinal discretionary revenue 
model employed to address the research question23. The ROA variable is added to 
the estimation model due to the small sample size. As such, discretionary accruals 
represent the error term of the following model: 
TACCit/TAit-1 =  (1/TAit-1) + 2 [(ΔREVit - ΔARit)/TAit-1] +  (PPEit/TAit-1) + 4 
ROAit-1+ it                             (10) 
where 
TACCit are total accruals for firm i in year t. 
TAit-1 is total assets for firm i in year t-1. 
                                                          
23 The choice of two models to detect earnings management is justified in the summary of this chapter. 
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ΔREVit is the difference between revenues in year t and revenues in year t-1 for firm 
i. 
ΔARit is the difference between accounts receivable in year t and accounts 
receivable in year t-1 for firm i. 
PPEit are gross property, plant and equipment for firm i in year t. 
it is the error term for firm i in year t. 
3.4.3 Single Account Approach 
 One of the limitations of aggregate accrual models is that researchers cannot 
identify which component of income has been managed by firms (Stubben 2010). 
This implies that it cannot be known whether earnings management is exercised 
through revenues or expenses. This shortcoming is conquered by using a single 
account approach which reduces measurement error, as it permits incorporating 
essential factors unique to the specific accrual, and provides insights into how 
earnings management is exercised (Stubben 2010). Moreover, examining a single 
approach would provide useful information to standard setters on the effectiveness of 
standards and on how the latter can be improved (Healy and Wahlen 1999). The 
importance of employing specific accrual models instead of aggregate ones, has been 
highlighted by several studies (eg., McNichols 2000; Healy and Wahlen 1999; 
Beneish 2001), as the former is more likely to result in more accurate estimates of 
discretion (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Bernard and Skinner 1996; McNichols 2000). 
 The single account approach focuses on a specific accounting item that is 
subject to substantial managerial judgement and that, in case it is managed, could 
have a material impact on reported earnings (Goncharov 2005). According to 
Schipper (1989), this approach has to satisfy three assumptions for its results to be 
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interpretable. First, the selected account should be a plausible proxy for discretionary 
accruals. Second, the selected account should be significant, by which its 
management would have a great impact on reported earnings. Third, the chosen 
account requires reasonable managerial discretion. Some of the chosen accounts in 
the literature have satisfied these assumptions and other have not. This section 
critically discusses three examples of specific accrual models, namely, provision for 
loan losses (Beaver and Engel 1996; Beatty et al. 1995), bad debt provisions 
(McNichols and Wilson 1988), and revenues (Stubben 2010), with great emphasis on 
the latter as it represents the primary measure of earnings management in this study. 
3.4.3.1 Provision for Loan Losses 
 A loan loss reserve is a critical account in commercial banks. It represents a 
relatively large portion of net income and depends significantly on management’s 
discretion (Healy and Wahlen 1999).   
 Several studies claim that bank managers tend to manage earnings through 
using their discretion over loan loss provisions (e.g., Beatty et al. 1995; Collins et al. 
1995; Ahmed et al. 1999). Collins et al. (1995) investigate whether banks use loan 
loss provisions as one of the options to raise capital. They find a positive association 
between earnings and loan loss provisions, suggesting that bank managers tend to 
smooth earnings via loan loss provisions. Moreover, they find that managers of 
banks with low capital tend “to decrease, rather than increase, discretionary loan loss 
provisions” (p.281). Unlike Collins et al. (1995) results, Beatty et al. (1995) and 
Ahmed et al. (1999) find evidence that loan loss provisions are used to manage 
capital rather than to manage earnings.  
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 In the same vein, Ahmed et al. (1999) test the hypothesis of whether banks 
manage loan loss provisions “to signal private information about future earnings” 
(p.2). They find no association between loan loss provisions and earnings except 
when they used the model of non-discretionary provisions adopted in Collins et al. 
(1995).  
 Most of the studies in the loan loss provision literature argue that when bank 
managers expect high (low) levels of non-discretionary earnings, they tend to 
deliberately overstate (understate) loan loss provisions “to mitigate the adverse effect 
of other factors on earnings” (Ahmed et al. 1999, p.7). These studies reveal 
inconsistent results. Despite the fact that they are examining a single account (loan 
loss provision) which represents a large portion of reported earnings and is subject to 
substantial managerial discretion, the use of this account is limited to the banking 
industry.   
3.4.3.2 Bad Debt Provisions 
 McNichols and Wilson (1988) investigate whether firms manage earnings 
though deliberately manipulating bad debt provisions. They examine two 
perspectives for managing earnings. The first one is consistent with the incoming-
smoothing hypothesis, suggesting that firms tend to engage in income-increasing 
(income-decreasing) earnings management when their reported earnings are 
unusually low (high). The second perspective is motivated by Healy (1985)’s 
argument that managers whose bonuses will not be awarded if earnings do not 
exceed the lower bound tend to select income-decreasing accrual choices to 
maximize their expected subsequent future awards. The results of McNichols and 
Wilson (1988) were consistent with Healy (1985)’s argument, rather than the 
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smoothing hypothesis, suggesting that firms with unusual and extreme low or high 
earnings tend to engage in income-decreasing earnings management through 
manipulating the bad debt provision. 
 Interpreting this evidence should be done cautiously as there are also other 
factors than earnings management which can lead to downward change in income 
through the bad debt provision. These factors can be a change in the firm’s credit 
policy or a shift in demand for its products (DeAngelo 1988). Despite the advantage 
that this account is common among industries, a potential limitation for its usage lies 
in the fact that it represents a relatively small fraction of reported earnings. 
3.4.3.3 Revenues 
 Recently, Stubben (2010) has developed a revenue model suggesting its use 
for studying earnings management where it overcomes the shortcomings of all of the 
other alternative accrual earnings management detection models.   
Stubben (2010) argues that revenues are the typical earnings component to 
investigate. In comparison to the other single accounts used (bad debt provision, 
provision for loan losses, etc.) revenue represents the largest income component for 
most firms and it is the most commonly used account in earnings management 
practices (Stubben 2010).  
 Stubben (2010) evaluates the ability of his discretionary revenue model as 
well as of other four accrual models, namely, Jones (1991), Modified Jones (Dechow 
et al. 1995), Dechow and Dichev (2002) and performance matched (Kothari et al. 
2005), to detect both actual and simulated manipulations. Unlike accrual models, the 
revenue model was able to detect earnings management in a sample of firms subject 
to enforcement actions by the SEC. Also, using simulated manipulations, the 
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revenue model was more effective in detecting “earnings management for equal 
amounts of revenue and expense manipulation” (Stubben 2010, p.697). Stubben 
(2010) concludes that the revenue model is more likely to provide precise estimates 
of discretion than accrual models, whether the earnings management have actually 
occurred or not. 
 Similar to the accrual Jones (1991) and Modified Jones models, the 
discretionary revenue model uses an OLS regression to estimate the level of 
discretion practised by management. However, it differs in that it uses the change in 
account receivables, instead of total accruals, as a dependent variable with the 
change in revenues being the explanatory variable24. Moreover, unlike the Modified 
Jones model which treats collected revenues as non-discretionary, the revenue model 
includes reported revenues as a right-hand variable. 
 Stubben (2010) articulates that discretionary revenues could take the form of 
non-GAAP revenue recognition, revenue deferral and fictitious revenues as well as 
real activities manipulations such as channel stuffing, sales discounts, bill and hold 
sales and relaxed credit requirements. He argues that premature revenue recognition 
“is the most common form of revenue management”, and considers in his model the 
effect of premature revenue recognition (such as non-GAAP revenue recognition, 
bill and hold and channel stuffing) on the association between account receivable 
and revenues. As such the error term of the following equation represents the 
discretionary revenue estimate of a firm: 
ΔARit /TAit-1 = (1/TAit-1) + 2ΔREVit /TAit-1 + it                         (11) 
where 
                                                          
24 Receivables is the accrual component having the strongest empirical and conceptual relation to 
revenues (Stubben 2010). 
Chapter 3: Earnings Management 
 
86 
 
ΔARit is the difference between account receivable in year t and account receivable 
in year t-1 for firm i. 
TAit-1 is the total assets for firm i in year t-1. 
ΔREVit is the difference between revenue in year t and revenue in year t-1 for firm i. 
it is the error term for firm i in year t. 
 The revenue model was found to be more specified and less biased than 
accrual models (Stubben 2010). Given its ability to detect both revenue 
manipulations and earnings management (Stubben 2010), this study adopts the 
revenue model as the primary earnings management measure for detecting revenue 
manipulations in a period where a wide range of regulatory concerns were raised 
about misleading revenue recognition practices25.  
3.5 Summary 
 Earnings management could either improve information (be beneficial) or be 
opportunistic. The first perspective holds when managers attempt to bolster their 
relationship with owners through using their accounting discretion to signal private 
or value-relevant information (Ronen and Yaari 2008). On the other hand, 
opportunistic earnings management takes place as a result of the divergence of 
interests between managers and owners where the formers use the flexibility in 
accounting standards to manipulate earnings, either for personal gain or to mislead 
stakeholders about the real economic performance of the firm (Healy and Wahlen 
1999). Whether the exercised discretion is beneficial or opportunistic depends on 
managerial intent (Dechow and Skinner 2000). This study adopts the opportunistic 
view of earnings management where sample firms’ managements were expected to 
                                                          
25 Refer to the introduction for more details about the concerns raised by the UK regulatory bodies. 
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manipulate earnings in the aftermath of the global financial crisis to hide poor 
performance. 
 “[W]hile definitions of earnings management are necessarily structured in 
terms of management “intent”, to test hypotheses researchers must “operationalize” 
these definitions, identifying what accrual or account is being managed and how” 
(Dechow and Skinner 2000, p.247). Given the concerns raised by regulators about 
misleading revenue recognition practices after the global financial crisis, this study 
anticipates a manipulation in the revenue account and consequently uses the 
discretionary revenue model by Stubben (2010) as a measurement method. Unlike 
accruals models, which have been criticized for resulting in biased and noisy 
estimates of discretion, the discretionary revenue model is found to be more reliable 
and permits more conclusive inferences (Stubben 2010). Moreover, in contrast to all 
other used single accounts (bad debt provision, provision for loan losses, etc.) 
revenue represents the largest income component for most firms and is common 
among all industries. 
 Finally, the discretionary revenue model is capable of detecting real activities 
manipulations, such as those which accelerate revenue recognition (e.g., bill and 
hold sales and channel stuffing) (Stubben 2010). Zang (2011) finds that there is a 
“direct substitutive relation between real activities manipulation and accrual-based 
earnings management” and focusing on either type alone “does not fully explain 
earnings management activities” (pp.700-701). As such, this thesis also employs the 
performance adjusted discretionary accrual model as a complementary detection 
method to reduce measurement error and detect the highest possible level of earnings 
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management26. The procedures followed to estimate both discretionary revenue and 
discretionary accrual models are presented in chapter five under the measurement of 
the dependent variables section (5.2.3). 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 The performance adjusted model is chosen from among other discretionary accrual models as it 
“exhibits the least misspecification of the accrual models” (Stubben 2010, p.710). 
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Chapter 4 
Literature Review 
4.1 Introduction 
 This thesis examines the questions of how effective audit committees and 
board of directors are, first, in discharging their oversight responsibilities towards the 
financial reporting process and second in determining the levels of audit and non-
audit service fees. Addressing these questions, this chapter reviews and discusses 
two strands of prior literature that have tackled the impact of corporate governance, 
specifically, audit committees and board of directors, on financial reporting quality 
and auditor remuneration.  
 The first strand of literature which focuses on the association between 
internal governance mechanisms and financial reporting quality, is critically 
reviewed in section 4.2 and classified based on the Dechow et al. (2010) 
categorization of earnings quality proxies. Critical review of the second strand of 
literature, tackling the association between internal governance mechanisms on the 
one hand and audit fees and non-audit service fees on the other, is then presented in 
section 4.3 based on the sets of variables of the audit committee and the board of 
directors. The chapter identifies the gaps in the literature and concludes with an 
overall summary along with a table of existing literature. 
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4.2 Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting 
Quality 
 As the truthfulness of financial reporting figures has become a debatable 
issue (Noriaki 2011), one of the key remedies suggested to ameliorate financial 
reporting quality is to enhance the role of the board of directors in general, and audit 
committee effectiveness in particular.  
 Researchers have used a wide variety of earnings quality measures as 
surrogates for financial reporting quality. Recently, Dechow et al. (2010) have 
reviewed the literature of these proxies and categorized them into three categories: 
properties of earnings, investor responsiveness to earnings and external indicators of 
earnings misstatements.  
 Adopting the categorization of Dechow et al. (2010) for these proxies, this 
section reviews two streams of prior literature that have employed external indicators 
of earnings misstatements and properties of earnings as surrogates for financial 
reporting quality and examined their association with internal governance 
mechanisms.  
4.2.1 External Indicators of Earnings Misstatements  
 The first stream of research uses external indicators of earnings 
misstatements as direct measures for financial reporting quality. Examples of 
external indicators of earnings misstatements include regulatory enforcement 
releases (e.g., Farber 2005; Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; Abbott et al. 2000; 
Persons 2005; Chen et al. 2006), adverse rulings (e.g., Song and Windram 2004; 
Peasnell et al. 2001) and restatements (e.g., Agrawal and Chadha 2005; Abbott et al. 
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2004; Lin et al. 2006; Archambeault et al. 2008; Carcello et al. 2011; Abdullah et al. 
2010) . 
4.2.1.1 Regulatory Enforcement Releases 
 Dechow et al. (1996) use a sample of 86 US firms subject to SEC 
enforcement actions for alleged violation of GAAP between 1982 and 1992 as proxy 
for financial reporting quality 27 . They examine the impact of audit committee 
existence, proportion of executive directors on the board and CEO duality on 
fraudulent firms manipulating earnings and find that the latter are “less likely to have 
an audit committee” and more likely to have boards with CEO duality and a majority 
of executive directors. 
 Similarly, Beasley (1996) uses a sample of 75 US firms reported by the 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) and the Wall Street 
Journal Index (WSJ Index) as fraudulent firms between the period of 1980 and 1991. 
He investigates whether an association exists between the establishment of an audit 
committee, proportion of non-executive directors on the board and CEO duality on 
the one hand, and financial statement fraud on the other. His results reveal that 
fraudulent firms’ boards are less likely to comprise outside directors and audit 
committees are not effective in precluding fraudulent financial reporting. Although 
the samples of Beasley (1996) and Dechow et al. (1996) are taken from almost the 
same period, their results regarding audit committees are inconsistent. 
 In the same vein, Abbott et al. (2000) investigate the role that audit 
committees could play in reducing the likelihood of fraud. They extend prior 
literature by examining a composite measure of audit committee independence and 
                                                          
27 The enforcement actions were published in the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, by 
the SEC, against firms alleged to have overstated their reported earnings. 
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activity instead of audit committee existence. Using a sample of 156 firms, of which 
78 firms are subject to SEC enforcement actions in the period between 1980 and 
1996, and 78 firms are non-sanctioned control firms, Abbott et al. (2000) argue that 
for an audit committee to be effective in discharging its financial reporting oversight 
role it needs to be both active and independent. Consistent with their argument, they 
find that an audit committee that is comprised solely of independent directors and 
that meets at least two times per year is more likely to preclude fraudulent financial 
reporting. 
 In a more recent study, Persons (2005) examines the association between 
board of directors and audit committee characteristics on the one hand and the 
likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting on the other. She hypothesizes that the 
likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting is negatively associated with independent 
directors on the board and the audit committee, the proportion of audit committee 
directors with financial and accounting expertise, the number of board meetings and 
audit committee meetings, and the non-separation of the roles of the CEO and the 
chairman of the board. Utilizing a sample of 111 fraudulent firms subject to SEC 
enforcement actions and 111 non-sanctioned firms between the period of June 1999 
and October 2003, Persons (2005) provides evidence suggesting that fraud likelihood 
is negatively related to entirely independent audit committees and to the non-
separation of the roles of the CEO and the chairman of the board. However, the 
independence of the board and the financial expertise of the audit committee 
members as well as the number of meetings of the board and the audit committee are 
not found to be significant variables in reducing the likelihood of fraud. 
  Using the same measure for financial reporting quality (SEC enforcement 
actions) in the period between 1982 and 2000, Farber (2005) examines the 
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relationship between board characteristics (non-executive directors, size, & CEO 
duality) and audit committee characteristics (non-executive directors, number of 
meetings, financial expertise and size), on the one hand, and fraudulent financial 
reporting on the other. Controlling for a sample prior to the year of fraud detection, 
he finds that fraudulent firms have boards with fewer outside directors, higher 
percentage of CEO duality, and audit committees that are less active and comprise 
fewer financial experts. However, as the audit committee effectiveness literature 
finds consistent evidence of a link between audit committee independence and 
financial reporting quality (Archambeault et al. 2008), Farber (2005)’s results do not 
reveal such an association.  
 Providing evidence from China, Chen et al. (2006) investigate the 
relationship between board of director’s characteristics (non-executive directors, 
board meetings, board size, and CEO duality) and firms subject to enforcement 
actions by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Their sample 
includes 338 firms of which 169 firms are subject to regulatory enforcements and 
169 matched non-sanctioned firms. Arguing that the board of directors is responsible 
for major policy decision making and the oversight of the day-to-day business 
operations, Chen et al. (2006) find that a higher percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board is more likely to reduce fraudulent financial reporting. The 
number of board meetings, however, is found to be positively related to fraud 
implying that the board increases the frequency of its meetings to discuss the firm’s 
illegal or questionable activities. 
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4.2.1.2 Adverse Rulings 
 Song and Windram (2004) and Peasnell et al. (2001) use a construct similar 
to the regulatory enforcement actions to surrogate for financial reporting quality in 
the UK context. The two studies examine the impact of board composition and audit 
committee characteristics on firms subject to adverse rulings by the FRRP for 
violating accounting and financial reporting standards.  
 Peasnell et al. (2001) use a sample of 94 firms by which 47 are judged by the 
FRRP to have faulty financial reporting during the period 1990 to 1998. They find 
that companies subject to adverse rulings are less likely to have boards with a high 
percentage of outside members, as well as audit committees. However, they also find 
that FRRP firms seem to have a higher proportion of non-executive directors on the 
audit committee and less CEO duality cases on the board.  
 Song and Windram (2004) examine the effectiveness of audit committee and 
board characteristics in financial reporting using a sample of 54 firms. They find a 
significant positive relationship between non-executive directors on the board and 
financial reporting quality, but no such association with audit committee 
characteristics (literacy, meeting frequency and outside directorships). Audit 
committee characteristics are remarked by  Song and Windram (2004) that they may 
contribute to the effectiveness of the audit committee. 
4.2.1.3 Restatements 
 Agrawal and Chadha (2005) examine the association between board of 
directors and audit committee characteristics including independence, financial 
expertise and size on the one hand, and earnings restatement on the other. They 
utilize a sample of 318 US firms of which 159 firms have restated their earnings 
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during the period from 2000 to 2001, and the other 159 firms are non-restating 
control firms matched based on size and industry. The results of Agrawal and 
Chadha (2005) reveal that firms that restate earnings are less likely to have audit 
committees or boards that comprise independent financial experts. The size and the 
number of meetings of the board and the audit committee, however, are not found to 
be significantly related to the probability of a firm restating earnings. 
 Similarly, Abbott et al. (2004) use the US context and investigate the impact 
of audit committee characteristics, namely, independence, size, financial expertise 
and number of meetings, on the probability of firms restating earnings. Moreover, 
they control for the board size and the percentage of non-executive directors on the 
board. Using a sample of 88 firms that have restated their earnings during the period 
1991 and 1999, and 88 matched non-restated control firms, Abbott et al. (2004) find 
that the likelihood of financial restatement is reduced in the presence of an audit 
committee that is independent, meets more frequently, and includes at least one 
director with financial expertise. On the other hand, board size is found to be 
positively related to financial restatement likelihood suggesting that larger boards are 
more likely to suffer from communication problems that might adversely affect their 
effectiveness in monitoring. The results of Abbott et al. (2004) are robust to the 
examination of a sample of 44 fraudulent and non-fraudulent firms. 
 In the same vein, Lin et al. (2006) utilize a sample of 106 US firms that 
restated their earnings in the fiscal year 2000 along with 106 control firms matched 
based on total assets and four digits SIC code. They examine whether an association 
exists between each of the audit committee characteristics: size, independence, 
activity and financial expertise and financial restatement. Arguing that effective 
audit committees are less likely to be associated with earnings restatement, Lin et al. 
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(2006) find that among all the examined audit committee characteristics only audit 
committee size is negatively related to the likelihood of firms restating earnings. 
This finding suggests that larger audit committees are more likely to discharge an 
effective oversight role and enhance the quality of reported earnings. 
 Recently, Archambeault et al. (2008) have used a sample of 153 US 
restatement firms for the period between 1999 and 2002 matched with 153 non-
restatement firms28, and find that among the audit committee characteristics of non-
executive directors on the audit committee, financial expertise and number of 
meetings, only non-executive audit committee members are negatively related to the 
likelihood of earnings restatement.   
 More recently, Carcello et al. (2011) have examined the effectiveness of 
audit committees in reducing the likelihood of earnings restatement and whether the 
effectiveness will be inversely affected by the involvement of the CEO in selecting 
the members of the board of directors. Audit committee independence and financial 
expertise are used as constructs for audit committee effectiveness, while audit 
committee meetings and size along with board size and CEO duality are used as 
control variables. Utilizing a sample of 104 US firms that restated their earnings 
during the period between 2000 and 2001, and 104 control firms matched based on 
stock exchange, industry and size, Carcello et al. (2011) find that firms are less likely 
to restate their earnings when their audit committees are: solely comprised of 
independent directors, include at least one financial expert and composed of at least 
three members. These findings, however, are conditional on the involvement of the 
CEO in selecting the board members where the latter is suggested to reduce audit 
committee effectiveness. 
                                                          
28 Firms are matched based on year, SIC code, size and stock exchange. 
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 Providing evidence from Malaysia, Abdullah et al. (2010) examine the 
impact of some internal governance characteristics, namely, board independence, 
audit committee independence and CEO duality, on the likelihood of earnings 
restatement. They use a sample of 62 firms which include 31 firms that restated their 
earnings during the period 2002 to 2005 and 31 control firms “matched by size, 
industry, exchange board classification, and financial year end”. Contrary to 
predictions, the results of Abdullah et al. (2010) reveal only a positive association 
between the likelihood of financial restatement and audit committees comprised 
solely of independent directors.  
4.2.2 Properties of Earnings 
 The second stream of literature to which this study is related, uses properties 
of earnings as a measure for financial reporting quality (Ghosh et al. 2010; Peasnell 
et al. 2005; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008; Xie et al. 2003; Klein 2002a; Bedard et 
al. 2004; Osma and Noguer 2007; Peasnell et al. 2000; Rahman and Ali 2006; Park 
and Shin 2004; Habbash 2010; Basiruddin 2011; Ebrahim 2007; Davidson et al. 
2005).  
 Using two proxies for earnings quality (small earnings increase and negative 
earnings avoidance), Vafeas (2005) investigates the impact of audit committee and 
board characteristics on financial reporting quality. He uses a US sample of 1621 
firms between the years 1994 and 2000 and finds that effective boards and audit 
committees are associated with higher reporting quality. Specifically, his results 
reveal that non-executive directors on the board and the audit committee as well as 
audit committee meetings are associated with better financial reporting quality.  
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 In a more recent study, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) use a sample of 929 
US firms for the period between 2000 and 2002 and examine whether the 
requirement of the SOX Act to include a financial expert on the audit committee is 
effective in enhancing financial reporting quality. They employ accounting 
conservatism as a surrogate for financial reporting quality, and find that among all 
audit committee characteristics (independence, meetings, size, and financial 
expertise) only accounting financial expertise is associated with higher reporting 
quality. This finding is robust after controlling for endogeneity, and does not hold for 
non-financial experts or non-accounting financial experts. 
 Alternatively, the vast majority of this line of research uses abnormal 
accruals (discretionary accruals) as a construct for financial reporting quality (e.g., 
Klein 2002a; Xie et al. 2003; Bedard et al. 2004; Osma and Noguer 2007; Ebrahim 
2007; Park and Shin 2004; Habbash 2010; Basiruddin 2011; Davidson et al. 2005), 
but their results are also mixed.  
 For instance, Klein (2002a) investigates the impact of audit committee and 
board composition on discretionary accruals estimated by the Modified Jones model. 
Based on a sample of 692 US firms listed in the S&P 500 between 1992 and 1993, 
she finds a cross-sectional negative association between independent non-executive 
directors on the board or audit committee and earnings management. However, this 
finding does not hold when the audit committee or the board comprises solely of 
independent directors.  
 Similarly, Xie et al. (2003) use a sample of 282 US firms listed in the S&P 
500 for the years 1992, 1994 and 1996. Arguing that managers find it easier to 
manipulate current accruals than long-term ones, they employ current discretionary 
accruals as a surrogate for earnings management. Because of correlation between the 
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audit committee and the board sets of variables, they use two separate regressions 
and examine how effective these variables are in constraining earnings management. 
Their findings reveal that audit committees and boards having higher percentage of 
non-executive directors, more corporate and financial background members and a 
higher number of meetings are more likely to constrain earnings management.  
 In the same vein, Bedard et al. (2004) examine the effect of audit committee 
expertise, audit committee independence, audit committee size and audit committee 
activity on discretionary accruals. Using a sample of 300 US firms in the year 1996 
they find that audit committees comprising of independent directors who are 
equipped with governance and financial expertise are negatively associated with 
earnings management. However, audit committee size and number of meetings are 
not found to have a significant relationship with earnings management. 
 Ebrahim (2007) uses a sample of 2,360 US firms for the years 1999 and 2000 
and examines the association between board and audit committee independence and 
activity on the one hand and earnings management on the other. Using the 
discretionary accruals estimated from the Modified Jones model as a proxy for 
earnings management, Ebrahim (2007) finds that accrual-based earnings 
management is more likely to be curbed in the presence of independent directors on 
the audit committee and the board of directors. He further finds evidence that even 
lower levels of earnings management could be achieved in the presence of 
independent audit committees who are more active.  
 Recently, and arguing that the board and audit committee are the “ultimate 
guardian of financial reporting”, Ghosh et al. (2010) use three metrics for earnings 
management, namely, absolute performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, special 
item and deferred tax expense, and examine how earnings quality might be 
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influenced by board and audit committee characteristics pre- and post-SOX. In 
general, their results are consistent among the three measures and reveal that the size 
of the audit committee or the board is negatively associated with earnings 
management. Frequency of audit committee meetings, however, is positively related 
to earnings management.  
 Park and Shin (2004) provide evidence from Canada, and examine the impact 
of board composition on earnings management using a sample of 539 firms during 
the period between 1991 and 1997. Using discretionary accruals estimated from the 
Modified Jones model as a dependent variable and the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board as an independent variable, they find that the level of accrual 
manipulation is less likely to be affected by the proportion of non-executive directors 
on the board. However, directors of financial intermediaries and representatives of 
institutional shareholders are found to be negatively associated with accrual-based 
earnings management. 
 In the same vein, Davidson et al. (2005) provide evidence from Australia and 
examine the impact of some internal governance characteristics on earnings 
management. Specifically, they investigate whether an association exists between 
board independence, CEO duality, audit committee existence, audit committee 
independence, audit committee meetings and audit committee size on the one hand 
and the absolute value of discretionary accruals as estimated by the Modified Jones 
model on the other. Using a sample of 434 firms listed on the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) in the year ending 2000, Davidson et al. (2005) find that board of 
directors and audit committees that are comprised of higher proportion of non-
executive directors are more likely to curb earnings management. They further find a 
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negative association between the existence of audit committees and earnings 
management when the latter is measured by small earnings increase.  
 Rahman and Ali (2006) investigate the association between internal 
governance mechanisms and earnings management for a sample of the 97 largest 
Malaysian firms (by market capitalization) listed on the Bursa Malaysia Main Board 
during the period from 2002 to 2003. Using the absolute value discretionary accruals 
as measured by the Modified Jones model to proxy for earnings management, they 
find that among all the examined independent variables (the proportion of 
independent directors on the board and on the audit committee, CEO duality, board 
size, audit committee financial expertise and the number of audit committee 
meetings) only board size is positively related to earnings management. This finding 
suggests that smaller boards are more effective in monitoring management and 
constraining their opportunistic behaviours.  
 Providing evidence from the UK and before the major improvements of the 
Smith and Higgs reports to the UK Corporate Governance Code, Peasnell et al. 
(2000) and Peasnell et al. (2005) use discretionary accruals to proxy for financial 
reporting quality and find that there is less income-increasing accrual management 
when the proportion of outside directors on the board is high, and that no association 
exists with audit committees.  
 Interestingly, and also using the UK context, Habbash (2010) and Basiruddin 
(2011) examine the impact of audit committee and board characteristics on earnings 
management after the incorporation of the Smith and Higgs reports to the UK 
Corporate Governance Code. 
 Using a sample of 448 FTSE 350 firms for the period of 2003 to 2006, 
Habbash (2010) investigates the relation between the absolute value of discretionary 
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accruals estimated from the performance adjusted Modified Jones model and several 
audit committee and board characteristics. Using two separate regressions for each of 
the audit committee and the board sets of variables, Habbash (2010) provides 
evidence suggesting that independent directors on the audit committee along with 
financial experts help constrain earnings management. Moreover, his results reveal a 
negative relationship between board independence, size and chairman independence 
on the one hand and discretionary accruals on the other.  
 Performing an additional analysis, Habbash (2010) divides the firms in his 
earnings management sample into those with income-increasing and those with 
income-decreasing discretionary accruals29, and examines their association with each 
of the audit committee and board of directors sets of variables. He finds that audit 
committee expertise and board independence are effective characteristics in 
constraining both directions of discretionary accruals. However, the independence of 
the audit committee, along with its number of meetings, is found to be effective in 
constraining only income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Although Habbash 
(2010) shares some common features with this thesis in terms of examining the 
impact of corporate governance on earnings management in the UK context, his 
thesis does not include the audit committee and board variables in the same 
regression model. This might cast doubt on the robustness of his results given that 
the effectiveness of the audit committee is directly related to that of the board 
(Vafeas 2005), and the mere presence of an audit committee in a firm “does not 
mean that the board actually relies on the audit committee to enhance its monitoring 
ability” (Menon and Williams 1994). 
                                                          
29 Each of the directions may have different incentives to manage earnings. 
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 More recently, Basiruddin (2011) carries out a number of investigations into 
the impact of board and audit committee characteristics on several abnormal accrual 
metrics namely: Jones, Modified Jones and performance adjusted Modified Jones. 
Using a sample of 674 FTSE 350 firms in the period 2005 to 2008, she argues that 
joint monitoring of the board and the audit committee is needed to curb earnings 
management and ensure higher financial reporting quality. As such, she regresses all 
the governance variables against the three earnings management metrics without 
separating the board variables from those of the audit committee. Her results do not 
reveal any association between corporate governance characteristics (board and audit 
committee) and earnings management except for the size of audit committee when 
discretionary accruals are estimated by the Jones and Modified Jones models. 
Although the studies of Basiruddin (2011) and Habbash (2010) are relatively similar 
to this research in terms of context and sample firms, their results are inconsistent, 
and are questionable because of their usage of accrual models in measuring earnings 
management30.  
4.2.3 Summary 
 The results in the literature on the relationship between internal governance 
mechanisms (audit committee in particular) and financial reporting quality are 
inconsistent.  
 Part of this literature has used external indicators of earnings misstatements, 
such as regulatory enforcement releases, adverse rulings and restatements, as a direct 
measure for financial reporting quality. Although these proxies are salient indicators 
of a firm’s low financial reporting quality, not being accused of fraudulent reporting 
                                                          
30 Refer to chapter 3 for critique of the accrual models in estimating discretionary accruals. 
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does not mean that a firm is not manipulating its reported earnings. Even if there is 
compliance with GAAP, there would still be room for managers to manipulate 
reported earnings as alternative accounting treatments are permitted (Teoh et al. 
1998). For instance, a firm can manipulate revenues through using an accounting 
method that either delays or advances revenue recognition and still complies with 
GAAP (Park and Shin 2004; Teoh et al. 1998). Thus, results of this line of research 
cannot be generalized to an exemplary population of firms having less aggressive 
financial reporting practices, and “more subtle cases of earnings management” 
(Dechow et al. 1996, p.31). 
 On the other hand, as the wave of studies examines financial reporting 
quality through earnings management, their most common used proxy is 
discretionary accruals (Goncharov 2005, p.10; Pomeroy and Thornton 2008). 
However, results of such studies are questionable as accrual models are subject to 
criticism that they provide biased and noisy estimates (Stubben 2010). 
4.3 Corporate Governance and Auditor 
Remuneration 
 Much of the research which has tackled the pricing of audit services has been 
engendered from the seminal study by Simunic (1980) who examines how a number 
of auditor and auditee attributes may affect audit fees either positively or negatively 
(Hay et al. 2006a). Recently, and especially after the passage of governance 
regulatory reforms which address the relationship between auditors and their 
clients31, researchers started examining audit committees and board of directors as 
key determinants of audit and non-audit service fees. 
                                                          
31 Sarbanes Oxley in the US and Smith and Higgs reports in the UK  
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4.3.1 Audit Committee Effectiveness 
 Audit committee is the main governance mechanism delegated by the board 
to monitor the financial reporting process and the relationship between an entity’s 
management and the external auditor (FRC 2012; SOX 2002a). Researchers have 
studied the impact of an audit committee on external auditor remuneration (audit fees 
and non-audit fees) considering the latter as an economic aspect of the relationship 
between management and the auditor. This section reviews prior studies that have 
investigated the association between auditor remuneration and the following audit 
committee characteristics: existence, independence, meetings, financial expertise and 
size. 
4.3.1.1 Audit Committee Existence 
 Evidence provided from different contexts has reported a positive association 
between audit committee existence and audit fees (e.g., Voeller et al. 2013; 
O'Sullivan and Diacon 2002; Redmayne et al. 2011; Collier and Gregory 1996).   
Collier and Gregory (1996) use a sample of 315 FTSE 500 firms for the year 1991 
and find that the presence of an audit committee is more likely to increase audit fees 
and reduce risks of impairing auditor independence. Similarly, O'Sullivan and 
Diacon (2002) examine a sample of the UK’s largest 117 insurance firms by 
premium income in the year 1992. Their results are consistent with their argument 
that the presence of an audit committee will require auditors to do more extensive 
testing thus leading to higher audit fees.  
 Redmayne et al. (2011) also provide evidence from a voluntary governance 
system and use a sample of 204 public firms from New Zealand. They investigate 
the impact of audit committee existence on audit fees and include an interaction term 
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of audit committee existence and audit risk to capture their combined effects. 
Although their results reveal a positive association between the presence of audit 
committees and audit fees for profit-oriented public firms, they conclude that the role 
of audit committees is symbolic as the interaction terms are not found to be 
significant. 
 In the same vein, Voeller et al. (2013) provide evidence from the German 
governance system where a two-tier board structure exists32. They use a sample of 
785 firms listed in the German Prime Standard from 2006 to 2008 and examine 
whether an association exists between the presence of an audit committee and audit 
fees. Their results indicate a positive association and are robust to the usage of 
instrumental variables regressions. 
 On the other hand, Quick et al. (2013) examine the impact of audit committee 
existence on the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees for a sample of 330 German 
firms listed in the period between 2005 and 2007. Their results reveal no significant 
association between the committee existence variable and the non-audit fee ratio.  
4.3.1.2 Audit Committee Independence 
 Empirical evidence on the independence of audit committees is consistent 
with the agency perspective where independent members are seen as crucial 
contributors to the effectiveness of audit committees in discharging their oversight 
roles. 
 Using the US context, Carcello et al. (2002) examine the impact of some of 
the board of directors and audit committee characteristics on audit fees. They use a 
sample of 258 non-financial firms listed in the Fortune 1000 for the year ended 
                                                          
32 The two-tier board structure consists of two boards: the supervisory board that represents the 
interests of the owners and forms the committees (one of which is the audit committee) and the 
management board which is responsible for operating the business and setting its long-term strategy. 
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March 1993 and find that audit committee independence is positively related to audit 
fees. This finding does not hold, however, when they combine both of the audit 
committee and board variables in the same model. Therefore, Carcello et al. (2002) 
suggest that in the presence of the board, audit committees do not provide an 
incremental role. 
 Similarly, Abbott et al. (2003a) use a sample of 492 US non-regulated firms 
that are audited by Big 5 auditors and have filed their proxy statements with the SEC 
for the period between February and June 2001. They examine the association 
between audit fees and several audit committee characteristics and argue that 
“independent audit committee directors demand greater levels of audit assurance” 
leading auditors to increase their audit scope and in turn their audit fees. Their results 
are consistent with their argument where they find that audit committees which 
comprise solely of independent directors are associated with higher audit fees.  
 In a more recent study, Lee and Mande (2005) investigate the impact of some 
audit committee characteristics on audit fees and non-audit fees. Using a sample of 
780 US firms in the year ended December 2000, they contend that unlike inside and 
grey members, outside directors are more independent of management and therefore 
are more capable of enhancing audit committee effectiveness. Their findings are 
robust to the usage of both single and simultaneous equation regressions and reveal a 
positive association between independent audit committee directors and audit fees. 
Non-audit fees, however, are only found to be related to the composite measure of 
independence and number of committee meetings when regressed in a single 
equation regression. 
 Boo and Sharma (2008) extend the literature and investigate the association 
between internal governance mechanisms and audit fees, and how this association 
Chapter 4: Literature Review 
 
109 
can be affected by regulatory oversight. To observe the differential effect of 
regulations, they use a sample of 469 US listed firms in the year 2001, by which 252 
firms are regulated (financial and utility) and 217 are non-regulated. Their results 
reveal that the association between audit committee independence and audit fees is 
stronger for non-regulated firms than that for regulated ones. 
 Providing evidence from an emerging country, Rustam et al. (2013) and 
Hassan and Naser (2013) examine the effect of audit committee independence on 
audit fees and find inconsistent results. Rustam et al. (2013) use a sample of 50 firms 
for the period between 2007 and 2011 and employ a dichotomous variable having 
the value of one if at least one executive member serves on the audit committee. 
They find a significant and negative relationship with audit fees, concluding that the 
role of the audit committee is complementary to that of the auditor in monitoring 
management. Hassan and Naser (2013), however, use the percentage of independent 
directors on the audit committee as a proxy for independence. Based on a sample of 
30 non-financial firms listed on the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX), they 
find a negative association between audit committee independence and audit fees. As 
such they suggest that an increase in audit committee independence will reduce 
control risk which in turn reduces the audit scope and leads to lower levels of audit 
fees.  
 Addressing the concerns raised by regulators and academics on the effect of 
non-audit services on the client-auditor relationship, Abbott et al. (2003b) investigate 
the impact of audit committee characteristics on the ratio of non-audit service fees to 
audit fees. Using a sample of 538 US firms which filed proxies with the SEC 
between February and June 2001, they find that independence of audit committees is 
an important characteristic that contributes to the effectiveness of the committees in 
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enhancing auditor independence through reducing non-audit fees relative to audit 
fees. The findings of Abbott et al. (2003b) are consistent with those of Parkash and 
Venable (1993) who find that firms may reduce the purchase of non-audit services 
from their incumbent auditors in an attempt to reduce agency costs and enhance 
audit quality. 
 Interestingly, a recent study by Zaman et al. (2011) provides evidence from 
the UK context and fills the gap found in the auditor remuneration literature. They 
examine the association between governance quality on the one hand and audit fees 
and non-audit service fees on the other. Based on a sample of 540 FTSE 350 non-
financial firms for the period between 2001 and 2004, they find that audit committee 
independence has a positive association with audit fees and a negative one with non-
audit fees. Zaman et al. (2011) further investigate the relationship between audit 
committee independence and a dichotomous variable having the value of one if a 
firm’s non-audit service fees are greater than its audit fees. Their results also reveal a 
negative association suggesting that independent directors on the audit committee are 
more likely to decrease the purchase of non-audit services. 
 Basiruddin (2011), however, uses a similar sample of 674 FTSE 350 firms 
for the period between 2005 and 2008 and finds no evidence of any relationship 
between independent directors on the audit committee and either audit fees or non-
audit service fees. 
4.3.1.3 Audit Committee Meetings 
 It has been suggested that the more frequently audit committees meet, the 
more efficiently they discharge their monitoring and oversight roles. Moreover, 
Menon and Williams (1994) argues that the frequency of meetings is an indicative 
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measure of an audit committee’s diligence. A large and growing body of literature 
has supported this argument and has investigated meeting frequency as a determinant 
of audit and non-audit service fees (e.g., Zaman et al. 2011; Abbott et al. 2003b; Lee 
and Mande 2005; Rustam et al. 2013; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2009; Ittonen et al. 
2010; Basiruddin 2011). 
 Lee and Mande (2005) investigate the association between audit committee 
characteristics (meeting frequency, independence and expertise) on the one hand and 
audit fees and non-audit fees on the other for a sample of 780 US firms in the year 
2000. They posit that how frequent audit committees meet reflects how effective 
they are in discharging their responsibilities. Running single and simultaneous 
equation regressions, Lee and Mande (2005) find that audit committee meetings are 
significantly and positively related to audit fees. With respect to non-audit fees, 
however, they find a negative association with audit committee meetings only under 
the single equation regression. As such they conclude that this finding is spurious as 
its estimation does not take into account the simultaneity of fees.  
 Non-audit fees findings of Abbott et al. (2003b) contradict with those of Lee 
and Mande (2005). Abbott et al. (2003b) use a sample of 538 US firms and find no 
association between audit committee meetings and independence and the ratio of 
non-audit fees to audit fees. The composite measure of independence and meeting 
frequency33, however, was found to be significantly and negatively related to the 
non-audit fees ratio. Therefore, Abbott et al. (2003b) conclude that the independence 
characteristic of the audit committee is likely to be a more significant determinant of 
the non-audit fee ratio. 
                                                          
33 The composite measure represents a dichotomous variable equal to one if the audit committee is 
comprised solely of independent directors and meets at least four times a year. 
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 Similarly, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) use the US context and examine 
the impact of audit committee and board characteristics on audit fees for a sample of 
807 firms listed in the S&P 500 during the years 2000 to 2002. Their results are 
consistent with the demand-side perspective where they find a positive association 
between audit committee meetings and audit fees. In other words, their finding 
suggest that the more frequent audit committees meet the better monitoring will be 
exerted on auditors who in their turn will increase their audit testing leading to 
higher audit fees. 
 In the same vein, Ittonen et al. (2010) use a sample of 941 US firms listed in 
the S&P 500 for the years 2006 to 2008 and examine the effect of female 
representation on the audit committee, audit committee size, number of meetings and 
financial expertise on audit fees. They find that audit committees which are chaired 
by females are associated with lower audit fees, and the number of audit committee 
meetings as well as size is positively related to audit fees. 
 Providing evidence from Pakistan, Rustam et al. (2013) use a panel data 
technique and investigate the relationship between audit committee characteristics 
and audit fees. They argue that “panel data control for cross-sectional heterogeneity 
by observing individual firm and reduces the risk of biasness and collinearity among 
variables” (p.697). Rustam et al. (2013) find that audit committee meetings is 
positively related to audit fees and conclude that auditors tend to charge higher fees 
to compensate for the extra time spent on preparing and attending meetings with the 
audit committee. 
 Empirical evidence from the UK, however, has provided inconsistent results 
for the impact of audit committee meetings on audit fees and non-audit service fees. 
For instance, Zaman et al. (2011) use a sample of 540 FTSE non-financial 350 firms 
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for the period between 2001 and 2004 and find that audit committee meetings is 
positively related to audit fees. However, this finding does not hold for non-audit 
fees, where the results do not reveal any association. In contrast, Basiruddin (2011) 
uses a similar sample of 674 non-financial 350 firms but for the period from 2005 to 
2008, and finds that the number of audit committee meetings is positively related to 
non-audit fees but does not have a significant impact on audit fees. Basiruddin (2011) 
findings suggest that in the presence of an active audit committee, a firm purchase 
more non-audit services leading to a higher ratio of non-audit service fees to total 
fees. 
4.3.1.4 Audit Committee Financial Expertise 
 “The effectiveness of audit committees is affected, first and foremost, by the 
expertise of members of audit committees in the areas of accounting and financial 
reporting, internal controls and auditing” (POB 1994, p.15). Regulatory 
recommendations suggest that audit committee directors should be equipped with 
two types of knowledge: “financial reporting knowledge” by which committee 
members can understand how the economic events are reported in the financial 
statements and analysed, and “audit reporting knowledge” by which the committee 
members can understand the purpose and nature of the audit (DeZoort and Salterio 
2001). 
 In addition to its paucity, research on the relationship between audit 
committee financial expertise and auditor compensation (audit fees and non-audit 
fees) has revealed inconsistent findings. 
 Abbott et al. (2003a) employ a dichotomous variable, equal to one if at least 
one of the audit committee members has financial expertise, and investigate its 
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impact on audit fees. They argue that financial expertise allows the “committee 
members to better understand” auditing risks and issues and thus provide more 
support to the external auditor when discussing these issues with management. 
Based on a sample of 492 non-regulated firms that have filed proxy statements with 
the SEC from Feb 2001 to June 2001, Abbott et al. (2003a) find that audit committee 
financial expertise is positively related to audit fees suggesting that greater expertise 
of the committee “will lead to enhanced oversight of the management-auditor 
relationship” (p.29).  
 Using a similar sample of 538 US firms for the same sample period, Abbott 
et al. (2003b) examine the effect of audit committee characteristics on the ratio of 
non-audit service fees to audit fees. They proxy for audit committee expertise by 
using a dichotomous variable indicating the existence of at least one member with 
financial management expertise based on the Blue Ribbon Committee’s 
recommendation. Abbott et al. (2003b) find that no relationship exists between the 
financial expertise variable and the non-audit fees ratio suggesting that the former is 
not an important determinant of the latter. 
 In a more recent study, however, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) examine 
the differential impact of accounting and non-accounting financial experts on audit 
fees and find that in the presence of a strong governance system, accounting 
financial experts are negatively related to audit fees. Using a sample of 941 US firms 
listed in the S&P 500 and audited by Big 5 audit firms, they provide evidence that 
only accounting financial experts can contribute to the effectiveness of audit 
committees in mitigating control risk. The findings of Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2009) are consistent with the risk-based perspective where a higher level of 
monitoring exerted by the committee accounting financial experts is expected to 
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reduce the control risk for the auditor who in turn will reduce the audit scope and 
request lower fees. They further examine the interactive effect of accounting 
financial expertise and earnings manipulation risk on audit fees, and find that the 
coefficient of accounting financial expertise remains negative, however, the 
interaction variable is positively related to audit fees. As such, they conclude that the 
positive influence of accounting financial expertise is overwhelmed by the risk of 
earnings manipulation leading to higher levels of audit fees. 
 Zaman et al. (2011) provide evidence from the UK and investigate the impact 
of audit committee characteristics on both audit fees and non-audit fees. Based on a 
sample of 540 non-financial FTSE 350 firms for the period between 2001 and 2004, 
they contend that an audit committee including at least one financial expert tends to 
demand a wider audit scope to ensure a higher-quality of audit, which in turn will 
lead to higher audit fees. On the other hand, they argue that in the presence of 
financial experts on the audit committee, management are less likely to seek non-
audit services due to the former “strict monitoring and awareness of the deficiencies 
in the system” (p.172). As predicted, the results of Zaman et al. (2011) reveal a 
negative association between audit committee expertise and non-audit service fees. 
Audit fees, however, are not found to be affected by the committee financial 
expertise.  
 In the same vein, Basiruddin (2011) examines the effect of audit committee 
and board characteristics on audit and non-audit service fees for a sample of 674 
non-financial firms listed in the FTSE 350 during the period 2005 to 2008. Her 
findings, however, do not reveal any association between audit committee financial 
expertise and audit fees nor an association with non-audit fees. 
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4.3.1.5 Audit Committee Size 
 Vafeas (2005) argues that the relation between the size of an audit committee 
and its performance is non-linear and thus audit committees should be neither too 
small nor too large. In other words, adding members to small audit committees may 
enhance the performance of the latter as there will be more people to draw on. On 
the other side, audit committees that are too large may tend to be ineffective due to 
“coordination and process problems” (Jensen 1993).  
 Recent evidence suggests that audit committee size is positively related to 
either audit fees or non-audit service fees (e.g.,Ittonen et al. 2010; Vafeas and 
Waegelein 2007; Boo and Sharma 2008; Zaman et al. 2011). 
 Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) investigate the impact of audit committee and 
board characteristics on audit fees. Based on a sample of 767 US firms listed in the 
Fortune 500 during the years 2001 to 2002, they claim that audit committee size is 
an important contributor to the effectiveness of the audit committee and predict a 
positive association between audit committee effectiveness and audit fees. Consistent 
with their hypothesis, they find a positive relationship between audit committee size 
and audit fees and conclude “that audit committees complement external audit effort 
in disciplining management” (p.253). 
 Boo and Sharma (2008) examine the impact of some audit committee and 
board characteristics on audit fees for a sample of 469 US listed firms in the year 
2001. Their results reveal a positive association between audit committee size and 
audit fees and are consistent with their argument that larger audit committees boost 
the risk of errors and misstatements in the financial statements thus leading auditors 
to extend their audit work and ask for more audit fees. Furthermore, they find that 
this positive association is stronger for non-regulated firms than for regulated ones. 
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Boo and Sharma (2008) note that given that their sample includes only three audit 
committees being comprised of less than three members, they find it empirically 
meaningless to test for the size-audit fees non-linear association suggested by Vafeas 
(2005). 
 In a more recent study, Ittonen et al. (2010) use a sample of 941 US firms 
listed in the S&P 500 during the period 2006 to 2008 and investigate the effect of 
female representation and other audit committee characteristics on audit fees. They 
find that audit fees are negatively associated with female audit committee chairs and 
positively related to audit committee size. 
 Interestingly, Zaman et al. (2011) provide evidence from the UK and address 
the question of the association between audit committee characteristics and both 
audit fees and non-audit service fees. Based on a sample of 540 FTSE 350 non-
financial firms listed in the period between 2001 and 2004, they argue that internal 
controls quality is more likely to be enhanced by larger audit committees. In other 
words, the increase in resources provided by larger audit committees will enhance 
the latter monitoring role therefore leading to higher audit effort. At the same time, 
knowledge sharing among the members of large committees will help resolve 
problems and not otherwise seek for non-audit services. Consistent with their 
predictions, Zaman et al. (2011) find a positive association between audit committee 
size and audit fees. With respect to non-audit fees, however, results are contrary to 
their hypothesis and reveal a positive association with audit committee size. The 
coefficient of audit committee size remained positive even after employing a 
dependent dichotomous variable equal to one if non-audit fees are greater than audit 
fees. 
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 Unlike Zaman et al. (2011), Basiruddin (2011) uses the same UK context and 
finds no association between audit committee size and either audit fees or non-audit 
fees. Her results are inconsistent with those of Zaman et al. (2011) despite using a 
similar sample of 674 firms listed in the FTSE 350 but for the period of 2005 to 2008. 
4.3.2 Board of Directors  
 The UK Corporate Governance Code requires the board to “establish formal 
and transparent arrangements for considering how they should apply the corporate 
reporting and risk management and internal control principals and for maintaining an 
appropriate relationship with the company’s auditors” (FRC 2012, C.3). Moreover, 
as a sub-committee of the board, the audit committee is required to recommend to 
the board how the auditor will be appointed and remunerated and the policy to be 
implemented regarding the auditor’s supply of non-audit services (C.3.1). Therefore, 
the fact that the audit committee is the primary monitoring mechanism responsible 
for overseeing the financial reporting process and the management-auditor 
relationship does not exempt the board of directors from being involved in 
monitoring how transparent the financial reporting process is and how auditors are 
appointed, removed or remunerated.  
 Carcello et al. (2002) identify two types of linkages between the board and 
audit quality: formal and informal. Formal linkage can be represented through the 
board selection of the auditors and review of the “planned audit scope and proposed 
audit fees”. Informal linkage, on the other hand, can be illustrated through the fact 
that high quality and vigilant boards may signal to auditors that high expectations are 
placed on them to “perform a higher quality audit”. This section reviews existing 
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literature that has used the following board characteristics: non-executive directors 
on the board, size, CEO duality and number of meetings.  
4.3.2.1 Non-Executive Directors on the Board 
 The agency theory suggests that non-executive directors on the board tend to 
reduce information asymmetry that may arise between managers and shareholders 
because of the separation of ownership and control. Consistent with the agency 
perspective, the UK Corporate Governance Code requires non-executive directors to 
“scrutinise the performance of management in meeting agreed goals and objectives 
and monitor the reporting of performance” (FRC 2012, A.4).  
 A wave of studies has examined the relationship between non-executive 
directors on the board and audit fees and has revealed consistent results 
(e.g.,Carcello et al. 2002; Abbott et al. 2003a; Boo and Sharma 2008; Zaman et al. 
2011; Basiruddin 2011). 
 For instance, Carcello et al. (2002) investigate the association between board 
characteristics and audit fees for 258 non-financial firms from the Fortune 1000 in 
the year ending April 1992 to March 1993. They argue that non-executive directors 
are more likely to be concerned about audit quality which helps them achieve their 
objective of protecting shareholder wealth. Therefore, the more outside directors on 
the board, the more support will be provided to purchase “higher-quality audit 
services” which in turn leads to higher audit fees. Consistent with their claim, 
Carcello et al. (2002) find a positive relationship between the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board and audit fees.  
 Similarly, using the US context, Abbott et al. (2003a) examine the impact of 
outside directors on the board on audit fees. They find, using a sample of 492 non-
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regulated firms in the year 2001, that a positive association exists between the 
percentage of outside directors on the board and audit fees. 
 Boo and Sharma (2008) extend the literature and investigate how the relation 
between board characteristics and audit fees in regulated industries may differ from 
that in non-regulated ones. Arguing that regulatory oversight may lessen the need for 
external audit monitoring and make auditors perceive lower risk of financial errors 
(i.e. less audit work and lower fees), they hypothesize that “regulatory oversight 
weakens the association between board/audit committee independence and higher 
audit fees” (p.57). Their results are consistent with their hypotheses and reveal that 
the association between board independence and audit fees is stronger for non-
regulated firms than for regulated ones. 
 In the same vein, evidence from the UK provides consistent results. 
O’Sullivan (2000) uses audit fees as a surrogate for audit quality and examines 
whether the percentage of non-executive directors on the board is associated with 
better audit quality. Using a sample of 402 quoted large firms for the year 1992, he 
finds a positive relationship between board independence and audit fees suggesting 
that outside directors prompt auditors to perform “more intensive audits as a 
complement to their own monitoring role” (p.397). 
 More recently, Zaman et al. (2011) and Basiruddin (2011) have addressed the 
question of the relation between audit committee and board characteristics on the one 
hand and audit fees and non-audit fees on the other. Findings of both studies reveal a 
positive association between non-audit service fees and outside directors. Their 
results regarding the association with audit fees, however, are inconsistent. Zaman et 
al. (2011) find a negative association between audit fees and non-executive directors 
at the same time as Basiruddin (2011) finds a positive relationship. 
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4.3.2.2 Board Size 
 The UK Corporate Governance Code recommends that “the board should be 
of sufficient size that the requirements of the business can be met and that changes to 
the board’s composition and that of its committees can be managed without undue 
disruption, and should not be so large as to be unwieldy” (FRC 2012, B.1). This is 
consistent with the non-linear relationship perspective suggested by Vafeas (2000) 
on the association between the size of the board and its performance.  
 Empirically, in addition to the paucity of research tackling the impact of 
board size on audit fees and non-audit fees, findings reveal inconsistent results. 
(e.g.,Rustam et al. 2013; Boo and Sharma 2008; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2009; 
Basiruddin 2011). 
 A recent study by Boo and Sharma (2008) reveals that there is a positive 
association between board size and audit fees. The study examines the association 
between board size (in addition to other board and audit committee characteristics) 
and audit fees and how this association would differ between regulated and non-
regulated firms. Based on a sample of 469 US firms in the year 2001, they find that 
the relationship between board size and audit fees is stronger in non-regulated firms 
than in regulated ones. As such Boo and Sharma (2008) suggest “that regulatory 
oversight reduces information asymmetry” which in turn reduce auditors’ efforts and 
leads to lower audit fees.  
 Given the same US context, Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) investigate a 
sample of 767 US firms listed in the Fortune 500 for the period between 2001 and 
2002. Their results, however, reveal insignificant association between board size and 
audit fees. Similarly, based on a sample of 807 firms listed in the S&P 500 during 
Chapter 4: Literature Review 
 
122 
the period from 2000 to 2002, the results of Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) fail to 
find a significant relationship between board size and audit fees.  
 Providing evidence from an emerging country, Rustam et al. (2013) examine 
a sample of 50 Pakistani firms during the period 2007 to 2011. Similar to Vafeas and 
Waegelein (2007) and Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009), their results reveal that 
board size does not have a significant impact on audit fees. 
 As far as this study is concerned, the only study in the UK to examine the 
impact of board size on audit fees and non-audit service fees is Basiruddin (2011). 
Her study, however, is based on a different sample size (674) and sample period 
(2005-2008). She argues that smaller boards are more effective in communicating 
and predicts board size to have a negative coefficient with audit fees and a positive 
one with non-audit fees. Basiruddin (2011) findings reveal only a significant and 
positive relationship between board size and non-audit fees suggesting that smaller 
boards are more likely to limit the purchase of non-audit services in an attempt to 
enhance auditor independence. 
4.3.2.3 CEO Duality 
 It has been argued that separating the roles of the chairman of the board and 
the CEO is perceived by auditors as an indicator of a firm’s strong internal control 
system where lower levels of control risk exist and therefore lower audit efforts are 
needed (Basiruddin 2011). This is consistent with the agency perspective which 
suggests that in the presence of role duality on a board there is “absence of 
separation of decision management and decision control” (Fama and Jensen 1983), 
and thus higher levels of control risk.  
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 Empirical research, despite its paucity, has supported this argument and 
attempted to explain the effect of CEO duality on audit fees (e.g., Tsui et al. 2001; 
Krishnan and Visvanathan 2009; Zaman et al. 2011; Bliss 2011; O’Sullivan 2000; 
O'Sullivan 1999). 
 Tsui et al. (2001) investigate the impact of independent boards (where the 
roles of the chair and the CEO are separated) on audit fees. They argue that in the 
presence of CEO duality, internal monitoring would be less effective and accounting 
would be less reliable thus leading to higher control risk and wider audit scope. As 
such they hypothesize that separating the roles of the CEO and the board’s chair will 
be associated with lower control risk and consequently lower audit fees. Tsui et al. 
(2001) use a sample of 650 firms from Hong Kong for the period from 1994 to 1996. 
Their findings are consistent with their argument and reveal a positive and 
significant relationship between CEO duality and audit fees. 
 Similarly, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) find a positive association 
between CEO duality and audit fees. Their findings are based on a US sample of 807 
S&P 500 firms for the period from 2000 to 2002.  
 Bliss (2011) extends the literature and examines “whether CEO duality 
affects the association between board independence and demand for higher quality 
audits, proxied by audit fees” (p.361). He uses a sample of 799 Australian listed 
firms in the year 2003 and finds that board independence is positively related to audit 
fees; however, this relationship does not hold for boards with CEO duality cases. 
However, findings from the UK on the relationship between CEO duality and audit 
fees are inconsistent (e.g., O'Sullivan 1999; O’Sullivan 2000; Zaman et al. 2011). 
 O'Sullivan (1999) investigates the impact of board characteristics on audit 
fees for a sample of 146 largest non-financial firms listed on the LSE in the post-
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Cadbury period. His results reveal a negative but insignificant relationship between 
CEO duality and audit fees. Moreover, as none of the board characteristics are found 
to be significantly related to audit fees, he concludes that “internal governance 
innovations introduced” after the Cadbury report do not influence “auditor’s pricing 
strategies”.  
 Similarly, O’Sullivan (2000) examines the impact of some board 
characteristics on audit quality for a sample of 402 quoted firms for the year 1992. 
Using audit fees as a proxy for audit quality, he argues that the presence of CEO 
duality is expected to reduce the influence of non-executive directors “in seeking an 
intensive audit” and thus lower audit fees will be paid. His results, however, are not 
as predicted and reveal no significant association between CEO duality and audit 
fees. 
 More recently, Zaman et al. (2011) examine the effect of board 
characteristics on audit fees and non-audit fees for a sample of 540 FTSE 350 non-
financial firms listed in the period between 2001 and 2004. Their results reveal a 
negative association between CEO duality and audit fees; however, the coefficient of 
CEO duality against non-audit fees was insignificant. 
4.3.2.4 Board of Directors Meetings 
 The number of board meetings is the only publicly observable factor that 
measures the diligence of the board of directors (Carcello et al. 2002). Numerous 
studies have examined the effect of board meeting frequency on audit fees and have 
argued that boards that meet more frequently are more likely to enhance the 
effectiveness of their oversight role and support the conduct of extensive audit work 
to ensure higher audit quality which in turn leads to higher audit fees (e.g., Zaman et 
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al. 2011; Carcello et al. 2002; Abbott et al. 2003a; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2009; 
Basiruddin 2011). 
 Carcello et al. (2002) examine whether board characteristics have an impact 
on audit fees in the US. Based on a sample of 258 non-financial firms listed in the 
Fortune 1000 for the year ended March 1993, their results from multivariate analysis 
support their argument and reveal a positive association between the number of 
board meetings and audit fees. This finding is robust to the inclusion and exclusion 
of audit committee variables from the model. 
 Abbott et al. (2003a) examine the association between audit committee 
characteristics for a sample of 492 non-regulated firms filing proxy statements with 
the SEC from February to June 2001. They use the number of board meetings as one 
of the board control variables in their model and find a positive and significant board 
meeting coefficient with audit fees. 
 More recently, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) also use the US context and 
examine the impact of board meeting frequency on audit fees for a sample of 807 
S&P 500 firms for the period from 2006 to 2008. Their argument is based on the 
demand-based perspective where vigilant boards are expected to ask for a wider 
audit scope to ensure higher audit quality thus resulting in higher audit fees. The 
findings of Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) are consistent with their argument and 
reveal a positive association between audit fees and the number of board meetings. 
 Interestingly, Zaman et al. (2011) and Basiruddin (2011) examine the impact 
of board meeting frequency on both audit fees and non-audit fees for samples of UK 
FTSE 350 firms, but their results are inconsistent. Based on a sample of 540 non-
financial firms, Zaman et al. (2011) argue that more frequent board meetings would 
“indicate a higher level of control” and therefore predict a positive association with 
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audit fees and a negative one with non-audit fees. Their results support their 
prediction only for the relation with audit fees, where the number of board meetings 
is found to be negatively associated with non-audit fees. On the other hand, 
Basiruddin (2011) uses a sample of 674 firms listed in the period during 2005 and 
2008 and finds a negative association between the frequency of board meetings and 
audit fees. She suggests that active boards are more likely to exert effective 
monitoring resulting in reduced assessment of control risk and therefore a narrower 
audit scope and lower audit fees. Basiruddin (2011) results reveal no significant 
association between the number of board meetings and non-audit fees. 
4.4 Overall Summary 
 This chapter provides a critical literature review of the impact of audit 
committees and boards of directors on financial reporting quality and auditor 
remuneration (audit fees and non-audit service fees).  
 The review of the studies tackling the impact of internal governance 
characteristics on financial reporting quality reveals inconsistent results. Some of 
these studies used external indicators of earnings misstatement, such as regulatory 
enforcement releases, adverse rulings and restatements, as a direct and salient 
indicator of low financial reporting quality. However, results of these studies ignore 
an exemplary population of firms having less aggressive financial reporting practices, 
and “more subtle cases of earnings management” (Dechow et al. 1996, p.31). The 
vast majority of financial reporting quality literature has used discretionary accruals 
as a proxy for the quality of earnings, but the accrual models are criticized of 
providing noisy and biased estimates. To overcome these shortcomings, this thesis 
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adopts a discretionary revenue model that was developed recently by Stubben (2010) 
and proposed as a better specified and less biased estimate of earnings management. 
On the other hand, the literature on the impact of audit committee and board 
characteristics on audit fees and non-audit service fees is reviewed based on the 
individual characteristics of each of the audit committee and board of directors. 
 In general, there are two main arguments on the association between audit 
fees and corporate governance characteristics. The first argument is based on the 
agency theory and suggests that strong governance mechanisms are more concerned 
about audit quality and therefore tend to demand a wider audit scope which in turn 
requires greater audit efforts resulting in higher audit fees. The other argument, 
however, suggests that the presence of strong governance mechanisms reduces the 
likelihood of risk leading to less audit efforts and thus lower audit fees. Results of 
the reviewed studies are mixed, however, the majority support the agency 
perspective argument and reveal a positive association between audit fees and 
corporate governance characteristics34.  
 The non-audit service fees literature is very limited. The prevalent argument 
is based on the auditor independence impairment perspective suggesting that strong 
governance mechanisms are more likely to limit the purchase of non-audit services 
to preserve auditor independence and safeguard audit quality. The results, however, 
are not supportive of this argument and reveal a positive association between most of 
the corporate governance characteristics and non-audit service fees (e.g., Zaman et al. 
2011; Basiruddin 2011).  
 Research evidence on the association between corporate governance 
characteristics and both audit fees and non-audit service fees is inconsistent. Other 
                                                          
34 These findings are consistent with those reported in the meta-analysis by Hay (2013). 
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than the study conducted by Zaman et al. (2011) on a sample of 540 FTSE 350 firms 
listed during the period 2001 to 2004, the author is not aware of any published study 
that has examined this association in the UK. Thus, there is no UK evidence on the 
relationship between corporate governance and auditor remuneration (audit fees and 
non-audit fees) in the period following the financial crisis. Table 4.1 presents a 
summary of the studies reviewed in this chapter. 
Chapter 4: Literature Review 
 
129 
 
Table 4.1 Summary of Reviewed Literature 
Study Sample Dependent variable(s) Independent variable(s) Main results 
Dechow et al. 
(1996) 
176 firms: 86 firms 
subject to SEC 
enforcement actions for 
overstating their reported 
earnings & 90 control 
firms, between 1982 & 
1992  (US) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
for firms subject to SEC 
enforcement actions 
Audit committee: establishment 
 
Board : composition, CEO 
duality, & ownership 
Fraud firms are less likely to have 
audit committees and more likely to 
have boards with more executive 
directors and CEO duality 
Beasley (1996) 150 firms: 75 fraud firms 
reported by SEC & Wall 
Street Journal Index, and 
75 control firms, 
between 1980 & 1991 
(US) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
for firms subject to SEC 
enforcement actions 
Audit committee: establishment 
 
Board : composition, CEO 
duality, & ownership 
Fraud firms’ boards are less likely to 
comprise outside directors and audit 
committees are not effective in 
precluding fraudulent financial 
reporting 
Farber (2005) 174 firms: 87 fraud firms 
reported by SEC, and 87 
control firms, between 
1982 & 2000 (US) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
for firms subject to SEC 
enforcement actions 
Audit committee: composition, 
activity, expertise, & size 
 
Board: composition, size, 
ownership, & CEO duality 
Audit committees of fraud firms have 
fewer financial experts and fewer 
meetings. Fraud firms' boards have 
fewer non-executive directors & a 
higher percentage of CEO duality. 
Persons (2005) 222 firms: 111 fraud 
firms and 111 non-fraud 
firms between the period 
June 1999 to October 
2003 (US) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
for firms subject to SEC 
enforcement actions 
Audit committee: composition, 
expertise, activity 
 
Board: composition, CEO duality 
and activity 
The likelihood of fraud is negatively 
associated with totally independent 
audit committees and the non-
separation of the roles of the CEO 
and the board chair. No association 
exists with board and audit committee 
financial expertise as well as with the 
board and audit committee number of 
meetings. 
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Table 4.1 (cont’d) 
Chen et al. 
(2006) 
338 firms: 169 subject to 
enforcement actions by 
CSRC and 169 control 
firms (China) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
for firms subject to CSRC 
enforcement actions 
Board: composition, size, activity 
and CEO duality.  
Fraud firms are associated with lower 
percentage of non-executive directors 
on the board and more frequent board 
meetings. 
Abbott et al. 
(2000) 
156 firms: 78 fraud firms 
reported by SEC, and 78 
non-fraud firms, for the 
period between 1980 and 
1996 (US) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
for firms subject to SEC 
enforcement actions 
Audit committee: composite 
measure of independence and 
activity and composition 
 
Fraud firms are negatively associated 
with audit committees that are totally 
independent and that meet at least 
twice per year. 
Song and 
Windram (2004) 
54 firms: 27 firms 
subject to adverse rulings 
by FRRP & 27 control 
firms, between 1991 & 
2000 (UK) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
for firms subject to adverse 
rulings by FRRP 
Audit committee: composition, 
activity, & financial or accounting 
expertise 
 
Board: size, composition, & 
ownership 
No association between audit 
committee characteristics and 
financial reporting quality. 
Independent directors on the board 
have positive impact on financial 
reporting quality. 
Peasnell et al. 
(2001) 
94 firms: 47 firms 
subject to adverse rulings 
by FRRP & 47 control 
firms, between 1990 & 
1998 (UK) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
for firms subject to adverse 
rulings by FRRP 
Audit committee: establishment, 
composition, & size 
 
Board: CEO duality, ownership & 
composition 
Firms with adverse rulings are less 
likely to have boards with audit 
committees, high percentage of non-
executive directors and CEO duality 
cases 
Agrawal and 
Chadha (2005) 
318 firms: 159 
restatement firms and 
159 control firms 
matched based on size 
and industry for the 
period between 2000 and 
2001 (US) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
for firms that have restated their 
earnings 
Audit committee: size, 
composition, financial expertise 
 
Board: size, composition, and 
financial expertise 
Restatement firms are less likely to 
have independent financial experts in 
their audit committees and boards. No 
association exist with the size and 
number of meetings of the board and 
the audit committee. 
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Table 4.1 (cont’d) 
Abbott et al. 
(2004) 
176 firms: 88 
restatement firms and 
88 control firms for the 
period 1991 to 1999 
(US) 
Dichotomous variable equal 
to 1 for firms that have 
restated their earnings 
Audit committee: composition, 
size, expertise, and activity 
 
Board: size, composition, and 
CEO duality 
Restatement firms are negatively 
associated with audit committees 
that are independent, meet more 
frequently and comprise at least 
one financial expert. Board size is 
positively related to the likelihood 
of financial restatement. 
Lin et al. 
(2006) 
212 firms: 106 
restatement firms and 
106 control firms 
matched based on total 
assets and SIC code 
for the fiscal year 2000 
(US) 
Dichotomous variable equal 
to 1 for firms that have 
restated their earnings 
Audit committee: composition, 
size, expertise, and activity 
 
 
Restatement likelihood is 
negatively related to audit 
committee size.  
Archambeault 
et al. (2008) 
306 firms: 153 
restatement firms and 
153 matched control 
firms, for the period 
1999 to 2002 (US) 
Dichotomous variable equal 
to 1 for firms that have 
restated their earnings 
Audit committee: composition, 
expertise, and activity 
Non-executive directors on the 
audit committee are negatively 
associated with the likelihood of 
earnings restatement. 
Carcello et al. 
(2011) 
208 firms: 104 
restatement firms and 
104 control firms 
matched based on 
stock exchange, 
industry and size for 
the period 2000 to 
2001 (US) 
Dichotomous variable equal 
to 1 for firms that have 
restated their earnings 
Audit committee: composition, 
expertise, activity and size 
 
Board: size and CEO duality  
Restatement likelihood is 
negatively associated with audit 
committees that are solely 
independent, comprise at least one 
financial expert and composed of 
at least three members. CEO 
involvement in board members 
selection reduces the effectiveness 
of these findings. 
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Table 4.1 (cont’d) 
Abdullah et al. 
(2010) 
62 firms: 31 
restatement firms and 
31 control firms for the 
period 2002 and 2005 
(Malaysia) 
Dichotomous variable equal 
to 1 for firms that have 
restated their earnings 
Audit committee: composition 
 
Board: independence and CEO 
duality 
Audit committees comprised of 
solely independent members are 
positively associated with earnings 
restatements. 
Vafeas (2005) 1621 firms between 
1994 & 2000 (US) 
Small earnings increase and 
negative earnings avoidance 
Audit committee: composition, 
size & activity  
 
Board: composition, size & 
ownership 
Earnings quality is negatively 
associated with audit committee 
insiders and positively associated 
with audit committee frequency 
and board outsiders 
Peasnell et al. 
(2005) 
1271 firms between 
1993 and 1995 (UK) 
Discretionary accruals: 
Modified Jones model 
Audit committee: 
establishment 
 
Board: composition, size, CEO 
duality & ownership 
There is less income-increasing 
accrual management when the 
proportion of outside directors on 
the board is high, and no 
association exists with audit 
committees 
Ghosh et al. 
(2010) 
9290 firms between 
1998 and 2005 (US) 
Performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals, special 
item & deferred tax expense 
Audit committee: composition, 
size, activity, ownership & 
expertise 
 
Board: composition, size & 
CEO duality 
Audit committee & board sizes are 
negatively associated with 
earnings management. Frequency 
of audit committee meetings, 
however, is positively related to 
earnings management. 
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Table 4.1 (Cont’d) 
Krishnan and 
Visvanathan 
(2008) 
929 firms between 
2000 and 2002 (US) 
Accounting conservatism Audit committee: expertise, 
composition, size & activity 
 
Board: size, composition, CEO 
duality   
Accounting financial expertise is 
positively related to conservatism. 
Xie et al. 
(2003) 
282 firms (S&P 500 
index) for years 1992, 
1994, & 1996 (US) 
Discretionary accruals: Jones 
model 
Audit committee: activity, size, 
composition & expertise 
 
Board: CEO duality, activity, 
composition, size & expertise 
Audit committees and boards 
having higher percentage of non-
executive directors, more 
corporate and financial 
background members and higher 
number of meetings are more 
likely to constrain earnings 
management 
Klein (2002a) 692 firms (S&P 500) 
for years 1992 & 1993 
(US) 
Discretionary accruals: 
Modified-Jones model 
Audit committee: composition 
 
Board: composition & 
ownership 
Negative association exists 
between independent non-
executive directors on the board 
and audit committee on the one 
hand and earnings management on 
the other. However, no 
relationship exists when the audit 
committee or the board comprises 
only independent directors. 
Bedard et al. 
(2004) 
300 firms in the year 
1996 (US) 
Discretionary accruals: 
Modified Jones model 
Audit committee: expertise, 
composition, size & activity 
The presence of independent audit 
committee members having 
financial & governance expertise 
is negatively associated with 
earnings management. 
Chapter 4: Literature Review 
 
134 
Table 4.1 (Cont’d) 
Osma and 
Noguer (2007) 
155 firms from 1999 to 
2001 (Spain) 
Discretionary accruals: Jones 
model, Jones cash-flow 
model & the marginal model 
Audit committee: composition 
& ownership 
 
Board: composition & 
ownership 
No association exists between the 
audit committee and earnings 
management. Independent 
directors on the board were found 
to be positively related to EM, 
except in the presence of a 
nomination committee including a 
majority of institutional directors.  
Peasnell et al. 
(2000) 
1260 firms divided 
equally between pre- 
(1990-1991) & post-
Cadbury (1994-1995) 
periods (UK) 
Discretionary accruals: 
Modified Jones model 
Audit committee: 
establishment 
 
Board: composition, size & 
ownership 
Negative association exists 
between income-increasing 
accrual management & the 
proportion of non-executive 
directors only in the post-Cadbury 
period  
Park and Shin 
(2004) 
539 firms for the 
period between 1991 
and 1997 (Canada) 
Discretionary accruals: 
Modified Jones model 
Board: composition The percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board has no 
impact on earnings management. 
Ebrahim 
(2007) 
2360 firms for the 
period from 1999 to 
2000 (US) 
Discretionary accruals: 
Modified Jones model 
Audit committee: composition 
and activity 
 
Board: composition and 
activity 
Accrual-based earnings 
management is more likely to be 
constrained in the presence of 
independent audit committees and 
boards. Audit committees that are 
both independent and active are 
even more capable of curbing 
earnings management. 
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Table 4.1 (Cont’d) 
Rahman and 
Ali (2006) 
97 largest listed firms 
by market 
capitalization for the 
period 2002 to 2003 
(Malaysia) 
Discretionary accruals: 
Modified Jones model 
Audit committee: composition, 
expertise and activity 
 
Board: composition, size and 
CEO duality 
Board size is positively related to 
earnings management. No 
association exist with the other 
audit committee and board 
characteristics. 
Davidson et al. 
(2005) 
434 listed firms in the 
year ending 2000. 
Discretionary accruals: 
Modified Jones model 
 
Small earnings increase 
Audit committee: existence, 
composition, size and activity 
 
Board: composition, CEO 
duality 
Accrual-based earnings 
management is more likely to be 
constrained with higher percentage 
of non-executive directors on the 
board and the audit committee.  
Audit committee existence is 
negatively associated with 
earnings management when the 
latter is measured by small 
earnings increase. 
Habbash 
(2010) 
448 FTSE 350 firms 
between the period 
2003 and 2006 
Discretionary accruals: 
Performance Adjusted 
Modified Jones  
Audit committee: size, activity, 
composition & expertise 
 
Board: size, activity, 
composition, chairman 
independence & female 
directorship 
Among the audit committee 
characteristics, independence and 
financial expertise were found to 
be negatively associated with 
earnings management. 
Independent directors on the board 
and board size were also found to 
have a negative relationship. 
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Table 4.1 (Cont’d) 
Basiruddin 
(2011) 
674 FTSE 350 
firms between the 
period 2005 and 
2008 
Discretionary 
accruals: Jones, 
Modified-Jones & 
Performance Adjusted 
Modified-Jones 
 
Audit fees and non-
audit fees 
Audit committee: 
composition, expertise, 
activity & size 
 
Board: composition, size, 
activity & expertise 
Among all the audit committee and board 
characteristics, only audit committee size has a 
weak negative relationship with earnings 
management. 
Zaman et 
al. (2011) 
540 FTSE 350 
non-financial 
firms for the 
period 2001 to 
2004 (UK) 
Audit fees and non-
audit fees 
Audit committee: 
effectiveness (composite 
measure), composition, 
activity, expertise & size. 
 
Board: composition, activity 
& duality 
Audit committee effectiveness in larger clients is 
positively related to audit fees and non-audit fees. 
Individually, AC independence, meetings & size 
along with board meetings are positively related to 
audit fees. However, CEO duality is negatively 
related to audit fees. Regarding non-audit fees 
results reveal a negative association with AC 
independence and expertise, and a positive one with 
AC size, non-executive directors on the board and 
board meetings. 
Abbott et 
al. (2003b) 
538 firms that had 
filed proxies with 
SEC between 
February 5 and 
June 30 2001 
(US) 
Ratio non-audit fees 
to audit fees 
Audit committee: 
effectiveness (dichotomous 
variable equal to 1 if the AC is 
composed solely of 
independent directors and 
meets at least four times a 
year  
Audit committees that include only independent 
directors and meet at least four times a year are 
negatively associated with the non-audit to audit fee 
ratio  
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Table 4.1 (Cont’d) 
Carcello et al. 
(2002) 
258 non-financial 
firms from Fortune 
1000 for the year 
ended Apr.1992 to 
Mar.1993 (US) 
Audit fees Audit committee: 
composition, expertise & 
activity 
 
Board: composition, 
expertise & activity 
AC expertise and independence were found to be 
positively related to audit fees. 
Also the number of board meetings along with board 
independence and expertise were found to be 
positively related to audit fees. However, when 
combining both audit committee and board 
characteristics in the same model only board 
characteristics remain related to audit fees 
O’Sullivan 
(2000) 
402 quoted large firms 
for the year 1992 (UK) 
Audit fees Board: composition, 
ownership & CEO duality 
A positive relationship exists between non-executive 
directors on the board and audit fees. No association 
exist between audit fees on the one hand and CEO 
duality and block-holders on the other, but a negative 
association exists with managerial ownership. 
Lee and Mande 
(2005) 
780 firms in the year 
ended Dec. 31,2000 
(US) 
Audit fees; 
Non-audit 
fees & ratio 
non-audit to 
audit fees 
Audit committee: 
effectiveness 
(independence and 
activity), composition, 
activity & financial 
expertise 
Independent and active audit committees are 
positively associated with audit fees. 
Modelling non-audit fees endogenously reveals no 
association with audit committee effectiveness. 
Bliss (2011) 799 listed firms in the 
year 2003 (Australia) 
Audit fees Board: size, composition 
and CEO duality 
Board independence and size are positively associated 
with audit fees. However, the positive relationship 
between board independence and audit fees does not 
hold in firms with CEO duality 
Tsui et al. 
(2001) 
650 firms from the 
period of 1994 to 1996 
(Hong Kong) 
Audit fees Board: CEO duality There is negative association between audit fees and 
CEO duality suggesting that the latter increases 
control risk leading to a wider audit scope and higher 
audit fees 
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Table 4.1 (Cont’d) 
Voeller et al. 
(2013) 
785 firms from the 
German Prime 
Standard for the years 
2006,2007 & 2008 
(Germany) 
Audit fees Audit committee: Existence 
 
Board: activity and size 
Audit committee existence and board meetings were 
found to be positively related to audit fees. An 
increase in the board size, however, leads to an 
increase in the audit fees only if this increase (in board 
size) is required by law and not a result of voluntary 
appointments. 
O'Sullivan and 
Diacon (2002) 
117 largest insurance 
firms in the year 1992 
(UK) 
Audit fees Audit committee: Existence 
& composition 
 
Board: Composition, CEO 
duality & composition 
Audit committee existence was found to be positively 
related to audit fees. No association exists between 
either of the audit committee or the board composition 
and audit fees. 
Rustam et al. 
(2013) 
50 firms for the period 
2007 to 2011 
(Pakistan) 
Audit fees Audit committee: size, 
activity, composition 
&financial expertise  
 
Board: size, activity & 
composition 
Audit committee independence along with its 
frequency of meetings are positively related to audit 
fees 
Redmayne et 
al. (2011) 
204 public firms for 
the years 1998 to 2000 
(New Zealand) 
Audit fees Audit committee: existence  Audit committees were found to be positively related 
to audit fees in profit-oriented public firms, but 
negatively associated with those in public-benefit 
entities 
Boo and 
Sharma (2008) 
469 listed firms with 
assets greater than 
$1bn in 2001 (US) 
Audit fees Audit committee: 
composition & size 
 
Board: composition & size 
Associations between audit committee or board 
independence and size with audit fees are stronger for 
non-regulated firms than for regulated. 
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Table 4.1 (Cont’d) 
Hassan and 
Naser (2013) 
30 non-financial firms 
listed in the ADX in 
the year 2011 (Abu 
Dhabi) 
Audit fees Audit committee: 
composition 
Audit committee independence is negatively related to 
audit fees 
O'Sullivan 
(1999) 
146 largest non-
financial firms for the 
year 1995 (UK) 
Audit fees Audit committee: size, 
composition 
 
Board: CEO duality, 
composition, tenure of non-
executive directors  
Neither the audit committee nor the board has an 
effect on audit fees. 
Quick et al. 
(2013) 
330 listed firms from 
2005 to 2007 
(Germany) 
Ratio non-
audit fees to 
total fees 
Audit committee: existence No association exists between the existence of audit 
committees and non-audit fees ratio 
Collier and 
Gregory (1996) 
315 FTSE 500 firms 
for the year 1991 (UK) 
Audit fees Audit committee: existence The presence of an audit committee is more likely to 
increase audit fees and reduce risks of auditor 
independence impairment 
Krishnan and 
Visvanathan 
(2009) 
807 S&P 500 firms for 
the years from 2000 to 
2002 (US)   
Audit fees Audit committee: 
composition, activity & 
financial expertise 
 
Board: composition, size, 
CEO duality, ownership & 
activity 
In the presence of a strong governance system, 
accounting financial experts were found to be 
negatively related to audit fees. Also the results reveal 
a negative association of audit fees with CEO duality 
and a positive one with audit committee and board 
meetings 
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Table 4.1 (Cont’d) 
Ittonen et al. 
(2010) 
941 S&P 500 firms for the 
years 2006 to 2008 (US) 
Audit 
fees 
Audit committee: size, 
activity, financial 
expertise & female 
representation 
Audit committees chaired by females are associated 
with lower audit fees. Audit committee meetings and 
size are positively related to audit fees 
Abbott et al. 
(2003a) 
492 non-regulated firms, 
audited by Big 5 auditors & 
had filed proxy statements 
with the SEC from Feb 5,2001 
to June 30,2001 (US) 
Audit 
fees 
Audit committee: 
expertise, activity & 
composition 
 
Board: size & 
composition 
Audit committees which comprise solely of 
independent directors and include at least one member 
with financial expertise are associated with higher audit 
fees. Non-executive directors on the board along with 
board meetings are positively associated with audit 
fees. 
Vafeas and 
Waegelein 
(2007) 
767 firms listed in the Fortune 
500 in the years 2001 to 2002 
Audit 
fees 
Audit committee: 
composition, activity, 
member expertise and 
size 
 
Board: size, activity and 
composition  
Audit committee size and independence along with 
committee member expertise and board meetings are 
found to be positively related to audit fees. Percentage 
of outside directors on the board, however, is 
negatively associated with audit fees. 
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Chapter 5 
Hypotheses Development and Research 
Design 
5.1 Introduction 
 After choosing the theoretical framework of this research and reviewing the 
relevant literature, this chapter develops the research hypotheses and the relevant 
methodology used to test these hypotheses. The hypotheses development and the 
research design of each of the financial reporting quality models and the auditor 
remuneration models are presented separately. For each model, the hypotheses are 
stated based on a development of a theoretical link between the dependent and the 
independent variables. The measurements of the dependent variables (earnings 
management, auditor remuneration) and the independent variables (audit committee 
and board characteristics) as well as the control variables (firm-specific 
characteristics) are presented and discussed. Then the models’ specifications along 
with the sources of data and the sample selection procedures are presented. Finally, 
before concluding the chapter, the analytical procedures are discussed. 
5.2 Hypotheses Development and Research 
Design– Empirical One 
5.2.1 Audit Committee Effectiveness and Financial 
Reporting Quality 
 Agency theory suggests that the agent (manager) is given decision-making 
authority to perform some services on behalf of the principal (shareholders). As the 
incentives of the agent may sometimes diverge from those of the principal, the 
former is perceived to behave in a self-serving manner trying to achieve personal 
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gains at the expense of the latter’s wealth. As such, the principal relies on various 
tools to alleviate any conflict of interest and ensure alignment of incentives with the 
agent. One of the tools employed by the principal is the board of directors and its 
committees. The audit committee, being an extension of the board, is “the ultimate 
monitor” of the financial reporting process (BRC 1999). The UK Corporate 
Governance Code addresses the concerns regarding the agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders and delegates to audit committees the responsibility: 
to monitor the integrity of the financial statements of the company and 
any formal announcements relating to the company’s financial 
performance, reviewing significant financial reporting judgements 
contained in them (FRC 2012, C.3.2)  
 Moreover, given that the ownership structure of UK public firms is dispersed, 
and that shareholders’ identity changes from time to time, shareholders are not able 
to monitor managers effectively (Osma and Noguer 2007). Instead, they rely more 
on financial statements to exert monitoring and ameliorate information asymmetry 
(Ball and Shivakumar 2005). Furthermore, given the same fact and due to the agency 
conflict between managers and shareholders, the likelihood of managers behaving 
opportunistically and manipulating earnings will increase, and reported earnings will 
become less informative to shareholders (Osma and Noguer 2007; Park and Shin 
2004). Therefore, audit committees are the monitory mechanisms employed to 
ensure the flow of transparent reporting between management and shareholders 
(Pincus et al. 1989; Bradbury 1990). 
 The most common characteristics used in the literature to gauge audit 
committee effectiveness are independence, financial expertise, meetings frequency 
and size (e.g., Bedard et al. 2004; Xie et al. 2003; Klein 2002a; Ghosh et al. 2010).  
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5.2.1.1 Audit Committee Independence   
 Theoretically, from an agency perspective, shareholders might have conflicts 
with managers due to a divergence in incentives. In this case, the employment of 
non-executive directors can alleviate agency conflicts and reduce information 
asymmetry. Accordingly, intense emphasis is put on audit committees to be totally 
independent, notwithstanding that executive directors have more firm-specific and 
industrial information than their non-executive counterparts. An SEC report in 1980 
notes that a firm without an audit committee may be better off than having one with 
executive members, as shareholders will be misled in the belief that the audit 
committee is discharging its monitory role effectively (Menon and Williams 1994). 
Interestingly, Carcello and Neal (2000) have investigated the impact of audit 
committee independence on financially distressed firms with an audit report 
including a going-concern assumption and find that auditors are less likely to issue 
going-concern reports when audit committees of financially distressed firms include 
a high proportion of affiliated directors. Therefore, and consistent with the 
practitioners’ and regulators’ call for stronger independence in audit committees 
after the financial crisis (e.g., KPMG 2012; OECD 2009), this study conjecture that 
independent audit committee members play a crucial role in enhancing financial 
reporting quality. As such it hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between audit committee 
independence and financial reporting quality. 
5.2.1.2 Audit Committee Relevant Financial Experience   
 Based on agency theory, an audit committee is employed in high agency 
costs situations to alleviate agency problems and ensure the flow of transparent 
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information between the agent and the principal (Bradbury 1990; Pincus et al. 1989). 
In addressing agency concerns, the UK Corporate Governance Code requires that 
audit committees include at least one member with recent and relevant financial 
experience to be responsible for reviewing significant financial reporting judgements 
in the financial statements. Recently, scholars have investigated the impact of 
different types of audit committee financial experts on financial reporting quality. 
For instance, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) have examined the impact of audit 
committee members with accounting financial expertise, versus those with non-
accounting financial expertise, on accounting conservatism and found that only 
members with accounting expertise can enhance financial reporting quality. Given 
the concerns raised about firms manipulating revenues after the crisis and that 
revenue recognition is industry-specific, this study conjectures that audit committee 
members with relevant financial experience are effective monitors of a firm’s 
financial reporting process.  
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between audit committee relevant 
financial experience and financial reporting quality.  
5.2.1.3 Audit Committee Size 
 The UK Governance Code requires that audit committees comprise at least 
three independent non-executive directors. Empirical evidence on the relationship 
between audit committee size and financial reporting quality is diverse. While 
Vafeas (2005), Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008), Xie et al. (2003) and Bedard et al. 
(2004) find that no relationship exists, Ghosh et al. (2010) report that larger audit 
committees are more effective in overseeing the financial reporting process. 
Conversely, Jensen (1993) argue that as the size of the board gets larger, the board 
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will tend to be less effective. Interestingly, Beasley and Salterio (2001) find that the 
inclusion of more outside directors with “relevant financial reporting and audit 
committee knowledge and experience” than the mandated minimum requirement 
will bolster audit committee effectiveness (p.539). Given the UK Governance Code 
requirement that all audit committee members are independent and the need for 
directors with relevant financial experience to deal with firm-specific revenue 
recognition practices post-crisis, this study contends that large audit committees 
increase the breadth of knowledge needed in the absence of executive directors who 
are more knowledgeable of the firm-specific information. Therefore, it hypothesizes 
that:   
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between audit committee size and 
financial reporting quality. 
5.2.1.4 Audit Committee Meetings  
 Empirical evidence on the relation between audit committee meetings and 
financial reporting quality is mixed. While Vafeas (2005) and Xie et al. (2003) find 
that the frequency of audit committee meetings has a positive impact on financial 
reporting quality, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) and Bedard et al. (2004) do not 
find any association at all. From an agency perspective, companies with high agency 
costs will increase monitoring activity to reduce these costs (Collier and Gregory 
1999). Interestingly, Ghosh et al. (2010) find that discretionary accruals are 
positively associated with audit committee meetings, suggesting that audit 
committees have a reactive role in constraining aggressive financial reporting, and 
that firms increase the frequency of audit committee meetings after periods of high 
abnormal accruals. In the same vein, and following Jensen (1993)’s argument that 
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boards become more active after facing problems, Vafeas (1999) argues that boards 
tend to increase their meeting frequency after the firm’s decline in performance. 
Therefore, given firms’ poor performance after the crisis this study hypothesizes that:  
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between audit committee meetings 
and financial reporting quality.  
5.2.2 Corporate Boards and Financial Reporting Quality 
 Studying the impact of the board of directors’ monitory role over financial 
reporting quality in the UK, Peasnell et al. (2005) argue that establishing an audit 
committee does not exempt the board from being involved in the financial reporting 
process, as the latter relies on the accounting figures to compensate management and 
take operating and investment decisions.  
 As the audit committee is a sub-committee of the board, audit committee 
effectiveness is directly related to the effectiveness of the board (Vafeas 2005). 
Moreover, as a monitory governance mechanism employed by shareholders to 
mitigate agency conflicts with management, the board will not have effective control 
unless it is capable of curtailing managerial discretionary decisions (Beasley 1996). 
This implies that effective boards are associated with higher financial reporting 
quality. Given that the effectiveness of the board’s monitory role depends on its 
structure and organization (Peasnell et al. 2005), the used board variables are as 
follows. 
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5.2.2.1 Non-Executive Directors 35  
 Dechow et al. (1996) and Beasley (1996) find that non-executive directors on 
the board are effective in constraining fraudulent financial reporting. Similarly, Klein 
(2002a) examines the impact of independent boards on earnings management and 
finds a negative association. In the UK, while studying the impact of board 
composition on financial reporting quality pre- and post-Cadbury, Peasnell et al. 
(2000) find that outside directors became more effective post-Cadbury. These types 
of evidence are consistent with the agency theory, where non-executive directors on 
the board are expected to mitigate information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders. A board’s demand for executive directors having direct knowledge 
“about their firm’s operations and investment horizons”, however, “increases with 
the firms’ complexity and uncertainties” (Klein 2002b, p.438). Moreover, a high 
proportion of outside directors on the board are accused of failing to act instantly and 
urgently in crisis environments (Williamson 2008), as they may curb the manager’s 
discretion and “limit their capacity to respond to the contingencies of a financial 
crisis” (Van Essen et al. 2013, p.4). Therefore, this study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relationship between non-executive directors and 
financial reporting quality. 
5.2.2.2 CEO Duality   
 Agency problems could occur as a result of the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) serving as a chair of a board. For instance, since the chair is expected to 
monitor the CEO (Jensen 1993), CEO duality will impair the objectivity of the board 
                                                          
35 Including both affiliated and non-affiliated directors as “board independence reflects the trade-off 
between director independence and director expertise” and “affiliated directors or their companies 
have ties with the firm and often provide expertise to the firm about suppliers, customers, financial 
opportunities, or legal issues”(Klein 2002b, p.438). 
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and make its role dysfunctional. Moreover, providing evidence from the UK, Collier 
and Gregory (1999) find that there is a reduction in audit committee activity when 
the roles of the CEO and the chairman of the board are not separated. In the context 
of the financial crisis, however, this study argues that as firms suffer from poor 
performance, board effectiveness will be associated with CEO duality where the 
latter “conveys a sense of unity of command and strong leadership to stakeholders 
[…] creating an illusion of managerial efficacy [which] is most important when firm 
performance is poor” (Finkelstein and D'Aveni 1994, p.1087). As such this study 
hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive relationship between CEO duality and financial 
reporting quality. 
5.2.2.3 Board Meetings  
 Consistent with the agency perspective, Vafeas (1999) conjectures that the 
diligence of the board is a determinant of board effectiveness. Moreover, he evinces 
that as the board members meet more frequently, they will be more likely to achieve 
the incentives of shareholders. Similarly, Carcello et al. (2002) argue that directors 
of the board who meet more frequently are more effective in discharging their 
responsibilities and strengthening the financial reporting oversight process. Given a 
firm’s poor performance after the crisis, and that board meetings become more 
frequent after a decline in performance (Vafeas 1999), this study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 7: There is a negative relationship between board meetings and financial 
reporting quality. 
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5.2.2.4 Board Size   
 Ghosh et al. (2010) examine the impact of board size on financial reporting 
quality and find that companies with large boards have better financial reporting 
quality. They suggest that adding members to the board will increase the breadth of 
knowledge needed to exert an effective monitoring over the financial reporting 
process. Jensen (1993), however, articulates that adding more members to the board 
is linked with the incremental cost of poor communication associated with larger 
groups. Consistent with Jensen (1993), this study argues that small boards could 
deter confusion and facilitate the quick decision-making processes needed in crisis 
environments. As such it hypothesizes that:  
Hypothesis 8: There is a negative relationship between board size and financial 
reporting quality. 
5.2.3 Measurement of the Dependent Variables  
 There is no universally agreed upon measure for financial reporting quality 
(Feng et al. 2011). As mentioned in chapter three, the vast majority of studies use 
earnings management proxies, and specifically discretionary accruals, to proxy for 
financial reporting quality. Altamuro et al. (2005) argue that manipulating the 
recognition of revenues is one of the “earnings management tricks employed to mask 
the true consequences of management’s decisions” (p.376). Given that expected 
revenue manipulations in the sample period will lead to misleading earnings 
management (Altamuro et al. 2005), this study adopts the following earnings 
management definition: 
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of 
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the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers (Healy and Wahlen 1999, p.368). 
 
 As mentioned in chapter three, this study uses the discretionary revenues and 
the performance adjusted discretionary accruals as surrogates for financial reporting 
quality. Following Xie et al. (2003), Klein (2002a) and Stubben (2010), cross-
sectional estimates of these models are used because they are more specified than the 
time series ones (Subramanyam 1996). As such, and following similar studies (e.g., 
Habbash et al. 2012; Ghosh et al. 2010; Basiruddin 2011), both measures are estimated 
separately for each firm-year group including at least 6 firms with the same two-digit 
International Classification Benchmark (ICB) code36 .The purpose behind using these 
proxies is to account for the possibility of a firm switching from one earnings 
management method to another (Zang 2011), as well as to reduce measurement error. 
The first cardinal proxy is discretionary revenues, the absolute value of the error 
term in the following Stubben (2010) model: 
∆ARi,t = α0 + β1∆Ri,t + εi,t ,               (12) 
where ∆ARi,t represents the annual change in accounts receivable and ∆Ri,t represents 
the annual change in revenues, each scaled by lagged total assets. This study’s 
distinction in using this proxy stems from the following: first, addressing the 
concerns about misleading revenue recognition practices, it is the best measure to 
detect expected revenue manipulations after the financial crisis; second, the revenue 
model is less biased, better specified and more likely to reduce measurement error 
than accrual models (Stubben 2010)37. Finally, “improper revenue recognition is the 
single largest issue contributing to financial restatements” (Altamuro et al. 2005, 
p.374).  
                                                          
36 The ICB code is used, instead of the SIC one, because it is adopted by the majority of world’s 
exchanges including the LSE.  
37 Refer to Stubben (2010) for evidence on the reliability of revenue models versus accrual models in 
their ability to detect actual and simulated manipulations. 
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 Based on Kothari et al. (2005), the second proxy is the absolute value of the 
error term in the following performance-adjusted Modified Jones model: 
 ACC = α0 + α 1 (∆Ri,t - ∆ARi,t ) + α 2 PPE i,t + α 3 ROA i,t-1  + εi,t ,                    (13) 
where ACC are total accruals measured as the difference between earnings before 
extraordinary items and cash from operations38, ∆Ri,t is changes in revenues, ∆ARi,t is 
changes in accounts receivable, PPE i,t is end of the year property, plant and 
equipment, and ROA i,t-1 is return on assets for firm i at year t-1. All variables in the 
equation above, excluding ROA and the intercept, are scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the year.  
 Following Salama et al. (2010) and Warfield et al. (1995), and because of 
managers’ incentives to use both income increasing and income decreasing earnings 
management, the author uses the absolute value of discretionary accruals and 
discretionary revenues to include the combined effect of both types of earnings 
management (Abdul Rahman and Ali 2006). Although managers are expected to 
manipulate revenues upward in the post-crisis period to hide firms’ poor 
performance, some might have incentives to “take a bath” and aim to achieve future 
earnings’ targets through manipulating revenues downward39.  
5.2.4 Measurement of the Control Variables 
 This study has adopted firm characteristics variables used in relatively similar 
studies and found to be significantly correlated with earnings management proxies 
(e.g., Klein 2002a; Bedard et al. 2004). These variables are:  
                                                          
38 As stated in chapter three, there are two approaches for computing total accruals, the balance sheet 
approach and the cash flow approach. The author uses the latter as the former would result in 
“measurement error in accruals estimates” (Hribar and Collins 2002, p.105). 
39 Taking a bath  could be through engaging in income-decreasing earnings management and further 
decrease current earnings in an attempt to meet or beat future targets. 
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 Managerial ownership (MANOWN): Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest 
that increasing executive ownership will lower agency costs. Managerial 
ownership is expected to align managers’ and shareholders’ incentives 
through curtailing managers’ opportunistic behaviours thus leading to better 
financial reporting quality.  
 Block-holders (BLOCK): concentrated ownership is associated with lower 
agency costs as it provides direct monitory incentives (Abbott et al. 2003b), 
and is expected to curtail aggressive earnings management (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Moreover, examining the impact of institutional monitoring 
on aggressive earnings management, Chung et al. (2002) find that  managers’ 
opportunistic behaviours are curbed by large institutional owners. Therefore 
this study expects a positive relationship with financial reporting quality. 
 Leverage (LEV): given the recession in the 2008 crisis, this study posits that 
highly leveraged firms will have incentives to increase income through 
manipulating revenues to avoid debt covenant violation. Hence, it predicts a 
negative association between leverage and financial reporting quality. 
 Growth (GROWTH): Matsumoto (2002) argues that managers of high-
growth firms are inclined to avoid missing earnings targets and manipulate 
earnings upward. As such, using market-to-book ratio (M/B) as a proxy for 
growth, this study predicts a negative relationship with financial reporting 
quality. 
 Firm size (SIZE): associated with higher political costs, larger firms are more 
likely to be involved in aggressive earnings management to reduce these 
costs (Watts and Zimmerman 1990; Warfield et al. 1995). Thus this study 
expects a negative association with financial reporting quality. 
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 Cash flow from operating activities (CFO): Good performance of firms with 
high operating cash flows reduces their likelihood to engage in income 
increasing earnings management (Becker et al. 1998; Jiang et al. 2008). 
However, managers of firms facing economic shocks may go for accelerated 
revenue recognition practices to hide poor current performance (Leuz et al. 
2003). Hence this study predicts a negative relationship with financial 
reporting quality. 
 Loss in either or both of previous two years (LOSS): Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) provide evidence that firms with slightly negative earnings are 
inclined to exercise discretion to report positive earnings. Moreover, Pucheta-
Martínez and de Fuentes (2007) find a significant negative relationship 
between firms incurring losses in either one or both of the two previous years 
and financial reporting quality. Therefore this study predicts a negative 
association between this variable and financial reporting quality. 
5.2.5 Model Specification  
The hypotheses are tested using the following regression model: 
FRQ = β0 + β1 ACM + β2 ACS + β3 ACI + β4 ACRX + β5 NEDs + β6 DUAL + β7 BM 
+ β8 BS + β9 MANOWN + β10 BLOCK + β11 LEV + β12 GROWTH + β13 
CFO + β14 SIZE + β15 LOSS + ε                         (14) 
where: 
Dependent variable 
FRQ = Financial reporting quality, measured by the following two ways: (1) 
DiscRev, which is the absolute value of the residuals in the Stubben 
(2010) discretionary revenue model, and (2) DiscAcc, which is the 
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absolute value of the residuals in the performance-adjusted modified 
Jones accrual model. 
Independent variables 
ACM =  Number of audit committee meetings held in a given year. 
ACS =  Total number of audit committee members. 
ACI =  The percentage of independent directors on the audit committee. 
ACRX = The percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial 
expertise on the audit committee. 
NEDs =  The percentage of non-executive directors on the board. 
DUAL =  Indicator variable with a value of 1 if the CEO also serves as a chair 
of the board. 
BM  =  Frequency of board meetings held during a year. 
BS = Number of directors on the board. 
MANOWN = Percentage of total shares held by executive directors to total number 
of shares. 
BLOCK      =  Percentage ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5 percent or 
more of outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated with 
management.  
LEV =  Total long-term debt to total assets. 
GROWTH =  Market to book ratio. 
CFO =  Cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total assets.  
SIZE =  Natural logarithm of total assets at year end. 
LOSS =  Indicator variable with a value of 1 if a firm incurred losses in either 
one or both of the previous two years. 
ε =  Error term 
 
5.3 Hypotheses Development and Research Design 
– Empirical Two 
5.3.1 Audit Committee Effectiveness, Audit Fees and 
Non-Audit Fees 
 Audit committees play an important role in determining the scope of audit 
and the compensation of external auditors (Kalbers and Fogarty 1993). Specifically, 
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they play a crucial role in appointing, retaining and removing the external auditor as 
well as in approving the remuneration and terms of engagement of the auditor (FRC 
2012). Moreover, the audit committee is responsible to monitor the independence of 
the external auditor and review the provision of non-audit services by the latter, 
identifying and recommending to the board on any matters which may arise (FRC 
2012). These roles are not just expected to reduce information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders, but also to protect external auditors from fraud 
allegations through enhancing the auditor independence from management 
(Eisenhardt 1989). 
 There are a limited number of studies which have examined the impact of 
corporate governance on audit fees and non-audit fees. In their meta-analysis of the 
demand and supply attributes of audit fees, Hay et al. (2006b) find that in addition to 
the scarcity of research on the relationship between audit fees and corporate 
governance, the direction of this relationship, whether it is positive or negative, is 
still not understood. Extant literature reveals two theoretical arguments behind this 
ambiguity in the relationship. The first argument is based on the agency theory and 
suggests that higher audit fees would result from the audit committee’s demand for 
greater audit efforts to ensure higher audit quality (Zaman et al. 2011). On the other 
hand, the second argument suggests that strong governance mechanisms are more 
likely to reduce risk thus leading to decrease in audit efforts and in turn audit fees 
(Zaman et al. 2011). 
 In the same vein, an important aspect of the oversight role that audit 
committees are expected to discharge is illustrated in monitoring the provision of 
non-audit services and the extent to which this provision will have a negative effect 
on auditor independence. Abbott et al. (2003b) argue that at the time that non-audit 
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services have a slight impact on the ability of the auditor to detect a material 
misstatement, these services are perceived to reduce “the auditor’s willingness to 
report a material misstatement” (Abbott et al. 2003b, p.221). Several studies have 
supported this argument confirming that the provision of non-audit services by the 
incumbent auditor would impair auditors’ objectivity and compromise their 
independence (e.g., Hay et al. 2006a; Firth 1997). They suggest that the 
simultaneous provision of audit services and non-audit services might create 
excessively high desires for auditors to maintain their clients and sustain lucrative 
income even if this is at the expense of compromising the auditors’ independence 
(Zaman et al. 2011). This is consistent with the agency perspective where the joint 
provision of audit services and non-audit services is expected to result in moral 
hazard agency conflicts (Quick et al. 2013). As such, the audit committee is the 
monitoring mechanism delegated by the board of directors to reduce these conflicts 
through reviewing the external auditors’ supply of non-audit services and monitoring 
auditors’ independence. 
 Regulatory recommendations about auditor independence are also consistent 
with the agency perspective and suggest that the audit committee is not only 
incentivised to limit non-audit services purchases, but also has the right to act as a 
stakeholder in the purchase decision (Abbott et al. 2003b). Abbott et al. (2003b) 
argue that the committee could either directly or indirectly affect the purchase of 
non-audit services. First, impairing the independence of auditors represents a direct 
reasonable reason for the audit committee to influence the purchase of non-audit 
services decisions. Alternatively, an indirect effect suggests that management would 
respond to an effective and vigilant audit committee by voluntarily limiting the 
purchase of non-audit services. 
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 The most common audit committee characteristics used by scholars to 
examine the effectiveness of audit committees on audit fees and non-audit service 
fees are: independence, financial expertise, size and meetings (e.g., Zaman et al. 
2011; Lee and Mande 2005; Basiruddin 2011; Rustam et al. 2013; Ittonen et al. 2010; 
Carcello et al. 2002). 
5.3.1.1 Audit Committee Independence   
 Watts and Zimmerman (1983) theorize that the conduction of an audit by 
someone who is independent of management (the external auditor) tends to reduce 
agency conflicts that result from the divergence of interests between managers and 
shareholders. Independent directors are therefore appointed to the board to 
attentively oversee the management-auditor relationship, monitor the audit process 
and ultimately protect the independence of auditors from management. Empirical 
evidence from different contexts supports this argument.  
 For instance, Hope et al. (2012) find that shareholders have more agency 
conflicts with CEOs than with independent directors. Similarly, providing evidence 
from an emerging country, Rustam et al. (2013) find that audit fees are negatively 
related to executive directors on the audit committee and conclude that the roles of 
the audit committee and the external auditors are complementary in monitoring 
management.  
 On the other hand, evidence from the non-audit fees literature reveals a 
negative association between non-audit service fees and audit committee 
independence. Abbott et al. (2003b) find that an independent audit committee is 
more likely to enhance auditor independence through limiting the purchase of non-
audit service fees in relation to audit fees. Similarly, Parkash and Venable (1993) 
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find that firms attempt to reduce their agency costs and enhance audit quality 
through reducing the purchase of non-audit service fees from the incumbent auditors. 
Moreover, providing evidence from the UK, Zaman et al. (2011) find that there is a 
negative relationship between audit committee independence and non-audit fees. 
This finding is robust to the use of an indicator variable with a value of one if a 
firm’s non-audit service fees are greater than its audit fees. 
 Zaman et al. (2011) argue that independent directors tend to be more 
concerned about the impairment of auditor independence and its effect on audit 
quality than are executives. Such directors have interests to serve in the decision 
control and protect audit quality in order to enhance their reputational capital as 
experts (Abbott et al. 2003b). Unlike executive directors, independent directors are 
more likely to ensure higher audit quality through exercising more power on 
management and demanding a wider audit scope (i.e. higher audit fees) (Zaman et al. 
2011), as well as through limiting the purchase of non-audit services from the 
incumbent auditor40 (Zaman et al. 2011; Abbott et al. 2003b). As such this study 
hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 9a: There is a positive relationship between audit committee 
independence and audit fees. 
Hypothesis 9b: There is a negative relationship between audit committee 
independence and non-audit service fees. 
5.3.1.2 Audit Committee Relevant Financial Experience   
 “The effectiveness of audit committees is affected, first and foremost, by the 
expertise of members of audit committees in the areas of accounting and financial 
                                                          
40 Independent directors are keener than executives to reduce moral hazard agency conflicts which 
may emerge from the simultaneous provision of audit services and non-audit services. 
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reporting, internal controls and auditing” (POB 1994, p.15). Regulatory 
recommendations on audit committee financial expertise highlight the importance of 
the possession of two types of knowledge by audit committee members. “Financial 
reporting knowledge” which enables the committee members to understand and 
analyse accounting figures in the financial reports, and “audit reporting knowledge” 
which will help the committee members to have a better understanding of the 
purpose and nature of the audit (DeZoort and Salterio 2001).  
 In the same vein, several studies have emphasized the importance of the audit 
committee including members with financial expertise in order to understand 
external auditors’ judgements and deal with the disputes that might occur between 
auditors and management (e.g., Defond et al. 2005; Kalbers and Fogarty 1993; 
Davidson et al. 2004). Such members are found more likely to detect material 
misstatements (Defond et al. 2005; Davidson et al. 2004), and reduce internal control 
problems (Krishnan 2005).  
 Similarly, Defond et al. (2005) argue that financial and accounting experts in 
the audit committee are needed to deal with higher levels of accounting 
sophistication in organizations. They contend that the presence of such experts in the 
audit committee will enable the latter to assess the level of aggressiveness or 
conservativeness of accounting policies, evaluate accounting judgements, review 
management’s actions against the audit adjustments proposed by the external auditor 
“and appraise the quality of the firm’s financial reports and not just their 
acceptability” (p.155). 
  Zaman et al. (2011) articulate that audit committee members lacking the 
financial experience required to effectively monitor the financial reporting process 
are more likely to impair audit quality. Their results reveal no association between 
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audit committee financial expertise and audit fees; however, they find that financial 
experts on the audit committee are associated with lower levels of non-audit service 
fees. 
 The UK Corporate Governance Code recommends that a firm’s audit 
committee should include at least one member with recent and relevant financial 
experience. This recommendation is consistent with the agency theory which 
suggests that an audit committee comprising of financially knowledgeable members 
is more able to understand and monitor management accounting judgements and the 
overall financial reporting process thus leading to reduction in information 
asymmetry.  
 This study argues that audit committee members with relevant financial 
experience are more likely to obtain better understanding of management accounting 
judgements and discretions and often ensure a higher audit quality through 
demanding a broader audit scope thus leading to higher audit fees. On the other side, 
as these members are more knowledgeable about the system’s deficiencies, they are 
more likely to discourage managers from seeking non-audit services (Zaman et al. 
2011). As such this study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 10a: There is a positive relationship between audit committee relevant 
financial experience and audit fees. 
Hypothesis 10b: There is a negative relationship between audit committee relevant 
financial experience and non-audit service fees. 
5.3.1.3 Audit Committee Size   
 Jensen (1993) argues that a large number of directors on the audit committee 
tend to adversely affect the latter’s effectiveness because of process and coordination 
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problems. This argument, however, is less valid in small audit committees where the 
addition of directors is expected to enhance audit committee effectiveness as there 
will be more people to draw on. Empirically, several studies have emphasized the 
effectiveness of large audit committees in discharging a strong oversight role, and 
have found a positive association between audit committee size and audit fees 
(Ittonen et al. 2010; Boo and Sharma 2008; Vafeas and Waegelein 2007).  
 The UK Corporate Governance Code recommends that the number of 
directors on the audit committee should be at least three, or two in the case of 
smaller companies (FRC 2012, C.3.1). This is consistent with several studies which 
have noted that an ideal audit committee size would be between three and four 
directors (e.g., Xie et al. 2003; Vafeas 2005). 
 Interestingly, and arguing that audit committees are more likely to enhance 
the quality of internal controls, Zaman et al. (2011) provide evidence from the UK 
context that larger audit committees are associated with higher audit fees. They 
suggest that a higher level of resources provided by larger audit committees will 
enhance the latter’s oversight role leading to higher audit efforts and therefore higher 
audit fees. Contrary to their predictions, Zaman et al. (2011) find a positive 
relationship between audit committee size and non-audit service fees. 
 This study suggests that larger audit committees are better observers of 
management actions. They are equipped with more resources which enables them to 
discern substantial problems and improve their oversight quality (Zaman et al. 2011). 
Their large size helps them enhance their power within organizations and demand a 
higher audit quality (Zaman et al. 2011), where more substantive audits are 
performed and higher audit fees are charged. At the same time, the higher level of 
knowledge found in larger audit committees is more likely to compensate for the 
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need to purchase non-audit services to resolve problems. As such this study 
hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 11a: There is a positive relationship between audit committee size and 
audit fees. 
Hypothesis 11b: There is a negative relationship between audit committee size and 
non-audit service fees. 
5.3.1.4 Audit Committee Meetings  
 Diligent audit committees tend to be proactive in discharging their oversight 
role (Abbott et al. 2003b), and effective monitors over the audit process (Zaman et 
al. 2011). The number of audit committee meetings was used as an indicative 
measure of the committee’s diligence (Menon and Williams 1994) and was found to 
be negatively related to fraud (Zaman et al. 2011). 
 Active audit committees with frequent meetings are more effective in 
monitoring the audit process and urging the external auditors to increase their audit 
testing (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2009). They are more likely to limit the purchase 
of non-audit services from the incumbent auditor (Abbott et al. 2003b). 
 Empirically, audit committees with frequent meetings are found to be 
positively related to audit fees (e.g., Zaman et al. 2011; Rustam et al. 2013; Krishnan 
and Visvanathan 2009; Lee and Mande 2005). Evidence on non-audit service fees, 
however, does not reveal a consensus on the relationship with audit committee 
meetings. For instance, Zaman et al. (2011) and Basiruddin (2011) both provide 
evidence of a sample of FTSE 350 firms and reveal inconsistent results. Zaman et al. 
(2011) find no association between audit committee meetings and non-audit service 
fees at the time that a positive relationship is found by Basiruddin (2011).  
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 This study argues that an audit committee which meets more frequently tends 
to vigilantly oversee the financial reporting process requiring the auditor to perform 
a wider audit scope41, and leading to lower non-audit fees due to less purchases of 
non-audit services by management (Abbott et al. 2003b; Zaman et al. 2011; Turley 
and Zaman 2004). As such this study hypothesises that: 
Hypothesis 12a: There is a positive relationship between audit committee meetings 
and audit fees. 
Hypothesis 12b: There is a negative relationship between audit committee meetings 
and non-audit service fees. 
5.3.2 Corporate Boards, Audit Fees and Non-Audit Fees 
 Carcello et al. (2002) identify two types of linkages between the board of 
directors and audit quality, formal and informal. The formal linkage could be 
through the collaboration between the board and management in choosing the 
external auditor42, and reviewing the audit scope and remuneration. On the other 
hand, the informal linkage can be illustrated by the signalling role that the board 
could play. That is, high expectations to perform a high quality audit could be 
signalled to the auditor by a strong board which is committed to vigilant oversight. 
As such the auditor will ensure the performance of a higher quality audit and sustain 
a good relationship with the client (Carcello et al. 2002). 
 According to the UK Corporate Governance Code the board of directors is 
accountable for establishing formal and transparent arrangements “for maintaining 
an appropriate relationship with the company’s auditors” (FRC 2012, C.3). Although 
boards delegate the responsibility of overseeing the audit process and approving the 
                                                          
41 This implies that higher audit fees are charged as a result of more audit efforts exerted by the 
external auditor. 
42 The selection of the auditor is then subject to ratification by shareholders. 
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remuneration of external auditors to audit committees, they in their turn review how 
the latter is discharging their responsibilities and deal with the recommendations 
raised to them when any matters arise.  
 Unlike Carcello et al. (2002), who regressed the audit committee and board 
variables separately, this study combines both variable sets in the same model 
arguing that  the roles of the audit committee and the board are complementary and 
should be controlled for one another. The most commonly used board characteristics 
in the literature of audit fees and non-audit service fees are: Non-executive directors, 
CEO duality, number of meetings and size. 
5.3.2.1 Non-Executive Directors  
 Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that non-executive directors tend to focus on 
providing functional monitoring in an attempt to sustain a good reputation as 
effective decision controllers. Such directors are expected to reduce agency costs, 
enhance the quality of the audit report and narrow the gap between management and 
the external auditors (Uang et al. 2006). 
 Empirical evidence confirms a positive association between non-executive 
directors and either of audit fees (e.g., Abbott et al. 2003a; Carcello et al. 2002) and 
non-audit service fees (e.g., Zaman et al. 2011; Basiruddin 2011).  
 From an agency perspective, shareholders are less likely to have agency 
conflicts with non-executive directors but more likely to have such conflicts with 
executives. Non-executive directors are expected to “scrutinise the performance of 
management in meeting agreed goals and objectives and monitor the reporting of 
performance” (FRC 2012, A.4), in an attempt to reduce agency costs and 
information asymmetry. As such, seeking to achieve their ultimate objective of 
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protecting the wealth of shareholders, they will be more likely to be concerned about 
audit quality (Carcello et al. 2002). 
 Moreover, non-executive directors on the board tend to be more concerned 
about audit quality in an attempt to protect their reputation in the market and avoid 
“potential financial loss that may result from litigation” (Zaman et al. 2011, p.173).  
Therefore this study argues that non-executive directors on the board are more likely 
to emphasize higher audit quality which in turn requires the auditor to conduct more 
substantive audit tests thus leading to higher audit fees. On the other hand, such 
directors have incentives to limit the purchase of non-audit services from the 
incumbent auditor in an attempt to protect auditor independence and consequently 
their reputational capital. As such this study hypothesizes that:  
Hypothesis 13a: There is a positive relationship between Non-executive Directors 
and audit fees. 
Hypothesis 13b: There is a negative relationship between Non-executive directors 
and non-audit service fees. 
5.3.2.2 CEO Duality   
 O’Sullivan (2000) argues that the influence of non-executive directors in 
seeking higher levels of audit quality through emphasizing intensive audit is 
adversely affected by the presence of CEO duality. CEO duality in a firm tends to 
lower the effectiveness of internal monitoring and the reliability of accounting thus 
resulting in higher control risks and a broader audit scope (Tsui et al. 2001). 
 Several empirical studies provide evidence consistent with this argument 
(e.g., Krishnan and Visvanathan 2009; Tsui et al. 2001), and find a positive 
relationship between audit fees and CEO duality. This is consistent with the agency 
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theory which suggests that when there is non-separation of the roles of the CEO and 
the chair of the board there is “absence of separation of decision management and 
decision control” (Fama and Jensen 1983) thus leading to lower internal monitoring 
and higher control risk. This implies that increased efforts will be exerted by the 
external auditors to deal with the threat of increased risk. 
 Therefore a CEO who also serves as a chairman of the board may have an 
adverse effect on audit quality (Jensen 1993; Collier and Gregory 1996). This may 
result in higher audit fees because of increased efforts exerted by the external auditor 
to control for risk and higher non-audit service fees resulting from lower auditor 
independence. As such this study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 14a: There is a positive relationship between CEO duality and audit fees. 
Hypothesis 14b: There is a positive relationship between CEO duality and non-audit 
service fees. 
5.4.2.3 Board Meetings   
 The number of board meetings has been used in the literature to measure how 
diligent the board is in discharging its oversight role. It is the only observable factor 
that gauges the diligence of the board of directors (Carcello et al. 2002).  
 The vast majority of those who empirically examined the association between 
board meetings and audit fees find a positive relationship (e.g., Carcello et al. 2002; 
Abbott et al. 2003a; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2009; Basiruddin 2011). Krishnan 
and Visvanathan (2009) argue that this relationship is expected because vigilant 
boards tend to require a broader audit scope from the external auditor with the 
intention of achieving a higher audit quality. Similarly, Zaman et al. (2011) argue 
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that frequent board meetings would be associated with a higher level of control and 
more emphasis on a higher audit quality. 
 Empirical research on the association between board meetings and non-audit 
service fees reveal inconsistent results (e.g., Zaman et al. 2011; Basiruddin 2011). 
For instance, Zaman et al. (2011) find a negative relationship between board 
meetings and non-audit service fees at the same time that Basiruddin (2011) finds no 
significant association at all. 
 This study argues that an active board of directors with high frequency of 
meetings is more likely to be concerned about audit quality. The more frequent board 
meetings are, the more the board will be able to enhance the effectiveness of its 
oversight role and support the conduct of a wider and extensive audit work. 
Therefore an increase in the number of board meetings is expected to result in higher 
audit fees and lower non-audit service fees. As such this study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 15a: There is a positive relationship between board meetings and audit 
fees. 
Hypothesis 15b: There is a negative relationship between board meetings and non-
audit service fees. 
5.3.2.4 Board Size  
 According to the UK Corporate Governance Code, “the board should be of 
sufficient size that the requirements of the business can be met and that changes to 
the board’s composition and that of its committees can be managed without undue 
disruption, and should not be so large as to be unwieldy” (FRC 2012, B.1).  
 In comparison to small boards, larger boards are more likely to exert better 
oversight over management, better evaluation of firm performance and are less likely 
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to be dominated by management (Johnson et al. 1996). Moreover, such boards are 
more expected to help their firms emerge from hard financial difficulties (Johnson et 
al. 1996). 
 Empirically, most of the research tackling the association between audit fees 
and board size provides evidence of no association between these two variables (e.g., 
Vafeas and Waegelein 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2009; Rustam et al. 2013). 
With respect to non-audit service fees, however, it was found to be negatively related 
to board size for a sample of FTSE 350 firms in the UK (Basiruddin 2011). 
 This study argues that larger boards are more likely to heighten risks 
associated with material mis-statements and consequently require a wider audit 
scope and more extensive audit procedures (Boo and Sharma 2008). Moreover, such 
boards tend to support and help the firm in solving problems through their wider 
breadth of knowledge than otherwise to solve the problems through the purchase of 
consulting non-audit services. As such, this study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 16a: There is a positive relationship between board size and audit fees. 
Hypothesis 16b: There is a negative relationship between board size and non-audit 
service fees. 
5.3.3 Measurement of the Dependent Variables 
 This study tests the hypotheses relating to the impact of audit committee and 
board of directors on audit fees and non-audit service fees. Audit fees and non-audit 
fees are examined considering that they are one of the economic aspects of the 
relationship between external auditors and their clients. They have been tackled in 
the literature as surrogates for audit quality (O’Sullivan 2000; Basiruddin 2011; 
Nehme 2013) and auditor independence (Abbott et al. 2003b; Ghosh et al. 2009; Hay 
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et al. 2006a; Basiruddin 2011) respectively. The first strand of research, which uses 
audit fees as proxy for audit quality, argues that higher audit fees are a signal for 
higher audit quality as the former would be charged as a result of increased audit 
effort by the auditor (see Simunic 1980; Palmrose 1986). The second strand of 
research views higher levels of non-audit fees in relation to audit fees as an indicator 
of higher economic bonding between the external auditor and the client which could 
adversely influence auditor independence (see Abbott et al. 2003b; Becker et al. 
1998; Simunic 1984). This study argues that audit fees and non-audit service fees do 
not represent the entire determinants of audit quality and auditor independence 
respectively, and therefore it examines these fees per se rather than as proxies for 
other audit factors. 
5.3.4 Measurement of the Control Variables 
 Consistent with prior studies on audit fees and non-audit service fees, this 
study uses several firm-specific control variables to account for complexity, size, 
profitability, leverage, form of ownership and industry (e.g., Zaman et al. 2011; 
Carcello et al. 2002; Abbott et al. 2003b). It intends to control for necessary 
variables from each of these categories while avoiding ‘kitchen sink’ models43 (Hay 
2013). These variables are as follows:  
 Block-holders (BLOCK): block-holders have higher economic incentives for 
monitoring than minor shareholders, because their potential benefits 
outweigh the monitoring costs (Quick et al. 2013). Moreover, management 
may tend to increase the level of disclosure and voluntary releases in an 
attempt to gain the confidence of shareholders with concentrated ownership 
                                                          
43 Audit and non-audit fees models with a large number of control variables have been criticised as 
being ‘kitchen sink’ models as they comprise “more control variables than necessary” (Hay 2013) . 
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(Quick et al. 2013). As such, block-holders tend to demand a higher quality 
audit which is achieved through a wider audit scope, and therefore higher 
audit fees, and through reduction in the purchase of non-audit services to 
protect auditors’ independence. 
 Mergers and acquisition (ACQ): firms involved in merger and acquisition 
activities are associated with higher audit fees and higher non-audit service 
fees. Higher audit fees might result from the increased efforts of the external 
auditor to deal with internal control problems which might occur as a result 
of these activities (Zaman et al. 2011). On the other hand, such activities 
create the demand for the purchase of non-audit services by the relevant firms 
(Firth 1997). 
 Number of business segments (BUSSEG): the number of business segments 
is used to control for the complexity of firms. Firms with a larger number of 
business segments are relatively more complex and therefore require higher 
audit efforts and higher levels of non-audit services. As such, BUSSEG will 
be positively related to audit fees and non-audit fees.  
 Loss in either or both of previous two years (LOSS): LOSS is used in this 
study as a metric for profitability. Profitability could also be considered as a 
measure of risk, especially when the firm is not in good financial health. In 
case of poor performance the auditor is exposed to more risk and 
consequently charges higher audit fees (Hay et al. 2006b). On the other hand, 
firms with poor performance tend to demand more consulting non-audit 
services to improve profitability (Abbott et al. 2003b; Firth 1997). 
 Leverage (LEV): leverage is expected to increase agency costs thus leading 
to increase in audit fees and decrease in non-audit service fees (Abbott et al. 
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2003b). For instance, highly leveraged firms may tend to opportunistically 
manage earnings to avoid debt covenant violation (DeFond and Jiambalvo 
1994). More audit efforts and higher audit fees, thus, would result from the 
auditor’s attempts to reduce misstatement risks. On the other hand, a higher 
cost of debt leads firms to limit the purchase of non-audit services in an 
attempt to strengthen the creditor’s perception of auditor independence 
(Quick et al. 2013). In the same vein, Zaman et al. (2011) argue that highly 
leveraged firms are more exposed to business and financial risks and need to 
be protected through higher levels of monitoring . This might result in higher 
audit fees and lower non-audit service fees.  
 Firm size (SIZE): large firms are required to meet higher levels of regulatory 
recommendations and requirements. They require higher audit quality which 
could be achieved by increased audit efforts and therefore higher audit fees 
(Zaman et al. 2011). On the other hand large firms tend also to purchase 
higher levels of non-audit services to deal with their system complexities and 
wider range of activities (Abbott et al. 2003b; Zaman et al. 2011) thus 
leading to higher non-audit service fees. 
 Industry (INDY): the difficulty of an audit differs from one industry to 
another (Simunic 1980; Hay et al. 2006b). For instance, industries 
characterized by extensive receivables and inventory are relatively harder to 
audit than others (Hay et al. 2006b). Therefore such industries require more 
efforts and testing from the auditor leading the latter to charge higher fees. 
On the other hand, these industries tend to purchase higher levels of non-
audit services to help them deal with difficulties and problems.     
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5.3.5 Models Specification  
Model 1: the impact of audit committee and board characteristics on audit fees 
 
LnASF = β0 + β1 ACM + β2 ACS + β3 ACI + β4 ACRX + β5 NEDs + β6 DUAL + β7 
BM + β8 BS + β9 BLOCK + β10 ACQ+ β11 BUSSEG + β12 LOSS + β13 
LEV + β14 SIZE  + β15 INDY + β16T +     (15) 
Model 2: the impact of audit committee and board characteristics on non-audit fees 
LnNASF = β0 + β1 ACM + β2 ACS + β3 ACI + β4 ACRX + β5 NEDs + β6 DUAL + β7 
BM + β8 BS + β9 BLOCK + β10 ACQ+ β11 BUSSEG + β12 LOSS + β13 
LEV + β14 SIZE  + β15 INDY + β16T +     (16) 
where: 
Dependent variables 
LnASF = Natural logarithm of audit service fees 
LnNASF = Natural logarithm of Non-audit service fees 
Independent variables 
 
ACM =  Number of audit committee meetings held in a given year. 
ACS =  Total number of audit committee members. 
ACI  =  The percentage of independent directors on the audit committee. 
ACRX =  The percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial 
expertise on the audit committee. 
NEDs  =  The percentage of non-executive directors on the board. 
DUAL =  Indicator variable with a value of 1 if the CEO also serves as a chair 
of the board. 
BM  = Frequency of board meetings held during a year. 
BS  =  Number of directors on the board. 
BLOCK =  Percentage ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5 percent or 
more of outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated with 
management.  
ACQ =  Indicator variable with a value of 1 if a firm made an acquisition in 
either one or both of the previous two years. 
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BUSSEG  =   Number of a firm’s business segments  
LOSS =  Indicator variable with a value of 1 if a firm incurred losses in either 
one or both of the previous two years. 
LEV  =   Total long-term debt to total assets. 
SIZE  =   Natural logarithm of total assets at year end. 
INDY =  Type of industry. Indicator variable of 1 for each of the following 
industry types: Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, Consumer 
Goods, Health Care, Consumer Services, Telecommunications, 
Technology. 
T =  Time. Indicator variables of 1 for each of the following years: 2008, 
2009 and 2010. 
  =  Error term. 
5.4 Sample Selection and Data Sources 
 The initial sample consists of all FTSE 350 companies listed in the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE), for the three-year period between 2008 and 2010. 
Conducting this study in the above specifications is fascinating for the following 
reasons. First, as already mentioned in the introductory chapter, using a sample 
period between 2008 and 2010 the author attempts to address regulatory concerns 
about firms having low financial reporting quality and ineffective external audit 
processes. During the 2008 to 2010 period, the UK financial reporting guardian, the 
FRRP, had raised concerns regarding the quality of financial reporting due to the 
belief that firms are more inclined to manipulate revenues after the recession. In 
parallel, the UK House of Lords criticises the role of Britain’s Big 4 auditors during 
the global financial crisis and recommended restrictions on the auditors’ provision of 
non-audit services to the FTSE 350 firms and an enhanced role for audit committees 
to monitor the auditor-management relationship aspects, one of which is auditor 
remuneration. Second, in contrast to the US rules-based accounting system where the 
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majority of similar studies took place, the UK has a principles-based accounting 
system which focuses on the substance of the principle rather than its form. Third, in 
contrast to the US mandatory corporate governance system in which the vast 
majority of the relevant studies were conducted, the UK follows the ‘comply or 
explain’ approach whereby audit committees are voluntary. Fourth, compared to the 
US, in the UK “there is greater variation in outside director representation on boards” 
(Peasnell et al. 2005, p.1313). Finally, FTSE 350 firms are the largest UK listed 
firms by market capitalization. The previously discussed calls to restrict auditors 
from providing non-audit services to FTSE 350 firms and to enhance the role of the 
audit committees of these firms make FTSE 350 the ideal sample to examine44. 
Moreover, using FTSE 350 index ensures higher availability of data and similar level 
of governance recommendations. The largest 350 firms have a higher level of 
recommendations to comply with, since, for instance, they are required to establish 
audit committees with at least three independent non-executive directors instead of 
the two required for smaller firms.  
 Corporate governance data are collected manually from annual reports. 
Financial and accounting data are obtained from DataStream. Firms in the insurance, 
financial and utilities industries are excluded for two reasons. First, with respect to 
the first empirical model (financial reporting quality), firms in the mentioned 
industries have revenues and accruals which are different from other firms (Stubben 
2010). Second, regarding the second empirical model (auditor remuneration), the 
excluded industries differ from other industries in terms of their regulatory 
environment (Zaman et al. 2011) and characteristics. For instance, in the UK, firms 
in the utilities industry are governed by their own relative service regulatory bodies: 
                                                          
44 It is worth noting that all of the FTSE 350 firms examined in the auditor remuneration model are 
audited by one of the Big Four auditors who were criticized by the House of Lords on their role 
during the financial crisis. 
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Office for the Regulation of Electricity and Gas, Office of Water Services, Office of 
Communication etc. Moreover, financial and utility institutions are characterised by 
relatively large assets, but they entail less audit effort and testing than firms with 
extensive receivables and inventory (Hay et al. 2006b). 
 The two empirical models in this study have different sample sizes. For the 
sample of the first empirical model tackling the impact of audit committee and board 
characteristics on financial reporting quality, this study further excludes industries 
consisting of less than six firms to minimize the possibility of biased estimates in 
calculating discretionary revenues and accruals. Moreover, in order to account for 
outliers, variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 2 percent. The final samples 
of the first and second empirical models consist of 662 and 619 observations 
respectively. Panel A and Panel B in Table 5.1 present the sample selection 
procedures of the financial reporting quality models and the auditor remuneration 
models respectively. The sample size of the second empirical study (619) is less than 
that of the first empirical study (662), despite the exclusion of less than six firm 
industries in the latter, because of the large number of missing audit fees and non-
audit service fees data on DataStream. 
 Table 5.2, Panel A and Panel B, present the distribution of sample firms by 
industry and year for the first and second empirical models respectively. The 
majority of firm observations in both of the empirical models are from the industrials 
and consumer services industries. Firms in these industries represent about 58% of 
the total sample of each of the two empirical studies. In Table 5.2, Panel A, the 
number of sample firms in the telecommunications industry in 2008 is zero due to 
the exclusion of industries having less than six firms. Graphical representations of 
sample firms’ distribution by industry and year for each of the financial reporting 
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quality sample and the auditor remuneration sample are presented in Figure 5.1 and 
Figure 5.2 respectively. Industries in both of the samples are roughly equally 
distributed over the three years except for the telecommunications industry which is 
excluded in the year 2008 of the first sample (Figure 5.1). 
 Finally, with respect to the pre-financial crisis sample examined in the 
additional analysis, the author follows the same sampling procedures mentioned 
above for both financial reporting and auditor remuneration models. Given that the 
mandatory adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by the 
UK took place on January 1, 2005, the pre-crisis sample period is chosen to be for 
the three years from 2005 to 2007 to avoid the effect of the change in standards on 
accounting quality. 
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Table 5.1 Sample Selection Procedures 
Panel A: Financial reporting models 
 
2008 2009 2010 
Total 
Sample 
Total firms in FTSE 350 at year end 
 
358 355 356 1069 
Companies in financial & insurance 
industries (ICB 8000)  
-113 -112 -116 -341 
Companies in utilities industry (ICB 7000) 
 
-10 -9 -9 -28 
Companies with missing corporate 
governance and financial values  
-6 -5 -3 -14 
Industries having less than 6 firms 
 
-13 -7 -4 -24 
Total sample 
   
216 222 224 662 
Panel B: Auditor remuneration models 
 
2008 2009 2010 
Total 
Sample 
Total firms in FTSE 350 at year end 
 
358 355 356 1069 
Companies in financial & insurance 
industries (ICB 8000)  
-113 -112 -116 -341 
Companies in utilities industry (ICB 7000) 
 
-10 -9 -9 -28 
Companies with missing corporate 
governance and financial values 
 
-29 -21 -31 -81 
Total sample 
   
206 213 200 619 
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Table 5.2 Distribution of Sample Firms by Industry and Year 
Panel A: Financial reporting quality models 
ICB code Industry 2008 2009 2010 Total 
0001 Oil and Gas 18 19 20 57 
1000 Basic materials 20 18 26 64 
2000 Industrials 69 65 59 195 
3000 Consumer goods 23 26 25 74 
4000 Health care 8 9 8 25 
5000 Consumer services 65 63 64 192 
6000 Telecommunications 0 6 6 10 
9000 Technology 13 16 16 45 
  Total 216 222 224 662 
Panel B: Auditor remuneration models 
ICB code Industry 2008 2009 2010 Total 
0001 Oil and Gas 15 18 15 48 
1000 Basic materials 20 20 21 61 
2000 Industrials 67 66 60 193 
3000 Consumer goods 24 27 24 75 
4000 Health care 8 9 8 25 
5000 Consumer services 60 55 53 168 
6000 Telecommunications 3 4 4 11 
9000 Technology 9 14 15 38 
  Total 206 213 200 619 
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5.5 Analytical Procedures 
 This section presents the statistical methods used to analyse the data. All 
statistics are processed on the STATA 12 statistical software. Data analysis 
presented in the next two chapters is structured as follows.  
 First the author describes the data and checks its normality in the descriptive 
statistics section. The mean, standard deviation, median, minimum, maximum, 
skewness and kurtosis are the statistics used to describe the data. The skewness and 
kurtosis determine the nature of the data whether normally distributed (parametric) 
or not (non-parametric) (Hair 2010). As a rule of thumb the data is normally 
distributed if its standard skewness and standard kurtosis lie within ±1.96 and ±3 
respectively (Gujarati 1995). In case the data is non-parametric, winsorizing or 
transformation methods are applied to enhance the normality of the distribution. 
 Then the correlations among variables are reported in the correlation matrix 
section. Correlation coefficients are used to gauge the strength of linear association 
between two variables (Gujarati 2003). Both of the Spearman and Pearson 
correlations are employed, however, the main relevant analysis is based on 
Spearman if the data is non-parametric and on Pearson if the data is parametric. 
Correlation coefficients are then used as indicators for multicollinearity problems. 
As a rule of thumb, if two variables have a correlation coefficient greater than 0.80 
then they are considered to be highly collinear (Gujarati 2003). 
 A multivariate analysis section is after that presented as the multivariate 
analysis accounts for the variation in firms’ characteristics and the other 
determinants of the dependent variables which are not controlled for under the 
correlation matrix. Before running the regressions, the validity of applying Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) regression, the most commonly used method in the literature, is 
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tested. There are five basic assumptions to be satisfied in order for the OLS estimator 
not to be biased (Gujarati 2003). These assumptions are:  
- The error term is normally distributed. 
- The error term is homoskedastic i.e., it has constant variance 
- The error term is not serially correlated. 
- The repressors are not highly correlated. 
- The model is linear. 
 The empirical models tested in this thesis are expected to suffer from 
heteroscedasticity problems. These problems might arise as a result of the presence 
of outliers especially in the earnings management and auditor remuneration variables. 
Another source of heteroscedasticity might be the skewness in the distribution of one 
or more independent variables in the models (e.g., ACM, Manown, Growth, and 
DUAL). To check for heteroskedasticity, either the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
or White’s tests for heteroskedasticity is used when the employed regression is 
pooled OLS. The Modified Wald test, however, is used for group-wise 
heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression models. Moreover, autocorrelation 
problems might arise in case there are omitted variables. Therefore, regression 
standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation through the 
use of robust standard errors and robust standard errors clustered by firm.  
 In addition to the correlation coefficients, checking for multicollinearity 
among repressors is done also through the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and 
tolerance value statistics. As a rule of thumb, variables with VIF value in excess of 
10 or tolerance value of less than 0.10 are regarded as highly collinear (Gujarati 
2003, p.362). Simple and panel effects regressions are used. Where appropriate, the 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test is conducted to help decide on 
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whether to use a random-effect regression or simple OLS one. The Hausman test is 
then used to help decide between random and fixed effects regressions.  
 Similar to other comparative studies in corporate governance, the results of 
this thesis may suffer from endogeneity problems. The author uses several ways to 
mitigate such problems including incorporating additional control variables, using 
fixed effect regression and incorporating residuals as regressors in jointly-
determined models. 
 Finally additional tests to check the robustness of the results are presented in 
the additional analysis section. Extant research finds that the performance of 
governance mechanisms may differ between recession periods and regular periods. 
As such the author includes descriptive and multivariate analysis to test the 
hypotheses in the pre-financial crisis period from 2005 to 2007. Other tests for 
additional control variables and different variable definitions are also provided. 
5.6 Summary 
 The author examines the impact of corporate governance on financial 
reporting quality and auditor remuneration through the use of two empirical models. 
This chapter presents the hypotheses development and research design of each of 
these empirical models. Specifically, research hypotheses are developed through the 
use of theoretical links between the hypotheses variables supported by relevant 
empirical evidence. The specifications of the models under study are then presented 
after discussing the measurements of each of the dependent variables and the control 
variables.  
 Data for the variables under study are collected from two sources: corporate 
governance data are collected manually from annual reports, whilst financial data are 
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obtained from DataStream. The initial sample consists of all FTSE 350 firms listed 
in the LSE for the three-year period between 2008 and 2010. After excluding firms 
in the financial, insurance and utilities industries as well as those with missing data, 
the final size of each of the financial reporting quality and auditor remuneration 
samples comprises 662 and 619 firm-year observations respectively. OLS 
regressions (either simple or panel) with robust standard errors and robust standard 
errors clustered by firm are used to test the hypotheses. The results are presented in 
the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 6 
Findings and Discussion – Corporate 
Governance and Financial Reporting 
Quality 
6.1 Introduction 
 The findings of the first empirical investigation tackling the impact of audit 
committee and board characteristics on financial reporting quality are presented and 
discussed in this chapter. Two empirical analyses are used for each of the proxies of 
financial reporting quality (discretionary revenue and the performance-adjusted 
discretionary accrual model). The structure of this chapter is as follows. Variables’ 
statistics as well as the normality of data is discussed in the following section (6.2). 
Then the linear association and collinearity among variables are tackled in the 
correlation matrix section (6.3). Research hypotheses are tested using appropriate 
regression techniques in the multivariate analyses section (6.4). Additional tests to 
check the robustness of the main results are discussed in the additional analysis 
section (6.5). The chapter concludes with a summary of the results in section 6.6.  
6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 6.1 provides the descriptive statistics for earnings management 
measures, corporate governance variables and control variables. The statistics used 
to describe the sample under study are: mean, standard deviation, median, minimum, 
maximum, skewness and kurtosis.  
 The mean (median) of absolute discretionary revenues and absolute 
discretionary accruals is 2.2% (1.3%) and 4.6% (3.0%) of total assets respectively. 
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The mean (median) of discretionary revenues in a study conducted by Feng et al. 
(2011) tackling the impact of financial reporting quality (proxied by the 
discretionary revenue model used in this study) on investment efficiency for a 
sample of 6,727  private firms from 21 emerging countries for the period between 
2002 and 2005 is 4.7% (2.4%) 45 . The mean (median) of Feng et al. (2011) 
discretionary revenue sample is approximately double that reported in this study. 
This is probably due to two reasons: first, unlike the UK, where a strong governance 
system exists, emerging countries tend to have a lower financial reporting quality 
because of poorer governance systems; second, private firms tend to have a lower 
financial reporting quality than public ones because of the lower market demand for 
a higher quality from the former (Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Burghstahler et al. 
2006). The mean (median) of discretionary accruals estimated from the performance 
adjusted Modified Jones model, on the other hand, is comparable to that found in 
other UK studies using the same measure (e.g., Basiruddin 2011).  
 The governance structure in the used sample reveals that the average audit 
committee contains four directors and meets four times a year. This is consistent 
with a similar UK study conducted by Basiruddin (2011) on 613 FTSE 350 firms for 
the period from 2005 to 2008. Moreover, these statistics are in compliance with the 
combined code where audit committees are recommended to be composed of at least 
three members and to meet at least three times a year. Not all audit committees in 
our sample, however, comply with the code in consisting solely of independent non-
executive directors, as 10.2% of the members are non-independent. Descriptive 
statistics of a similar UK study conducted by Habbash (2010) for the period 2003 to 
2006 reveal that on average 16.4% of the audit committee directors in his sample are 
                                                          
45 As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the author is not aware of any study that has examined 
the association between discretionary revenues and corporate governance. 
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non-independent. This implies that lately there is an increased tendency of the FTSE 
350 firms to comply with the recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code. On average 30.7% of audit committee directors have relevant financial 
expertise.  
 On average, the board comprises nine directors, of which 64.9% are non-
executive, and meets nine times a year. The chief executive is acting as the chairman 
of the board in 3.5% of the cases.  
 Comparatively, the independence and size statistics of the audit committee 
and the board are consistent with those reported in similar studies in the US (e.g., 
Ghosh et al. 2010), notwithstanding the difference in governance regimes46. This 
implies that large companies in the UK tend to meet and sometimes exceed the 
minimum regulatory governance requirements even if they are not mandated. 
 Descriptive statistics of the control variables in Table 6.1 reveal that, on 
average, 3.9% of shares are held by executive directors. Block-holders who are 
unaffiliated with management own 28.6% of the stock. The mean (median) 
GROWTH is 2.087 (2.140). These statistics are mildly higher than those reported by 
Basiruddin (2011) where the mean of the executive directors’ ownership, block-
holdership, and GROWTH in her 613 FTSE 350 sample for the period between 2005 
and 2008 are 4.4%, 23.6% and 3.066 respectively. The mean of CFO and LOSS are 
0.135 and 0.177 respectively. Providing evidence from the UK, Basiruddin (2011) 
documents a similar mean of 0.135 for CFO and 0.052 for LOSS. The author 
suggests that the higher percentage of firms which have reported losses in either one 
or both of the previous two years found in this study is attributed to the post-
financial crisis period from which this study’s sample is taken. Finally the mean 
                                                          
46 Unlike the US mandatory corporate governance system, the UK follows the “Comply or Explain” 
corporate governance approach. 
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(median) of the total assets of this study’s sample firms is 6,525,315,000 
(1,404,100,000). This is relatively consistent with the UK study conducted recently 
by Nehme (2013) where the reported mean (median) of total assets is 6,362,582,000 
(1,408,132,000)47. 
 In general, the data used in this study is found to be non-parametric. As a rule 
of thumb, for the data to be normally distributed or parametric the standard skewness 
and standard kurtosis should be within ±1.96 and ±3 respectively (Gujarati 1995; 
Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). Table 6.1 presents severe levels of skewness and kurtosis 
for some variables including DiscRev, DiscAcc, ACM, MANOWN and GROWTH. 
As such and following other similar earnings management studies (e.g., Bergstresser 
and Philippon 2006; Zang 2011; Hazarika et al. 2012), the author winsorizes each of 
the continuous variables at the bottom and top 2 percent to reduce the influence of 
outliers. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 The sample of Nehme (2013) comprises of 908 FTSE 350 firms for the period from 2007 to 2010. 
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Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
   
Number Mean Standard Deviation Median Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
                      
Earnings Management 
         
DiscRev 
 
662 0.022 0.026 0.013 0.000 0.228 2.741 14.169 
DiscAcc 
  
662 0.046 0.056 0.030 0.000 0.644 4.049 30.184 
    
       
Audit Committee Characteristics 
 
       
ACM 
  
662 4.113 1.563 4.000 1.000 15.000 2.560 14.129 
ACS 
  
662 3.585 0.886 3.000 2.000 7.000 1.095 4.723 
ACI 
  
662 0.898 0.181 1.000 0.000 1.000 -1.770 5.961 
ACRX 
  
662 0.307 0.267 0.333 0.000 1.000 1.133 4.128 
           
Board Characteristics 
         
NEDs 
  
662 0.649 0.116 0.667 0.267 0.929 -0.242 2.828 
DUAL 
 
662 0.035 0.183 0.000 0.000 1.000 5.081 26.819 
BM 
  
662 8.911 3.190 8.000 3.000 26.000 1.735 8.520 
BS 
  
662 9.107 2.452 9.000 5.000 20.000 1.097 4.461 
           
Control Variables 
         
MANOWN 
  
662 0.039 0.110 0.002 0.000 0.654 3.727 16.847 
BLOCK 
  
662 0.286 0.187 0.259 0.000 0.924 0.708 3.289 
LEVERAGE 
 
662 0.192 0.164 0.171 0.000 0.807 0.729 3.029 
GROWTH 
  
662 2.087 23.309 2.140 -390.460 187.100 -7.641 151.488 
CFO 
  
662 0.135 0.111 0.112 -0.237 0.914 2.097 11.973 
TA (£'000) 
  
662 6,525,315 20,500,000 1,404,100 44,068 237,000,000 7.435 67.507 
SIZE (LnTA) 
  
662 14.305 1.504 14.155 8.644 19.130 0.511 3.481 
LOSS 
  
662 0.177 0.382 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.695 3.873 
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Table 6.1 (Cont’d) 
DiscRev is the estimated absolute value of the residuals from the following industry-year regression: 
∆AR i, t = α0 + β1∆R i, t + ε i, t 
DiscAcc is the estimated absolute value of the residuals from the following industry-year regression: 
ACC i, t = α0 + α 1 (∆R i, t - ∆AR i, t ) + α 2 PPE i, t + α 3 ROA i, t-1  + ε i, t 
ACM is the number of audit committee meetings held in a given year; ACS is the total number of audit committee members; ACI is the percentage of 
independent directors in the audit committee; ACRX is the percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial expertise on the audit committee; 
NEDs is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board; DUAL is an indicator variable set to 1 when there is no separation between the roles of the 
CEO and the board chairman; BM is the frequency of board meetings held in a given year; BS is the number of directors in the board; MANOWN is the 
percentage of total shares held by executive directors to total number of shares; BLOCK is the percentage ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5 % or 
more of outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated with management; LEV is total long-term debt to total assets; GROWTH is Market-to-book ratio; 
CFO is cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total assets; TA is total assets at year end; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at year end; 
LOSS is an indicator variable with 1 if a firm incurred losses in either one or both of the previous two years. 
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 Table 6.2 presents the yearly statistics of the financial reporting quality 
models. The decrease in the average levels of DiscRev (DiscAcc) from 0.026(0.058) 
in 2008 to 0.017(0.039) in 2010 indicate an enhancement in the financial reporting 
quality of the sample firms throughout this period. There have not been significant 
changes in the corporate governance structures of the sample firms in the period 
between 2008 and 2010. The major changes are illustrated in the percentage increase 
of audit committee members with relevant financial experience from 28.7% in 2008 
to 32.1% in 2010 as well as in the CEO duality cases in the sample firms’ boards 
from 2.8% in 2008 to 3.6% in 2010. On average, sample firms’ audit committees 
have complied with the UK Corporate Governance Code, in terms of including at 
least three members and meeting for at least three times a year, throughout the three-
year period from 2008 to 2010. Finally, the increase in the percentage of sample 
firms that have reported losses in either or both of their previous years from 11.1% in 
2008 to 26.9% in 2010 is attributed to the financial distress during and after the 2008 
financial crisis. 
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Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics by Year 
    2008   2009   2010 
  Mean St. Dev. Median 
 Mean St. Dev. Median  Mean St. Dev. Median 
        
Earnings 
Management 
           DiscRev 0.026 0.032 0.017 
 
0.023 0.026 0.014 
 
0.017 0.019 0.011 
DiscAcc 
 
0.058 0.070 0.036 
 
0.042 0.049 0.029 
 
0.039 0.046 0.026 
             Audit Committee
Variables 
           ACM 
 
4.032 1.479 4.000 
 
4.176 1.598 4.000 
 
4.130 1.610 4.000 
ACS 
 
3.599 0.887 3.000 
 
3.563 0.929 3.000 
 
3.592 0.843 3.000 
ACI 
 
0.906 0.165 1.000 
 
0.875 0.197 1.000 
 
0.913 0.179 1.000 
ACRX 
 
0.287 0.261 0.250 
 
0.314 0.279 0.250 
 
0.321 0.262 0.333 
             Board Variables 
           NEDs 
 
0.637 0.117 0.636 
 
0.653 0.120 0.667 
 
0.657 0.109 0.667 
DUAL 
 
0.028 0.164 0.000 
 
0.041 0.198 0.000 
 
0.036 0.186 0.000 
BM 
 
8.954 3.178 8.000 
 
9.050 3.115 9.000 
 
8.731 3.281 8.000 
BS 
 
9.313 2.508 9.000 
 
9.045 2.449 9.000 
 
8.969 2.398 9.000 
             Control Variables 
           MANOWN 0.042 0.120 0.002 
 
0.034 0.093 0.002 
 
0.040 0.116 0.002 
BLOCK 
 
0.291 0.194 0.265 
 
0.292 0.182 0.268 
 
0.274 0.186 0.241 
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Table 6.2 (Cont’d)            
LEVERAGE 0.205 0.168 0.182 
 
0.197 0.170 0.172 
 
0.176 0.154 0.159 
GROWTH -2.464 33.478 1.510 
 
4.343 20.037 2.340 
 
4.269 9.867 2.620 
CFO 
 
0.142 0.117 0.115 
 
0.122 0.099 0.105 
 
0.141 0.115 0.119 
TA (£'000) 5,340,162 15,700,000 1,455,100 
 
6,729,503 21,000,000 1,341,517 
 
7,475,308 23,800,000 1,457,393 
SIZE 
 
14.280 1.457 14.191 
 
14.266 1.546 14.109 
 
14.368 1.510 14.192 
LOSS 
 
0.111 0.314 0.000 
 
0.149 0.357 0.000 
 
0.269 0.444 0.000 
DiscRev is the estimated absolute value of the residuals from the following industry-year regression: 
∆AR i, t = α0 + β1∆R i, t + ε i, t 
DiscAcc is the estimated absolute value of the residuals from the following industry-year regression: 
ACC i, t = α0 + α 1 (∆R i, t - ∆AR i, t ) + α 2 PPE i, t + α 3 ROA i, t-1  + ε i, t 
 
ACM is the number of audit committee meetings held in a given year; ACS is the total number of audit committee members; ACI is the 
percentage of independent directors in the audit committee; ACRX is the percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial 
expertise on the audit committee; NEDs is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board; DUAL is an indicator variable set to 1 when 
there is no separation between the roles of the CEO and the board chairman; BM is the frequency of board meetings held in a given year; BS is 
the number of directors in the board; MANOWN is the percentage of total shares held by executive directors to total number of shares; BLOCK 
is the percentage ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5 % or more of outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated with 
management; LEV is total long-term debt to total assets; GROWTH is Market-to-book ratio; CFO is cash flow from operating activities scaled 
by lagged total assets; TA is total assets at year end; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at year end; LOSS is an indicator variable with 1 
if a firm incurred losses in either one or both of the previous two years. 
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6.3 Correlation Matrix 
 Table 6.3 reports the Spearman and Pearson correlations among all the 
variables in the financial reporting quality models. However, given the non-
parametric nature of the data set used in this study, the Spearman non-parametric 
correlations are used by the author more as a basis for the correlation analyses. 
 Both Spearman and Pearson correlations in Table 6.3 indicate a positive 
significant correlation between DiscRev and DiscAcc (Spearman 0.13, Pearson 0.23), 
suggesting that this study’s sample firms use both revenue manipulation and accrual-
based earnings management at the same time. As predicted in hypothesis 3, 
Spearman and Pearson correlations point out a negative significant correlation 
between ACS, on the one hand, and DiscRev and DiscAcc on the other. Moreover, 
ACS is positively correlated with BS having coefficients above 40 in both 
correlations, suggesting that large boards are associated with large audit committees. 
Consistent with hypothesis 7, BM has a positive significant Pearson correlation of 
0.07 with DiscRev, suggesting that a board’s meeting frequency increases after 
aggressive revenue recognition practices.  
 Contrary to the author’s predictions, Table 6.3 reports a positive significant 
correlation between ACRX and DiscRev (Spearman 0.09, Pearson 0.11), suggesting 
that audit committee members with relevant financial expertise are associated with 
more revenue manipulations after the financial crisis. This result, however, is 
indecisive and contributes to the ambiguity and controversy over the definition and 
kind of financial expertise to be included in audit committees48. Thus, such a finding 
implies that audit committee members with only relevant financial experience may 
                                                          
48 There is a large stream of research which tackles different types of financial expertise and their fit 
to the needs of an audit committee’s oversight role (e.g., Defond et al. 2005; Krishnan and Lee 2009). 
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not be sufficient to ameliorate financial reporting quality in financial crisis periods. It 
might be that accounting financial experts with accounting qualifications and 
auditing experience are more needed to deal with the accounting complexities and 
sophistications inherent in financial reporting (Defond et al. 2005), especially in the 
presence of uncertain conditions. Non-executive directors on the board and board 
size are found to be negatively correlated with DiscAcc suggesting that large boards 
are more likely to constrain accrual-based earnings management and enhance 
financial reporting quality. 
 Finally, correlation coefficients are also used to test if there is 
multicollinearity among variables. A variable with a correlation coefficient of more 
than 0.80 is regarded as highly collinear (Nehme 2013). Table 6.3 shows that 
correlation coefficients are reasonable and do not indicate multicollinearity problems. 
The highest Spearman (Pearson) correlation is 0.53 (0.59) between SIZE and BS. 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) test of multicollinearity is further presented in the 
multivariate analyses section.  
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Table 6.3 Spearman (Lower Triangle) and Pearson (Upper Triangle) Correlations 
Variables DiscRev DiscAcc ACM ACS ACI ACRX NEDs DUAL BM BS MANOWN BLOCK LEV GROWTH CFO SIZE LOSS 
DiscRev 1 0.23 -0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.11 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.2 0.03 0.17 -0.19 -0.04 
DiscAcc 0.13 1 -0.03 -0.09 -0.02 0.09 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.11 0.04 -0.1 0.02 0.05 -0.08 0.02 
ACM -0.01 -0.05 1 0.31 0.10 -0.07 0.29 0.03 0.26 0.36 -0.09 -0.04 0.0 0.02 -0.04 0.39 -0.02 
ACS -0.09 -0.08 0.28 1 0.02 -0.20 0.30 0.05 -0.01 0.44 -0.10 -0.19 0.1 0.02 -0.08 0.40 -0.05 
ACI -0.02 0.02 0.11 -0.01 1 0.03 0.09 -0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.10 -0.09 0.0 -0.05 0.07 0.11 -0.04 
ACRX 0.09 0.07 -0.08 -0.32 0.05 1 0.02 0.08 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.0 0.00 0.08 -0.01 0.03 
NEDs -0.00  -0.07 0.25 0.27 0.10 -0.05 1 -0.03 -0.03 0.15 -0.20 0.07 0.1 0.04 0.00 0.38 -0.03 
DUAL -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.07 -0.02 1 -0.06 0.04 0.17 0.06 0.0 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 
BM 0.03 -0.03 0.20 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 1 -0.04 -0.09 -0.06 0.0 -0.01 -0.14 0.00 0.04 
BS -0.04 -0.09 0.32 0.45 0.04 -0.09 0.13 0.04 -0.10 1 -0.10 -0.09 0.1 0.00 -0.04 0.59 -0.04 
MANOWN 0.13 0.09 -0.24 -0.22 -0.15 0.06 -0.43 0.10 -0.13 -0.18 1 0.02 -0.1 0.01 0.07 -0.20 0.11 
BLOCK -0.01 0.08 -0.06 -0.17 -0.07 0.02 0.05 0.06 -0.03 -0.16 0.12 1 -0.1 -0.01 0.04 -0.25 0.16 
LEV -0.21 -0.14 0.02 0.08 -0.04 -0.04 0.10 -0.01 0.05 0.13 -0.24 -0.10 1 -0.12 -0.21 0.25 0.01 
GROWTH 0.09 -0.04 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.06 0.05 -0.10 -0.02 0.02 -0.09 -0.15 1 0.22 -0.10 -0.03 
CFO 0.16 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 0.04 0.09 -0.02 -0.01 -0.15 -0.03 0.06 -0.05 -0.20 0.41 1 -0.24 -0.20 
SIZE -0.20 -0.12 0.38 0.35 0.12 -0.06 0.36 0.00 -0.03 0.53 -0.46 -0.26 0.33 -0.21 -0.25 1 -0.06 
LOSS -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.16 0.01 -0.13 -0.22 -0.04 1 
DiscRev is the estimated residuals from the following industry-year regression: 
∆ARi,t = α0 + β1∆Ri,t + εi,t 
DiscAcc is the estimated residuals from the following industry-year regression: 
ACCi, t = α0 + α 1 (∆Ri,t - ∆ARi,t ) + α 2 PPE i,t + α 3 ROA i,t-1  + εi,t  
 ACM is the number of audit committee meetings held in a given year; ACS is the total number of audit committee members; ACI is the percentage of independent directors 
in the audit committee; ACRX is the percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial expertise on the audit committee; NEDs is the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board; DUAL is an indicator variable set to 1 when there is no separation between the roles of the CEO and the board chairman; BM is the 
frequency of board meetings held during the financial year; BS is the number of directors in the board; MANOWN  is the percentage of total shares held by executive 
directors to total number of shares; BLOCK  is the percentage ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5 % or more of outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated 
with management; LEV is total long-term debt to total assets; GROWTH is Market-to-book ratio; CFO is cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total assets; 
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets at year end. LOSS is an indicator variable with 1 if a firm incurred losses in either one or both of the previous two years. 
* Bolded coefficients are statistically significant at 10% level. 
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6.4 Multivariate Analyses 
 In this section the author analyses multivariate tests, as correlation tests do 
not control for variations in firm characteristics and other earnings management 
determinants.  
 The author tests the hypotheses using fixed-effect regression with robust 
standard errors clustered by firm to adjust for heteroskedasticity and possible 
autocorrelation (Gow et al. 2010; Petersen 2009; Zang 2011). The author decided to 
use a fixed-effect regression after conducting the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test and the Hausman test. The LM test helps decide on whether to 
use a random-effect regression or simple OLS one. Then the Hausman test is used to 
decide between random or fixed effects.  
 Table 6.4 presents the LM test for both discretionary revenue and 
discretionary accrual models in Panel A and Panel B respectively. 
 
Table 6.4 Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test for 
Random Effects 
 
 
Panel A: Discretionary revenue model 
 
Panel B: Discretionary accrual model 
 
 
DiscRev [cn,t] = Xb + u[cn] + e[cn,t] 
 
DiscAcc [cn,t] = Xb + u[cn] + e[cn,t] 
 
           
 
Estimated 
results: 
   
Estimated 
results: 
   
  
  Var sd = sqrt(Var) 
  
  Var sd = sqrt(Var) 
 
  
DiscRev 0.0005 0.0228 
  
DiscAcc 0.0020 0.0442 
 
  
E 0.0003 0.0175 
  
e 0.0013 0.0354 
 
  
U 0.0002 0.0141 
  
u 0.0010 0.0313 
 
           
 
Test: Var(u) = 0 
  
Test: Var(u) = 0 
  
   
chibar2(01) = 24.51 
   
chibar2(01) = 18.10 
 
   
Prob > chibar2 = 0.000 
   
Prob > chibar2 =  0.000 
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 The null hypothesis tested in the LM test is that there is no panel effect or 
significant difference across entities. Results of the LM test in both Panels A and B 
reveal a rejection of the null hypothesis and that random effect regression is 
appropriate because of significant differences across firms. 
 Hausman test results for the DiscRev and DiscAcc models are presented in 
Table 6.5 Panel A and Panel B respectively. They both reveal a rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the difference between fixed and random coefficients is not 
systematic and indicate the use of fixed-effect regression. 
 
Table 6.5 Hausman Test 
 
 
  
Panel A: Discretionary revenue 
model 
Panel B: Discretionary accrual 
model 
 
 
Variable 
Fixed 
(b) 
Random 
(B) 
Difference 
(b-B) 
Fixed 
(b) 
Random 
(B) 
Difference 
(b-B) 
 
 
ACM -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.005 
 
 
ACS -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.000 
 
 
ACI -0.010 -0.003 -0.007 -0.020 -0.010 -0.010 
 
 
ACX 0.001 0.005 -0.004 0.014 0.011 0.003 
 
 
NEDs 0.030 0.019 0.011 -0.001 -0.007 0.007 
 
 
DUAL -0.010 -0.003 -0.007 0.012 -0.008 0.020 
 
 
BM 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
   BS 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
 
MANOWN 0.010 0.008 0.002 0.075 0.047 0.028 
 
 
BLOCK 0.009 -0.004 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.002 
 
 
LEV 0.032 -0.010 0.042 0.034 -0.012 0.046 
 
 
GROWT
H 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
CFO 0.053 0.029 0.024 0.080 0.022 0.058 
 
 
SIZE -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.009 0.000 -0.009 
 
 
LOSS -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.022 -0.008 -0.014 
 
  
b = consistent under Ho and Ha b = consistent under Ho and Ha 
 
  
B = inconsistent under Ha, 
efficient under Ho 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient 
under Ho 
 
  
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in 
coefficients not systematic 
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients 
not systematic  
 
                  
   
  
Chi2(15) = 31.14 Chi2(15) = 28.98 
 
  
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0084 Prob > Chi2 = 0.0162 
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 One of the main assumptions for using an OLS regression is that the variance 
of the residuals is constant and does not vary from observation to observation. When 
the error variance is not constant, it is said to be heteroskedastic. The results of the 
Modified Wald test in Table 6.6 reveal the presence of heteroskedasticity in both of 
the discretionary revenue (Panel A) and discretionary accrual (Panel B) models49.  
 
Table 6.6 Modified Wald Test for Group-Wise Heteroskedasticity 
in Fixed Effect Regression Model 
 
Panel A: Discretionary revenue model 
 
Panel B: Discretionary accrual model 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
        
 
chi2 (265)   =    5.50E+33 
  
chi2 (265)   =  1.60E+34 
 
 
Prob >chi2 = 0.0000 
  
Prob >chi2 = 0.0000 
 
        Due to the presence of heteroskedasticity the author uses robust standard 
errors clustered by firm to adjust for heteroskedasticity and any possible 
autocorrelation. 
 After the correlation analyses in the previous section revealed no signs of 
multicollinearity and before testing the hypotheses, the author presents the VIF and 
tolerance value as a further check for multicolinearity among variables. As a rule of 
thumb, any variable having a VIF value of more than 10 or tolerance value of less 
than 0.10 is regarded as highly collinear (Gujarati 2003, p.362). Table 6.7 presents 
the VIF and tolerance values of the variables in both of the financial reporting 
quality models and confirms the non-existence of any multicolinearity problem in 
any of the used variables. The highest VIF and lowest tolerance values are for SIZE 
of 2.31 and 0.43 respectively. 
 
 
                                                          
49 The author presented the Modified Wald test as it is the only heteroskedasticity test that could be 
used after fixed effect regressions.  
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Table 6.7 VIF and Tolerance Value of the Financial Reporting Models 
 
Variable VIF Tolerance (1/VIF) 
 
SIZE 2.31 0.432 
 
 
BS 1.84 0.544 
 
 
ACS 1.51 0.664 
 
 
ACM 1.45 0.690 
 
 
NEDs 1.4 0.716 
 
 
CFO 1.26 0.792 
 
 
BLOCK 1.21 0.827 
 
 
BM 1.16 0.863 
 
 
MANOWN 1.15 0.871 
 
 
LEV 1.13 0.887 
 
 
LOSS 1.11 0.903 
 
 
ACX 1.1 0.913 
 
 
GROWTH 1.07 0.931 
 
 
DUAL 1.07 0.936 
 
 
ACI 1.05 0.952 
 
 
Mean VIF 1.32 
  
 
Hypothesis testing 
 Tables 6.8 and 6.9 report the results from the discretionary revenues and 
discretionary accrual models respectively. In each of these tables, the author presents 
three regression results, by which audit committee and board variables are regressed 
both together and separately.   
 Regressions 1 incorporate audit committee characteristics and control 
variables. Regressions 2 incorporate board characteristics and control variables, and 
regressions 3 amalgamate both governance characteristics with the control variables. 
Contrary to a number of prior studies that do not include the variables of the audit 
committee and the board in the same regression (e.g., Xie et al. 2003; Habbash 2010), 
this study regresses the two sets of variables in the same model, as well as separately 
for robustness, arguing that the effectiveness of the audit committee role is directly 
related to that of the board (Vafeas 2005).  
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 The results of these regressions are consistent, regardless of whether the 
author separates audit committee and board variables or not. The adjusted coefficient 
of determination (adjusted R2) in both of the discretionary revenue and discretionary 
accrual models are 6.98% and 6.00% respectively and are consistent with other 
similar earnings management studies (e.g., Xie et al. 2003; Osma and Noguer 2007)   
Interestingly, audit committees and boards are found to be effective in constraining 
revenue manipulations. Specifically, the results in Table 6.8 show negative 
significant coefficients for ACS (-0.005; t-stat= -2.48) and ACI (-0.010; t-stat= -1.91) 
at 1% and 10% respectively, indicating that financial reporting quality is more likely 
to be enhanced in the existence of larger audit committees (Ghosh et al. 2010) 
comprising a higher proportion of independent directors (Vafeas 2005; Bedard et al. 
2004; Klein 2002a). 
  Moreover, the results in Table 6.8 support the validity of hypothesis 6 that 
not separating the roles of CEO and Chairman would lead to better financial 
reporting quality, and are consistent with Peasnell et al. (2001), who have found that 
in the UK context the CEO duality is negatively associated with firms subject to 
adverse rulings from the FRRP. Consistent with the reactive role theory of the board 
(Vafeas 1999; Jensen 1993; Ghosh et al. 2010) the BM coefficient is positively 
significant (0.001; t-stat= 2.00) at 5% suggesting an increase in the frequency of 
board meetings after periods of misleading revenue recognition. Finally, the results 
in Table 6.8 show a positive significant coefficient for LEV at 1% (0.032; t-
stat=2.53), indicating that highly leveraged firms are more inclined to increase 
income through manipulating revenues to avoid debt covenant violation, and a 
positive significant coefficient for CFO at 1% (0.053; t-stat= 2.96), indicating that 
firms with higher cash flows are more likely to manipulate revenues. 
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 On the other hand, Table 6.9 regression 1, presents the results of the 
relationship between audit committee characteristics and discretionary accruals and 
reveals a negative significant coefficient for ACM (-0.006; t-stat= -1.82). This is not 
the case, however, after the author combined audit committee variables with those of 
the board. Moreover, among all control variables, three are found to be associated 
with discretionary accruals. MANOWN is statistically significant at 5% (0.075; t-
stat= 2.16), suggesting an increase in the firm’s discretionary accruals with the 
increase in managerial ownership. Firms with higher cash flows are found more 
likely not just to manipulate revenues, but also accruals (Panel B; 0.080; t-stat= 2.12). 
Finally, the negative and significant coefficient of LOSS indicates that sample firms 
reporting losses in either or both of the previous two years are less likely to be 
involved in accrual-based earnings management (-0.0225; t-stat= -3.01). 
 In summary, this study finds no association between corporate governance 
characteristics (audit committee and board) and financial reporting quality when the 
latter is proxied by the performance-adjusted discretionary accrual model. These 
findings are consistent with the UK study conducted by Basiruddin (2011) who uses 
the same earnings management measure and finds similar results. Using 
discretionary revenue as a surrogate for financial reporting quality, however, the 
author finds that larger audit committees that comprise a higher proportion of 
independent directors are more likely to enhance financial reporting quality. 
Moreover, the board is found to have a reactive role in constraining revenue 
manipulations, and the presence of CEO duality is more likely to enhance financial 
reporting quality50.  
                                                          
50 To date, no studies have examined the impact of corporate governance on discretionary revenues to 
compare the results of this study.  
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Table 6.8 OLS Panel Clustered Robust by Firm. (Dep.: Disc. Rev.) 
   
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 
 
Variables 
  
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 
      (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)   
INERCEPT 
 
0.089 0.0606 0.077 
 
   
(1.23) (0.85) (1.09) 
 
ACM 
  
-0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
   
(-0.79) 
 
(-1.46) 
 
ACS 
  
-0.004 
 
-0.005 
 
   
(-2.31)** 
 
(-2.48)*** 
 
ACI 
  
-0.010 
 
-0.010 
 
   
(-1.92)* 
 
(-1.91)* 
 
ACRX 
  
0.003 
 
0.001 
 
   
(0.64) 
 
(0.28) 
 
NEDs 
   
0.019 0.030 
 
    
(0.95) (1.52) 
 
DUAL 
  
-0.011 -0.010 
 
    
(-2.11)** (-1.86)* 
 
BM 
   
0.001 0.001 
 
    
(1.79)* (2.00)** 
 
BS 
   
-0.000 0.000 
 
    
(-0.28) (0.36) 
 
MANOWN 
 
0.010 0.011 0.010 
 
   
(0.69) (0.78) (0.70) 
 
BLOCK 
  
0.009 0.009 0.009 
 
   
(1.04) (1.01) (1.00) 
 
LEV 
  
0.032 0.037 0.032 
 
   
(2.43)** (2.85)*** (2.53)*** 
 
GROWTH 
 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
   
(-0.72) (-0.60) (-0.79) 
 
CFO 
  
0.051 0.050 0.053 
 
   
(2.64)*** (2.72)*** (2.96)*** 
 
SIZE 
  
-0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
 
   
(-0.77) (-1.07) (-1.02) 
 
LOSS 
  
-0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 
   
(-1.32) (-1.25) (-1.16) 
 
       
Year and Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Adjusted R-square 
 
5.36% 5.03% 6.98% 
 
Observations 
 
662 662 662 
 
***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level or better, respectively. 
The dependent variable is Discretionary Revenues, which is the absolute value of the 
residuals from the following equation: 
∆AR i, t = α0 + β1∆R i, t + ε i, t 
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Table 6.8 (cont’d) 
ACM is the number of audit committee meetings held in a given year; ACS is the total 
number of audit committee members; ACI is the percentage of independent directors in the 
audit committee; ACRX is the percentage of audit committee directors with relevant 
financial expertise on the audit committee; NEDs is the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board; DUAL is an indicator variable set to 1 when there is no separation 
between the roles of the CEO and the board chairman; BM is the frequency of board 
meetings held in a given year; BS is the number of directors in the board; MANOWN  is the 
percentage of total shares held by executive directors to total number of shares; BLOCK is 
the percentage ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5 % or more of outstanding 
common shares and are unaffiliated with management; LEV is total long-term debt to total 
assets; GROWTH is Market-to-book ratio; CFO is cash flow from operating activities scaled 
by lagged total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at year end. LOSS is an 
indicator variable with 1 if a firm incurred losses in either one or both of the previous two 
years. 
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Table 6.9 OLS Panel Clustered Robust by Firm. (Dep.: Disc. Acc.) 
   
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 
 Variables 
 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
       (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)   
  
 
   
 INERCEPT 
 
0.199 0.150 0.190 
 
  
 
(1.70)* (1.26) (1.56) 
 ACM 
 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.006 
 
  
 
(-1.82)* 
 
(-1.62) 
 ACS 
 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.003 
 
  
 
(-0.57) 
 
(-0.74) 
 ACI 
 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.020 
 
  
 
(-1.24) 
 
(-1.26) 
 ACRX 
 
 
0.012 
 
0.014 
 
  
 
(1.12) 
 
(1.26) 
 NEDs 
 
 
 
-0.012 -0.001 
 
  
 
 
(-0.36) (-0.02) 
 DUAL 
 
 
0.011 0.012 
 
  
 
 
(0.95) (0.95) 
 BM 
 
 
 
-0.001 -0.000 
 
  
 
 
(-0.75) (-0.44) 
 BS 
 
 
 
0.001 0.001 
 
  
 
 
(0.21) (0.51) 
 MANOWN 
 
0.076 0.073 0.075 
 
  
 
(2.24)** (2.16)** (2.16)** 
 BLOCK 
 
 
0.016 0.013 0.014 
 
  
 
(0.75) (0.64) (0.68) 
 LEV 
 
 
0.036 0.038 0.034 
 
  
 
(1.21) (1.16) (1.10) 
 GROWTH 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  
 
(0.07) (0.41) (0.11) 
 CFO 
 
 
0.079 0.076 0.080 
 
  
 
(2.08)** (1.98)** (2.12)** 
 SIZE 
 
 
-0.009 -0.008 -0.009 
 
  
 
(-1.14) (-1.01) (-1.10) 
 LOSS 
 
 
-0.0224 -0.0222 -0.022 
 
  
 
(-2.97)*** (-2.99)*** (-3.01)*** 
 
   
   
 Year and Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
 Adjusted R-square 
 
6.30% 4.66% 6.00% 
 Observations 
 
662 662 662 
 
***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level or better, respectively. 
The dependent variable is Discretionary Accruals, which is the absolute value of the 
residuals from the following equation:  
 
ACCi, t = α0 + α 1 (∆R i, t - ∆AR i, t ) + α 2 PPE i, t + α 3 ROA i, t-1  + ε i, t  
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Table 6.9 (Cont’d) 
ACM is the number of audit committee meetings held in a given year; ACS is the 
total number of audit committee members; ACI is the percentage of independent 
directors in the audit committee; ACRX is the percentage of audit committee 
directors with relevant financial expertise on the audit committee; NEDs is the 
percentage of non-executive directors on the board; DUAL is an indicator variable 
set to 1 when there is no separation between the roles of the CEO and the board 
chairman; BM is the frequency of board meetings held in a given year; BS is the 
number of directors in the board; MANOWN  is the percentage of total shares held by 
executive directors to total number of shares; BLOCK is the percentage ownership of 
block-holders who hold at least 5 % or more of outstanding common shares and are 
unaffiliated with management; LEV is total long-term debt to total assets; GROWTH 
is Market-to-book ratio; CFO is cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged 
total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at year end. LOSS is an 
indicator variable with 1 if a firm incurred losses in either one or both of the previous 
two years. 
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6.5 Additional Analyses 
 In order to check the robustness of the main results the author has conducted 
a number of additional tests. 
 First, it has been argued that the same corporate governance choices and 
mechanisms that might be optimal in non-crisis periods might be misaligned in crisis 
periods (Dowell et al. 2011; Van Essen et al. 2013). Van Essen et al. (2013) argue 
this point and find that the performance of governance mechanisms is different in 
crisis periods than in non-crisis periods. As such, the author conducted an additional 
analysis for the pre-crisis period between 2005 and 2007 to compare the 
effectiveness of the audit committee and the board in the two periods (pre-crisis 
(2005-2007) and post-crisis (2008-2010))51.  
 Before analysing the multivariate regressions of the pre-crisis period, it is 
important to present the significant statistical differences of the major variables in 
the pre- and post-crisis periods. Table 6.10 Panel A reports the differences in the 
mean and median of both earnings management measures for the pre- and post-crisis 
periods. Interestingly, the results indicate that the level of discretionary revenues is 
significantly lower (mean and median differences statistically significant at 1%) after 
the crisis, at a time when there is a less significant increase in the level of 
discretionary accruals (mean difference significant at 10%). This finding suggests 
that intense emphasis and scrutiny activities exerted by regulatory bodies to monitor 
                                                          
51 Trying to have almost the same number of observations in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, and 
to avoid the effect of the UK adoption of the IFRS that took place at the beginning of 2005 on 
accounting quality, the author includes the same number of years. 
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a firm’s revenue recognition criteria after the crisis52, lead up to firms using more 
accrual-based earnings management and less revenue manipulations.  
 This is consistent with Zang (2011)’s findings on the substitutive relationship 
between real earnings management activities and accrual-based earnings 
management, as well as on the fact that firms suffering from unhealthy financial 
conditions tend to “use more accrual-based earnings management and less real 
activities manipulation” (p.700)53.  
 Panel B in Table 6.10 reports comparability changes in corporate governance 
variables between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Most of the significant 
changes in governance variables are found in board characteristics. The only change 
in audit committee characteristics is reflected by the significant increase (at 1%) of 
members having relevant financial expertise after the crisis. This is consistent with 
the call of regulatory bodies and academics for the inclusion of directors with 
industry financial expertise in the audit committee. Significant changes in board 
characteristics after the crisis are represented in the decrease of board size and CEO 
duality, and an increase of non-executive directors. As a result, these findings 
suggest that post-crisis our sample firms have responded to corporate governance 
reform recommendations (e.g., OECD 2009) by adopting more changes in the 
structure of boards than in that of audit committees. 
                                                          
52 The 2008 annual review of the FRRP stated that “the reporting of revenue criteria is likely to 
require greater attention during the coming reporting season” (FRRP 2008, p9). Since 2008 the panel 
has kept a close eye on the corporate reporting of revenue recognition criteria and investigated the 
adequacy of disclosures in order to provide users with a clear explanation on how significant revenue 
streams were recognized by management (FRRP 2008, 2009). In several cases, the Panel find that 
some companies  failed to describe how the underlying principles of revenue recognition were applied 
to revenue streams, as such, “the Panel took account of the relative significance of the revenue source 
in determining whether additional or more focused disclosure was necessary” (FRRP 2008, p.9).  
53 Real activities manipulation is one of the forms of discretionary revenues (Stubben 2010). 
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Table 6.10 Descriptive Statistics for Earnings Management, Audit Committee, and Board Variables Surrounding Crisis 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for earnings management surrounding the crisis 
   
Pre-Crisis 
 
Post-Crisis 
 
Differences(a) 
   Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
          
Earnings Management 
        
DiscRev 0.035 0.015 
 
0.021 0.013 
 
0.014*** 0.002*** 
DiscAcc 
 
0.040 0.028 
 
0.044 0.030 
 
-0.004* -0.001 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for governance variables surrounding the crisis 
Audit Committee Variables 
        
ACM 
  
4.124 4.000 
 
4.074 4.000 
 
0.05 0.000 
ACS 
  
3.593 3.000 
 
3.576 3.000 
 
0.017 0.000 
ACI 
  
0.902 1.000 
 
0.899 1.000 
 
0.003 0.000 
ACRX 
  
0.269 0.250 
 
0.307 0.333 
 
-0.039*** -0.083*** 
          
Board Variables 
         
NEDs 
  
0.618 0.625 
 
0.649 0.667 
 
-0.031*** -0.042*** 
DUAL 
 
0.054 0.000 
 
0.035 0.000 
 
0.019* 0.000* 
BM 
  
8.604 8.000 
 
8.817 8.000 
 
-0.213 0.000 
BS 
  
9.336 9.000 
 
9.103 9.000 
 
0.233* 0.000** 
a) ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
 
DiscRev is the estimated absolute value of the residuals from the following industry-year regression: 
∆AR i, t = α0 + β1∆R i, t + ε i, t 
DiscAcc is the estimated absolute value of the residuals from the following industry-year regression: 
ACC i, t = α0 + α 1 (∆R i, t - ∆AR i, t ) + α 2 PPE i, t + α 3 ROA i, t-1  + ε i, t 
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Table 6.10 (Cont’d) 
ACM is the number of audit committee meetings held in a given year; ACS is the total number of audit committee members; ACI is the 
percentage of independent directors in the audit committee; ACRX is the percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial 
expertise on the audit committee; NEDs is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board; DUAL is an indicator variable set to 1 when 
there is no separation between the roles of the CEO and the board chairman; BM is the frequency of board meetings held in a given year; BS is 
the number of directors in the board. 
Chapter 6: Findings and Discussion – Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting Quality 
 
211 
 In Table 6.11, Panel A and Panel B present the pre-crisis (2005-2007) 
regression results from the discretionary revenues and discretionary accrual models 
respectively. In each of these panels, the author presents three regression results, by 
which audit committee and board variables are regressed both together and 
separately. The results of these regressions are consistent, regardless of whether we 
separate audit committee and board variables, and reveal that all audit committee 
characteristics in the pre-crisis period do not have significant impact on both types of 
earnings management. Whereas, among board characteristics, the author finds that 
only BM has a significant positive coefficient at 10% (0.0042; t-stat = 1.71) with 
discretionary revenues suggesting that the boards of the sample firms behave 
reactively and increase their meetings’ frequency after facing problems (Jensen 1993; 
Vafeas 1999), such as misleading revenue recognition practices. SIZE coefficients 
are positively significant at 10% in Panel A (0.0315; t-stat=1.85) and at 5% in Panel 
B (0.0178; t-stat=2.14), indicating that larger firms report higher discretionary 
revenues and discretionary accruals. GROWTH is negatively significant in Panel B 
(-0.0007; t-stat=-2.13) indicating that higher growth firms are less likely to be 
involved in accrual-based earnings management. In essence, these findings suggest 
that audit committees do not have an effective role in ameliorating FRQ in steady 
state conditions, and are consistent with the results of Agoglia et al. (2011) which 
reveal that audit committees tend not to be effective in curbing aggressive financial 
reporting in principles-based regimes.  
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Table 6.11 OLS Panel Clustered Robust by Firm (Sample: 2005-2007) 
      Panel A: Discretionary revenue   Panel B: Discretionary accrual   
   
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 
 
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 
 Variables 
  
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
     (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)  (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)  
INERCEPT 
 
-0.443 -0.495 -0.521 
 
-0.208 -0.205 -0.225 
 
   
(-1.79)* (-2.08)** (-2.16)** 
 
(-1.98)** (-1.81)* (-1.88)* 
 ACM 
  
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
   
(0.13) 
 
(-0.08) 
 
(-0.25) 
 
(0.42) 
 ACS 
  
0.000 
 
-0.001 
 
0.001 
 
-0.000 
 
   
(0.09) 
 
(-0.13) 
 
(0.25) 
 
(-0.11) 
 
ACI 
  
0.013 
 
0.019 
 
0.007 
 
0.008 
 
   
(0.37) 
 
(0.55) 
 
(0.47) 
 
(0.50) 
 ACRX 
  
-0.020 
 
-0.022 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.010 
 
   
(-1.44) 
 
(-1.50) 
 
(-1.00) 
 
(-0.92) 
 NEDs 
   
0.066 0.067 
  
0.017 0.017 
 
    
(1.24) (1.24) 
  
(0.43) (0.41) 
 DUAL 
  
0.043 0.047 
  
-0.002 0.001 
 
    
(1.54) (1.58) 
  
(-0.22) (0.06) 
 BM 
   
0.004 0.004 
  
-0.002 -0.002 
 
    
(1.74)* (1.71)* 
  
(-1.17) (-1.20) 
 BS 
   
0.002 0.002 
  
0.001 0.001 
 
    
(0.70) (0.72) 
  
(0.48) (0.48) 
 MANOWN 
 
-0.162 -0.163 -0.160 
 
-0.037 -0.043 -0.041 
 
   
(-1.02) (-1.05) (-1.01) 
 
(-1.22) (-1.58) (-1.48) 
 BLOCK 
  
0.035 0.025 0.028 
 
0.011 0.009 0.010 
 
   
(1.01) (0.76) (0.84) 
 
(0.54) (0.44) (0.49) 
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Table 6.11 (Cont’d) 
LEV 
  
-0.041 -0.047 -0.050 
 
-0.027 -0.022 -0.023 
 
   
(-0.62) (-0.71) (-0.74) 
 
(-1.08) (-0.88) (-0.94) 
 GROWTH 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
   
(0.45) (0.92) (0.62) 
 
(-2.12)** (-2.12)** (-2.13)** 
 CFO 
  
0.0369 0.0369 0.042 
 
0.069 0.064 0.064 
 
   
(0.32) (0.34) (0.36) 
 
(1.32) (1.22) (1.20) 
 SIZE 
  
0.033 0.031 0.032 
 
0.017 0.017 0.018 
 
   
(1.82)* (1.85)* (1.85)* 
 
(2.36)** (2.10)** (2.14)** 
 LOSS 
  
0.007 0.010 0.011 
 
-0.017 -0.018 -0.017 
 
   
(0.57) (0.70) (0.79) 
 
(-1.52) (-1.55) (-1.50) 
            Year and Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 Adjusted R-square 3.28% 4.83% 4.65% 
 
3.82% 4.12% 3.79% 
 Observations 614 614 614 
 
614 614 614 
 ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level or better, respectively. 
 
The dependent variables are  Discretionary Revenues and Discretionary accruals, which are the absolute value of the residuals from the 
following equations respectively: 
∆AR i, t = α0 + β1∆R i, t + ε i, t 
ACCi, t = α0 + α 1 (∆R i, t - ∆AR i, t ) + α 2 PPE i, t + α 3 ROA i, t-1  + ε i, t 
 
ACM is the number of audit committee meetings held in a given year; ACS is the total number of audit committee members; ACI is the 
percentage of independent directors in the audit committee; ACRX is the percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial 
expertise on the audit committee; NEDs is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board; DUAL is an indicator variable set to 1 when 
there is no separation between the roles of the CEO and the board chairman; BM is the frequency of board meetings held in a given year; BS is 
the number of directors in the board; MANOWN  is the percentage of total shares held by executive directors to total number of shares; BLOCK 
is the percentage ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5 % or more of outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated with 
management; LEV is total long-term debt to total assets; GROWTH is Market-to-book ratio; CFO is cash flow from operating activities scaled by 
lagged total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at year end. LOSS is an indicator variable with 1 if a firm incurred losses in either 
one or both of the previous two years. 
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 Second, in an attempt to mitigate measurement error, the author uses the Jones 
model as an alternative accrual construct for earnings management and examines its 
relationship with the right-hand variables in the main model. The results are presented 
in Table 6.12. They reveal no significant association with any of the corporate 
governance variables and therefore are qualitatively consistent with those of the 
performance-adjusted discretionary accrual main model.  
 Third, this study examines the effectiveness of the audit committee by using 
audit committee individual characteristics. Following Zaman et al. (2011), the author 
further tests audit committee effectiveness (ACE) using a composite measure having a 
value of one if the audit committee is composed of at least three independent directors, 
includes one member with relevant financial experience and meets at least three times a 
year, and zero otherwise. Table 6.13 presents the results in regressions 4 of Panel A and 
B and reveals no significant association between ACE and both of the financial 
reporting quality proxies (discretionary revenues and discretionary accruals). 
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Table 6.12 OLS Panel Clustered Robust by Firm. (Dep.: Jones 
Discretionary Accruals) 
   
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 
 Variables 
  
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
       (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)   
INERCEPT 
  
0.200 0.157 0.184 
 
   
(1.51) (1.19) (1.36) 
 ACM 
  
-0.004 
 
-0.004 
 
   
(-1.31) 
 
(-1.05) 
 ACS 
  
-0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
   
(-0.41) 
 
(-0.63) 
 ACI 
  
-0.015 
 
-0.016 
 
   
(-0.96) 
 
(-1.02) 
 ACRX 
  
0.007 
 
0.008 
 
   
(0.64) 
 
(0.79) 
 NEDs 
   
0.001 0.010 
 
    
(0.04) (0.26) 
 DUAL 
   
0.012 0.012 
 
    
(0.86) (0.85) 
 BM 
   
-0.001 -0.001 
 
    
(-1.20) (-1.02) 
 BS 
   
0.001 0.001 
 
    
(0.32) (0.52) 
 MANOWN 
  
0.070 0.07 0.070 
 
   
(1.67)* (1.63) (1.62) 
 BLOCK 
  
0.005 0.003 0.003 
 
   
(0.23) (0.12) (0.14) 
 LEV 
  
0.037 0.038 0.034 
 
   
(1.11) (1.10) (1.03) 
 GROWTH 
  
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
   
(-0.31) (-0.14) (-0.29) 
 CFO 
  
0.084 0.080 0.084 
 
   
(2.07)** (1.99)** (2.10)** 
 SIZE 
  
-0.010 -0.009 -0.009 
 
   
(-1.08) (-0.98) (-1.02) 
 LOSS 
  
-0.025 -0.025 -0.025 
 
   
(-3.33)*** (-3.41)*** (-3.37)*** 
 
      
 Year and Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
 Adjusted R-square 
 
6.18% 5.78% 6.08% 
 Observations 
 
662 662 662 
 ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level or better, respectively. 
 
Chapter 6: Findings and Discussion – Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting Quality 
 
216 
Table 6.11 (Cont’d) 
The dependent variable is Discretionary Accruals, which is the absolute value of the 
residuals from the following equation:  
ACCi, t = α0 + α 1 (∆R i, t) + α 2 PPE i, t + ε i, t  
ACM is the number of audit committee meetings held in a given year; ACS is the total 
number of audit committee members; ACI is the percentage of independent directors in 
the audit committee; ACRX is the percentage of audit committee directors with relevant 
financial expertise on the audit committee; NEDs is the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board; DUAL is an indicator variable set to 1 when there is no 
separation between the roles of the CEO and the board chairman; BM is the frequency 
of board meetings held in a given year; BS is the number of directors in the board; 
MANOWN  is the percentage of total shares held by executive directors to total number 
of shares; BLOCK is the percentage ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5 % 
or more of outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated with management; LEV is 
total long-term debt to total assets; GROWTH is Market-to-book ratio; CFO is cash 
flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets at year end. LOSS is an indicator variable with 1 if a firm 
incurred losses in either one or both of the previous two years. 
 
 Fourth, the author uses alternative definitions for audit committee independence 
(ACID) and financial expertise (ACRXD). Consistent with the recommendations of the 
UK Corporate Governance Code, ACID represents a dummy variable of 1 if the audit 
committee is solely composed of independent directors, and ACRXD is also a dummy 
variable of 1 if the audit committee includes at least one member with relevant financial 
experience. Results presented in Table 6.13 reveal no significant associations between 
ACID and both discretionary revenues (Panel A, reg. 3) and discretionary accruals 
(Panel B, reg. 3). Given the significant and negative association between the percentage 
of audit committee independent directors and discretionary revenues from the main 
model, this finding suggests that audit committees with a majority of independent 
directors are more likely to constrain revenue manipulations than solely independent 
audit committees (Klein 2002a). Results pertaining to ACRXD, however, are 
qualitatively consistent with those of the main model and reveal no association between 
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this variable and both discretionary revenue (Panel A, reg. 3) and discretionary accruals 
(Panel B, reg. 4). 
 Fifth, the vast majority of prior studies have controlled for whether a firm is 
audited by a Big Four audit firm. This is because large audit firms are more likely to 
detect questionable accounting practices and curtail aggressive financial reporting 
(Becker et al. 1998). As such, the author adds a new dummy variable, having the value 
of one if the firm is audited by a Big Four audit firm, to the main model and finds 
qualitatively consistent results with those of the main model. 
 Finally, similar to other comparative studies in the corporate governance 
literature, the results of this study may suffer from endogeneity problems54. Larcker 
and Rusticus (2010) state that the endogeneity problem can be mitigated by 
incorporating “additional control variables or fixed effects”. Accordingly, the author 
accounts for the possible unobserved heterogeneity in the main model by using fixed 
effect panel data (Coles et al. 2012; Linck et al. 2008; Dittmann et al. 2010) and by 
including a set of relevant and comprehensive control variables. Nonetheless, as 
corporate governance research commonly uses instrumental variables (IV) regressions 
to adjust for endogeneity problems (Larcker and Rusticus 2010), the literature suffers 
from a lack of convenient instruments (Chhaochharia and Laeven 2009), as 
“instrumental variables are weak predictors of the endogenous variables and the 
instrumental variables are themselves partially endogenous” (Larcker et al. 2007, 
p.1003). Alternatively, some researchers have included the lagged values of the 
dependent variable to curb endogeneity problems (e.g., Linck et al. 2008). The history 
of the dependent variable includes all the past firm information, observable and 
unobservable, which other methods cannot possibly control for” (Li 2011, p.15). In this 
                                                          
54 Concerns about such problems are reduced in our study, as the financial crisis was not expected to 
occur (Mitton 2002; Van Essen et al. 2013). 
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sense, including lagged discretionary revenues may help control for the variation in 
governance variables that is caused by contemporary variation in discretionary revenues. 
Therefore, the author further regresses discretionary revenues on lagged discretionary 
revenues and all other explanatory variables used in the main model. The results in 
Table 6.13 (regressions 1 of Panels A and B) are qualitatively consistent and echo those 
in the main model. It is worth noting that although lagging the dependent variable may 
control for the omitted variables bias (Gatchev et al. 2010), there is a limitation in using 
this method in OLS regressions. That is, “if residual autocorrelation is present, the 
lagged dependent variable causes the coefficients for explanatory variables to be biased 
downward” (Keele and Kelly 2006, p.186). 
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Table 6.13 OLS Panel Clustered Robust by Firm (Additional Tests) 
   
Panel A: Discretionary revenue Panel B: Discretionary accrual 
   
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 
Variables 
  
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
    (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
INERCEPT 
 
0.084 0.089 0.067 0.060 0.205 0.142 0.168 0.149 
   
(1.21) (1.22) (0.93) (0.84) (1.65)* (1.13) (1.41) (1.26) 
L.DiscRev 
  
-0.000 
  
  
    
 
  
(-0.01) 
  
  
    
L.DiscAcc 
  
  
  
  -0.201 
   
   
  
  
  (-4.59)*** 
   
ACE 
  
  
  
-0.002 
   
-0.005 
   
  
  
(-0.89) 
   
(-1.14) 
ACM 
  
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002   -0.005 -0.006 -0.005  
   
(-1.08) (-1.46) (-1.38)   (-1.37) (-1.61) (-1.53)  
ACS 
  
-0.005 -0.005 -0.005   -0.002 -0.003 -0.004  
   
(-2.78)*** (-2.48)*** (-2.62)***   (-0.61) (-0.74) (-1.01)  
ACI 
  
-0.011 -0.010 
 
  -0.023 -0.019 
 
 
 
  
(-2.00)** (-1.91)* 
 
  (-1.54) (-1.25) 
 
 
ACRX 
  
0.001 0.001 
 
  0.008 0.014 
 
 
   
(0.18) (0.28) 
 
  (0.76) (1.27) 
 
 
ACID 
  
  
 
-0.003   
  
-0.008 
 
   
  
 
(-1.56)     (-1.43)  
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Table 6.13 (Cont’d) 
ACRXD 
  
  
 
0.001   
  
0.013 
 
   
  
 
(0.56)   
  
(1.63) 
 
NEDs 
  
0.025 0.031 0.030 0.019 0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.010 
   
(1.21) (1.53) (1.54) (0.98) (0.08) (-0.11) (0.06) (-0.31) 
DUAL 
 
-0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.011 
   
(-1.92)* (-1.85)* (-1.91)* (-2.16)** (0.65) (0.95) (0.90) (0.95) 
BM 
  
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
   
(1.71)* (2.00)** (1.96)** (1.78)* (-0.38) (-0.46) (-0.46) (-0.76) 
BS 
  
0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 
   
(0.55) (0.33) (0.38) (-0.33) (0.08) (0.56) (0.60) (0.16) 
MANOWN 
 
0.012 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.072 
   
(1.32) (0.70) (0.74) (0.74) (1.93)** (2.15)** (2.31)** (2.10)** 
BLOCK 
  
0.006 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.015 0.014 0.017 0.013 
   
(0.73) (1.00) (1.04) (0.97) (0.69) (0.67) (0.78) (0.60) 
LEV 
  
0.032 0.032 0.031 0.036 0.032 0.035 0.031 0.036 
   
(2.38)** (2.50)*** (2.47)*** (2.80)*** (1.08) (1.14) (1.03) (1.11) 
GROWTH 
 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   
(-0.56) (-0.80) (-0.82) (-0.62) (0.01) (0.11) (0.04) (0.35) 
CFO 
  
0.055 0.054 0.053 0.050 0.039 0.078 0.082 0.075 
   
(2.98)*** (2.96)*** (2.95)*** (2.71)*** (1.10) (2.06)** (2.17)** (1.96)** 
SIZE 
  
-0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 
   
(-1.12) (-1.05) (-0.98) (-1.01) (-1.07) (-1.02) (-1.07) (-0.94) 
LOSS 
  
-0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.020 -0.022 -0.023 -0.022 
 
  
(-0.59) (-1.16) (-1.20) (-1.24) (-2.69)*** (-2.99)*** (-2.99)*** (-3.00)*** 
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Table 6.13 (Cont’d) 
BIG4 
  
  -0.010 
 
  
 
0.042 
  
   
  (-1.67)* 
 
  
 
(3.84)*** 
  
   
  
  
  
    Year and Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-square 6.38% 6.87% 6.88% 5.07% 10.31% 6.02% 6.43% 4.79% 
Observations 581 662 662 662 581 662 662 662 
***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level or better, respectively. 
 
The dependent variables are  Discretionary Revenues and Discretionary accruals, which are the absolute value of the residuals from the 
following equations respectively: 
∆AR i, t = α0 + β1∆R i, t + ε i, t 
ACCi, t = α0 + α 1 (∆R i, t - ∆AR i, t ) + α 2 PPE i, t + α 3 ROA i, t-1  + ε i, t 
 
L.DiscRev is the lagged values of discretionary revenue estimates; L.DiscAcc is the lagged values of the discretionary accrual estimates; ACE is a 
composite indicator variable with the value of one if the audit committee is comprised of at least three independent directors, include at least one 
member with relevant financial expertise and meets at least three times a year; ACM is the number of audit committee meetings held in a given 
year; ACS is the total number of audit committee members; ACI is the percentage of independent directors in the audit committee; ACRX is the 
percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial expertise on the audit committee; ACID is an indicator variable with a value of 1 
if the audit committee is totally independent; ACRXD is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if the audit committee include at least one 
member with relevant financial experience; NEDs is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board; DUAL is an indicator variable set to 
1 when there is no separation between the roles of the CEO and the board chairman; BM is the frequency of board meetings held in a given year; 
BS is the number of directors in the board; MANOWN  is the percentage of total shares held by executive directors to total number of shares; 
BLOCK is the percentage ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5 % or more of outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated with 
management; LEV is total long-term debt to total assets; GROWTH is Market-to-book ratio; CFO is cash flow from operating activities scaled by 
lagged total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at year end. LOSS is an indicator variable with 1 if a firm incurred losses in either 
one or both of the previous two years. BIG4 is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if the firm is audited by a big-four audit firm. 
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6.6 Summary 
 This chapter reports the empirical findings of the impact of audit committee 
and board characteristics on financial reporting quality as proxied by discretionary 
revenues and discretionary accruals. The main analysis of the study is based on the 
post-financial crisis period between 2008 and 2010 in an attempt to address UK 
regulatory concerns about misleading revenue recognition practices during this 
period. However, additional analysis for the pre-crisis period between 2005 and 2007 
is conducted to provide a comparison of the effectiveness of internal governance 
mechanisms in enhancing financial reporting quality during pre- and post-crisis 
periods. 
 The regression results reveal that audit committees and boards of directors 
are associated with better financial reporting quality after the financial crisis. This is 
only the case when the author uses discretionary revenues as a construct for financial 
reporting quality. Specifically, the author finds that large audit committees 
comprising independent directors are effective monitors of the firm’s financial 
reporting process. Similarly, not separating the roles of the chairman and the CEO 
has a positive impact on financial reporting quality post-crisis. Finally, boards are 
found to have a reactive role, thus tending to increase their meetings’ frequency after 
facing an escalating problem, such as revenues management. 
 By comparing the alternative measures of earnings management 
(discretionary revenues and discretionary accruals) and the firms’ internal 
governance mechanisms pre- and post-crisis, the author finds the following. First, 
there is significant decrease in the level of discretionary revenues after the crisis, at a 
time when there is less significant increase in the level of discretionary accruals 
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(Table 6.10, Panel A), suggesting a shift from one earnings management method to 
another. Second, in terms of corporate governance characteristics, there is significant 
decrease in board size and CEO duality after the financial crisis along with a 
significant increase in non-executive directors on the board and relevant financial 
experience of audit committees. This suggest that sample firms’ response to 
regulators’ calls for corporate governance reforms after the crisis (e.g., OECD 2009), 
is through more changes in the structure of boards than in that of audit committees. 
 Additional multivariate analysis during the pre-crisis period 2005 to 2007 
reveals no significant associations between governance variables and both financial 
reporting quality proxies, except for BM with discretionary revenues at the 10% 
level. This finding is consistent with the post-crisis finding confirming the reactive 
role perspective of the board in constraining revenue manipulations. A summary of 
the hypotheses related to the impact of audit committee and board characteristics on 
financial reporting quality, along with the relevant findings, are presented in Table 
6.14. 
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Table 6.14 Summary of Hypotheses and Relevant Findings 
Hypothesis 
Number 
Hypothesis Findings 
1 
There is a positive relationship between audit 
committee independence and financial 
reporting quality. 
Supported 
(Discretionary revenue 
proxy) 
2 
There is a positive relationship between audit 
committee relevant financial experience and 
financial reporting quality.  
Not supported 
3 
There is a positive relationship between audit 
committee size and financial reporting 
quality.  
Supported 
(Discretionary revenue 
proxy) 
4 
There is a negative relationship between 
audit committee meetings and financial 
reporting quality.  
Not supported 
5 
There is a negative relationship between non-
executive directors and financial reporting 
quality. 
Not supported 
6 
There is a positive relationship between CEO 
duality and financial reporting quality. 
Supported 
(Discretionary revenue 
proxy) 
7 
There is a negative relationship between 
board meetings and financial reporting 
quality. 
Supported 
(Discretionary revenue 
proxy) 
8 
There is a negative relationship between 
board size and financial reporting quality. 
Not supported 
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Chapter 7 
Findings and Discussion – Corporate 
Governance, Audit Fees and Non-Audit 
Fees 
7.1 Introduction 
 After presenting the results of the first empirical study in chapter six, this 
chapter presents the findings of the second empirical investigation tackling the 
impact of audit committee and board characteristics on auditor remuneration. Two 
empirical analyses are employed for each of the dependent variables, audit fees and 
non-audit service fees. Similar to the previous chapter, the remainder of this chapter 
is structured as follows: the next section (7.2) discusses the descriptive statistics 
followed by the correlation matrix in section 7.3, while sections 7.4 and 7.5 present 
the multivariate analysis and additional analysis respectively. Finally the chapter 
concludes with a summary of the findings in section 7.6.  
7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 7.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables (audit 
fees and non-audit fees), corporate governance variables and control variables. The 
statistics used to describe the sample under study are: mean, standard deviation, 
median, minimum, maximum, skewness and kurtosis. Given that the descriptive 
statistics of corporate governance variables are discussed in the previous chapter 
(6.2), this section only discusses the descriptive statistics of audit fees, non-audit fees 
and the other control variables which are not tackled previously. 
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 The mean (median) of audit fees and non-audit fees for 619 observations for 
the period from 2008 to 2010 are £2.137 million (£0.800 million) and £1.354 million 
(£0.495 million) respectively. A similar UK study conducted by Basiruddin (2011) 
on 674 observations for the period from 2005 to 2008 reports a mean (median) of 
£1.466 million (£0.805 million) and £1.296 million (£0.600 million) for audit fees 
and non-audit fees respectively. Comparing the means from the two studies indicates 
an average increase of audit fees and non-audit fees by 45.77% and 4.48% 
respectively. Comparisons of the medians, however, indicate roughly similar values 
for audit fees but a decrease by 17.5% for non-audit fees. The inconsistency of the 
mean and median is because of the non-parametric nature of the data. As shown in 
Table 7.1, the skewness (kurtosis) for audit fees and non-audit fees are 5.189 (36.874) 
and 11.828 (189.318) respectively, and are severely higher than those for normally 
distributed data of ±1.96 (±3) (Gujarati 1995). As such, and following Zaman et al. 
(2011) and Basiruddin (2011), the natural logarithm of audit fees and non-audit fees 
is used as a transformation method. 
 In addition to the descriptive statistics of the control variables discussed in 
the previous chapter, Table 7.1 presents the descriptive statistics of ACQ and 
BUSSEG. On average, sample firms are found to have three business segments and 
64.5% of the firms have made acquisitions during the sample period.  
 The yearly descriptive statistics are presented in Table 7.2. In 2008, the mean 
of audit fees and non-audit fees are £2.268 million and £1.736 million respectively. 
Year 2010 shows a decrease in the mean of audit fees and non-audit fees by 7.89% 
and 37.67% respectively. The significant decrease in non-audit fees suggests that 
sample firms have responded to the post-financial crisis concerns of low audit 
quality by reducing the purchase of non-audit services. The average number of 
Chapter 7: Findings and Discussion – Corporate Governance, Audit Fees and Non-Audit Fees 
 
228 
business segments has been approximately constant throughout the three years. 
However, the percentage of firms that have undertaken acquisition activities 
decreases from 73.3% in 2008 to 61.5% in 2010. This is probably because of the 
financial distress experienced by firms after the crisis. 
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Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
   
Number Mean Standard Deviation Median Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Dependent variables 
        
ASF (£‘000) 
 
619 2,137,844.000 4,165,314.000 800,000.000 23,000.000 37,400,000.000 5.189 36.874 
LnASF 
 
619 13.717 1.260 13.592 10.043 17.437 0.248 3.128 
NASF (£‘000) 
 
619 1,354,121.000 3,993,373.000 495,375.300 0.000 73,700,000.000 11.828 189.318 
LnNASF 
 
619 12.727 2.573 13.113 0.000 18.116 -3.231 16.894 
   
       
Audit Committee Characteristics 
 
       
ACM 
 
619 4.134 1.524 4.000 2.000 15.000 2.500 13.580 
ACS 
 
619 3.620 0.901 3.000 2.000 7.000 1.032 4.456 
ACI 
 
619 0.907 0.171 1.000 0.000 1.000 -1.769 5.600 
ACRX 
 
619 0.321 0.271 0.333 0.000 1.000 1.140 4.031 
          
Board Characteristics 
         
NEDs 
 
619 0.646 0.117 0.667 0.267 0.929 -0.216 2.821 
DUAL 
 
619 0.029 0.168 0.000 0.000 1.000 5.605 32.419 
BM 
 
619 8.995 3.151 8.000 3.000 26.000 1.736 8.595 
BS 
 
619 9.268 2.494 9.000 5.000 20.000 1.116 4.624 
          
Control Variables 
         
BLOCK 
 
619 0.278 0.185 0.248 0.000 0.924 0.767 3.457 
LEV 
 
619 0.196 0.164 0.174 0.000 0.807 0.704 2.983 
TA(£‘000) 
 
619 7,294,121.000 21,500,000.000 1,590,572.000 44,068.000 203,000,000.000 6.298 47.658 
SIZE 
 
619 14.416 1.510 14.280 10.693 19.130 0.556 3.286 
LOSS 
 
619 0.158 0.365 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.872 4.504 
ACQ 
 
619 0.645 0.479 1.000 0.000 1.000 -0.604 1.365 
BUSSEG 
 
619 3.197 1.941 3.000 1.000 10.000 0.798 3.265 
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Table 7.1 (Cont’d) 
ASF are audit service fees in £; LnASF is the natural logarithm of ASF; NASF are non-audit service fees in £; LnNASF is the natural logarithm of NASF; 
ACM is the number of audit committee meetings held in a given year; ACS is the total number of audit committee members; ACI is the percentage of 
independent directors in the audit committee; ACRX is the percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial expertise on the audit committee; 
NEDs is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board; DUAL is an indicator variable set to 1 when there is no separation between the roles of the 
CEO and the board chairman; BM is the frequency of board meetings held during the financial year; BS is the number of directors in the board; BLOCK is 
the percentage ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5 % or more of outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated with management; LEV is total 
long-term debt to total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at year end; LOSS is an indicator variable with 1 if a firm incurred losses in either 
one or both of the previous two years; ACQ is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if a firm made an acquisition during the year; BUSSEG is the number of 
a firm business segments. 
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Table 7.2 Descriptive Statistics by Year 
    2008   2009   2010 
  
Mean St. Dev. Median  Mean St. Dev. Median  Mean St. Dev. Median 
        
Dependent variables 
          ASF (£) 2,268,007 4,492,664 900,000 
 
2,057,249 4,121,843 796,805 
 
2,089,611 3,868,012 800,000 
LnASF 13.786 1.253 13.710 
 
13.654 1.271 13.588 
 
13.714 1.258 13.592 
NASF (£) 1,736,828 5,834,196 517,143 
 
1,239,159 3,112,075 400,000 
 
1,082,367 1,975,383 462,000 
LnNASF 12.956 2.339 13.156 
 
12.550 2.744 12.899 
 
12.680 2.610 13.043 
             Audit Committee
Variables 
           ACM 
 
4.107 1.616 4.000 
 
4.146 1.467 4.000 
 
4.150 1.493 4.000 
ACS 
 
3.665 0.910 3.000 
 
3.577 0.942 3.000 
 
3.620 0.848 3.000 
ACI 
 
0.913 0.165 1.000 
 
0.887 0.181 1.000 
 
0.924 0.164 1.000 
ACRX 
 
0.309 0.273 0.250 
 
0.326 0.273 0.333 
 
0.329 0.269 0.333 
             Board Variables 
           NEDs 
 
0.634 0.120 0.636 
 
0.650 0.121 0.667 
 
0.654 0.109 0.667 
DUAL 
 
0.029 0.169 0.000 
 
0.028 0.166 0.000 
 
0.030 0.171 0.000 
BM 
 
8.976 3.026 9.000 
 
9.155 3.164 9.000 
 
8.845 3.270 8.000 
BS 
 
9.529 2.642 9.000 
 
9.099 2.447 9.000 
 
9.180 2.376 9.000 
             Control Variables 
           BLOCK 0.278 0.192 0.245 
 
0.287 0.179 0.267 
 
0.269 0.184 0.239 
LEV 0.213 0.166 0.186 
 
0.198 0.168 0.173 
 
0.178 0.156 0.158 
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Table 7.2 (Cont’d) 
TA(£‘000) 7,210,988 20,600,000 1,636,850 
 
6,814,193 20,400,000 1,454,155 
 
7,890,872 23,600,000 1,689,100 
SIZE 14.452 1.512 14.308 
 
14.340 1.497 14.190 
 
14.458 1.526 14.340 
LOSS 0.083 0.276 0.000 
 
0.155 0.363 0.000 
 
0.240 0.428 0.000 
ACQ 0.733 0.443 1.000 
 
0.587 0.494 1.000 
 
0.615 0.488 1.000 
BUSSEG 3.000 1.719 3.000 
 
3.263 1.994 3.000 
 
3.330 2.086 3.000 
                          
ASF are audit serivce fees in £; LnASF is the natural logarithm of ASF; NASF are non-audit service fees in £; LnNASF is the natural logarithm of NASF; 
ACM is the number of audit committee meetings held in a given year; ACS is the total number of audit committee members; ACI is the percentage of 
independent directors in the audit committee; ACRX is the percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial expertise on the audit committee; 
NEDs is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board; DUAL is an indicator variable set to 1 when there is no separation between the roles of the 
CEO and the board chairman; BM is the frequency of board meetings held during the financial year; BS is the number of directors in the board; BLOCK is 
the percentage ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5 % or more of outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated with management; LEV is total 
long-term debt to total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at year end; LOSS is an indicator variable with 1 if a firm incurred losses in either 
one or both of the previous two years; ACQ is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if a firm made an acquisition during the year; BUSSEG is the number of 
a firm business segments. 
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7.3 Correlation Matrix  
 Table 7.3 reports the Spearman and Pearson correlations among the 
dependent and independent variables (excluding industry dummies) in the audit fees 
and non-audit fees models. The analysis is mainly based on the Spearman correlation 
due to the non-parametric nature of the examined data. 
 Both Spearman and Pearson correlations in Table 7.3 indicate a positive 
significant correlation between lnASF and lnNASF (Spearman 0.68, Pearson 0.48). 
This suggests that sample firms purchase both audit and non-audit services from the 
incumbent auditor at the same time. All audit committee variables are found to be 
significantly correlated with both lnASF and lnNASF under the Spearman 
correlation. Of the board variables, however, only NEDs and BS are significantly 
correlated with both lnASF and lnNASF, and BM has only a significant correlation 
with lnASF. Unexpectedly, corporate governance variables that are correlated with 
lnNASF have positive coefficients, suggesting that good governance mechanisms 
tend to demand the purchase of greater levels of non-audit services. Moreover, 
ACRX and BM are found to be negatively correlated with lnASF. This implies that 
the presence of audit committee members with relevant financial experience as well 
as the increase in the number of board meetings is expected to reduce the audit 
efforts of auditors and therefore reduce audit fees. 
 Correlations among the independent variables do not reveal any 
multicollinearity problem. The highest correlation of 0.59 is between SIZE and BS. 
The VIF multicollinearity test is further tested in the multivariate analysis. 
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Table 7.3 Spearman (Lower Triangle) and Pearson (Upper Triangle) Correlations  
Variables lnASF lnNASF ACM ACS ACI ACRX NEDs DUAL BM BS BLOCK LEV SIZE LOSS ACQ BUSSEG 
 lnASF 1 0.48 0.43 0.38 0.15 -0.08 0.36 -0.05 -0.03 0.52 -0.25 0.04 0.76 -0.10 0.32 0.37 
 lnNASF 0.68 1 0.24 0.22 0.05 -0.04 0.13 -0.09 0.00 0.32 -0.15 -0.01 0.39 -0.12 0.23 0.19 
 ACM 0.40 0.31 1 0.26 0.07 -0.07 0.26 0.00 0.27 0.36 -0.04 -0.02 0.39 -0.02 0.03 0.13 
 ACS 0.35 0.29 0.27 1 0.00 -0.23 0.27 0.01 -0.01 0.42 -0.19 0.07 0.38 -0.05 0.14 0.05 
 ACI 0.11 0.11 0.09 -0.03 1 0.03 0.10 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.03 0.11 0.00 0.06 -0.03 
 ACRX -0.16 -0.11 -0.09 -0.38 0.07 1 0.02 0.14 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.08 0.03 
 NEDs 0.36  0.23 0.25 0.25 0.09 -0.06 1 -0.02 -0.04 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.37 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 
 DUAL -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.12 -0.01 1 -0.03 0.01 0.10 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.07 
 BM -0.11 -0.04 0.19 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 1 -0.03 -0.07 0.03 0.02 0.05 -0.08 -0.04 
 BS 0.46 0.41 0.32 0.46 0.01 -0.14 0.10 0.02 -0.11 1 -0.08 0.06 0.59 0.00 0.14 0.21 
 BLOCK -0.28 -0.23 -0.07 -0.18 -0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.09 -0.03 -0.18 1 -0.07 -0.25 0.14 -0.12 -0.02 
 LEV 0.11 0.15 0.02 0.06 -0.05 -0.05 0.11 -0.01 0.04 0.09 -0.09 1 0.22 0.01 0.06 0.10 
 SIZE 0.71 0.59 0.37 0.34 0.10 -0.10 0.35 0.00 -0.04 0.55 -0.28 0.32 1 -0.03 0.18 0.28 
 LOSS -0.08 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.01 -0.02 1 -0.13 0.00 
 ACQ 0.34 0.25 0.04 0.13 0.05 -0.10 -0.01 0.03 -0.08 0.12 -0.14 0.10 0.19 -0.13 1 0.30 
 BUSSEG 0.38 0.27 0.14 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.17 -0.10 0.13 0.28 -0.01 0.33 1 
             
            ACM is the number of audit committee meetings held in a given year; ACS is the total number of audit committee members; ACI is the percentage of independent directors in
the audit committee; ACRX is the percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial expertise on the audit committee; NEDs is the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board; DUAL is an indicator variable set to 1 when there is no separation between the roles of the CEO and the board chairman; BM is the frequency of board 
meetings held during the financial year; BS is the number of directors in the board; BLOCK is the percentage ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5 % or more of 
outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated with management; LEV is total long-term debt to total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at year end; LOSS is 
an indicator variable with 1 if a firm incurred losses in either one or both of the previous two years; ACQ is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if a firm made an 
acquisition during the year; BUSSEG is the number of a firm business segments. 
* Bolded coefficients are statistically significant at 10% level. 
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7.4 Multivariate Analyses 
 This section presents a multivariate analysis of the impact of audit committee 
and board characteristics on audit fees and non-audit fees. Extent literature has 
shown that audit fees and non-audit fees are jointly determined (Whisenant et al. 
2003; Lee and Mande 2005) and examining them in single equation models may lead 
to biased results. Recently, Zaman et al. (2011) account for what they called this 
‘complex’ relationship between audit fees and non-audit fees as well as the other 
explanatory variables through incorporating the standardized residuals of the audit 
fees model into the non-audit fees model. Following Zaman et al. (2011), the author 
uses OLS regressions for testing the hypotheses. The author opts to use OLS 
regression for him to be able to predict the standardized residuals and incorporate 
them in the models. This section present the results of regressions excluding 
residuals followed in the next section by the robustness-test results of regressions in 
which the author incorporated the standardized residuals. After checking for the 
homoskedasticity of residuals and the results were negative, standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity by using the robust standard errors option55.  
 Table 7.4 presents the results of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity of both of the audit fees (Panel A) and non-audit fees (Panel B) 
models. The null hypothesis tested is that the variance of residuals is constant. 
Results of the test in both panels reveal a rejection of the null hypothesis and indicate 
the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
 
                                                          
55  Robust standard errors are also called White-Huber standard errors or sandwich estimator of 
variance. Regressing the models using robust standard errors clustered by firm also provide results 
which are qualitatively similar. 
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Table 7.4 Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity  
Panel A: Audit fees model 
 
Panel B: Non-audit fees model 
   Ho: Constant variance 
  
Ho: Constant variance 
 Variables: fitted values of lnASF 
 
Variables: fitted values of lnNASF 
         chi2(1)     =     2.85 
   
chi2(1)      =   174.91 
  Prob > chi2  =   0.0914 
  
Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
 
 To further check the validity of the OLS estimates, the author uses VIF and 
tolerance statistics to test for multicollinearity among the independent variables of 
the audit fees and non-audit fees models and the results are presented in Table 7.5. 
None of the variables has a VIF of more than 10 or a tolerance value of less than 
0.10 (Gujarati 2003), indicating the nonexistence of any multicollinearity problem. 
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Table 7.5 VIF and Tolerance Value of Audit Fees and Non-Audit Fees 
Models 
  
Variable VIF 
Tolerance 
(1/VIF) 
    
  
  
  INDST 6.32 0.158 
  CSERV 5.86 0.171 
  CGOD 3.69 0.271 
  BMAT 3.44 0.291 
  O&G 2.87 0.348 
  TECH 2.52 0.397 
  SIZE 2.51 0.398 
  BS 1.94 0.516 
  TELECOM 1.54 0.647 
  ACS 1.53 0.656 
  NEDs 1.48 0.676 
  2008 1.47 0.682 
  ACM 1.46 0.684 
  2009 1.39 0.718 
  BLOCK 1.34 0.749 
  ACQ 1.32 0.755 
  BUSSEG 1.32 0.757 
  LEV 1.25 0.800 
  BM 1.17 0.856 
  ACRX 1.16 0.863 
  DUAL 1.12 0.897 
  LOSS 1.1 0.907 
  ACI 1.07 0.930 
  Mean VIF 2.13     
 
Hypothesis testing 
 Tables 7.6 and 7.7 report the results from the audit fees and non-audit fees 
models respectively. In each of these tables, the author presents three regression 
results, by which audit committee and board variables are regressed both together 
and separately.   
 Regressions 1 incorporate audit committee characteristics and control 
variables. Regressions 2 incorporate board characteristics and control variables, and 
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regressions 3 combine both sets of governance characteristics with the control 
variables. All of the regressions report R2s which are comparable to other similar UK 
studies (Zaman et al. 2011; Nehme 2013).  
Audit fees 
 As predicted in hypotheses 9a, 11a, and 12a, Reg. 1 in Table 7.6 reveals that 
ACI, ACS and ACM are significant and positively related to audit fees, suggesting 
that higher audit fees are associated with larger audit committees (Zaman et al. 2011; 
Boo and Sharma 2008; Ittonen et al. 2010) that are independent (Zaman et al. 2011; 
Rustam et al. 2013; Lee and Mande 2005) and meet more frequently (Lee and 
Mande 2005; Zaman et al. 2011; Basiruddin 2011). The significance of the ACS, 
however, does not hold when combining both sets of audit committee and board 
variables in the same regression suggesting that the size of audit committee does not 
play an incremental role in the presence of the board. Contrary to Carcello et al. 
(2002), who find that the independence of the audit committee is not significant 
when the audit committee and board variables are combined in the same regression, 
ACI remains significant at 5% (0.327; t-stat= 1.94) even after combining the two sets 
of variables (Reg.3).  
  All board variables are found to be significantly related to audit fees except 
DUAL (Reg. 3). Consistent with Boo and Sharma (2008), NEDs and BS are 
positively related to audit fees suggesting that the latter are more likely to increase in 
the presence of larger boards comprising of a higher proportion of non-executive 
directors (Carcello et al. 2002; Abbott et al. 2003a). Contrary to hypothesis 15a and 
consistent with the UK study conducted by Basiruddin (2011), BM is negatively 
associated with audit fees at the 5% level (-0.023; t-stat=-2.16) suggesting that the 
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more frequent board meetings are, the less audit efforts will be exerted by the 
auditors and therefore the lower audit fees. 
 All main control variables except LOSS (Reg. 3) are significantly related to 
audit fees. ACQ, SIZE and BUSSEG are found to have a positive impact on audit 
fees suggesting that larger firms that engage in acquisition activities and have a 
larger number of business segments require greater audit efforts from the external 
auditor leading the latter to charge higher audit fees. Contrary to the author 
prediction, BLOCK is negatively related to audit fees suggesting that intense 
monitoring exerted by block-holders reduces the need for extensive audit work thus 
leading to lower audit fees. LEV is also found to be negatively related to audit fees. 
Despite that this finding contradicts with the author’s prediction of a positive sign, it 
is consistent with a finding of a UK study conducted by Zaman et al. (2011) on a 
sample of 540 FTSE firms listed during the period 2001 to 2004. Firms in the basic 
materials and consumer services industries appear to pay the highest audit fees 
compared to their counterparts. 
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Table 7.6 OLS with Robust Standard Errors (Dep.: Nat. Log. of Audit 
Fees) 
   
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 
 
Variables 
  
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 
      (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)   
       
INERCEPT 
 
4.131 4.393 4.427 
 
   
(11.14)*** (12.32)*** (11.19)*** 
 
ACM 
  
0.090 
 
0.089 
 
   
(4.45)*** 
 
(4.03)*** 
 
ACS 
  
0.112 
 
0.043 
 
   
(3.42)*** 
 
(1.22) 
 
ACI 
  
0.381 
 
0.327 
 
   
(2.28)** 
 
(1.94)** 
 
ACRX 
  
-0.060 
 
-0.116 
 
   
(-0.53) 
 
(-1.05) 
 
NEDs 
   
1.493 1.214 
 
    
(5.18)*** (4.06)*** 
 
DUAL 
   
-0.110 -0.078 
 
    
(-0.52) (-0.40) 
 
BM 
   
-0.012 -0.023 
 
    
(-1.17) (-2.16)** 
 
BS 
   
0.068 0.050 
 
    
(4.56)*** (3.27)*** 
 
BLOCK 
  
-0.134 -0.356 -0.354 
 
   
(-0.69) (-1.78)* (-1.78)* 
 
LEV 
  
-0.903 -0.955 -0.855 
 
   
(-4.65)*** (-5.13)*** (-4.65)*** 
 
SIZE 
  
0.587 0.547 0.516 
 
   
(23.17)*** (18.48)*** (16.99)*** 
 
LOSS 
  
-0.158 -0.153 -0.142 
 
   
(-1.71)* (-1.67)* (-1.58) 
 
ACQ 
  
0.206 0.210 0.202 
 
   
(2.96)*** (2.99)*** (2.94)*** 
 
BUSSEG 
  
0.100 0.093 0.096 
 
   
(6.40)*** (6.09)*** (6.39)*** 
 
O&G 
  
-0.401 -0.393 -0.327 
 
   
(-3.22)*** (-3.00)*** (-2.37)** 
 
BMAT 
  
-0.528 -0.570 -0.515 
 
   
(-3.36)*** (-3.63)*** (-3.27)*** 
 
INDST 
  
0.046 0.111 0.139 
 
   
(0.48) (1.23) (1.43) 
 
CGOD 
  
-0.416 -0.397 -0.320 
 
   
(-3.20)*** (-3.19)*** (-2.49)*** 
 
HCAR 
      
       
CSEV 
  
-0.425 -0.424 -0.374 
 
   
(-4.23)*** (-4.52)*** (-3.79)*** 
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Table 7.6 (Cont’d) 
TELECOM 
  
-0.469 -0.396 -0.360 
 
   
(-2.23)** (-1.50) (-1.41) 
 
TECH 
  
0.020 0.073 0.077 
 
   
(0.14) (0.51) (0.53) 
 
2008 
  
0.095 0.102 0.106 
 
   
(1.30) (1.42) (1.51) 
 
2009 
  
0.045 0.040 0.050 
 
   
(0.66) (0.59) (0.76) 
 
2010 
      
       
       
R-square 
 
70.99% 71.35% 72.57% 
 
Observations 
 
619 619 619 
 
              
***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level or better, respectively. 
ACM is the number of audit committee meetings held in a given year; ACS is the total number of 
audit committee members; ACI is the percentage of independent directors in the audit committee; 
ACRX is the percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial expertise on the audit 
committee; NEDs is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board; DUAL is an indicator 
variable set to 1 when there is no separation between the roles of the CEO and the board chairman; 
BM is the frequency of board meetings held during the financial year; BS is the number of directors in 
the board; BLOCK is the percentage ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5 % or more of 
outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated with management; LEV is total long-term debt to 
total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at year end; LOSS is an indicator variable 
with 1 if a firm incurred losses in either one or both of the previous two years; ACQ is an indicator 
variable with a value of 1 if a firm made an acquisition during the year; BUSSEG is the number of a 
firm business segments; O&G is oil and gas industry; BMAT is basic materials industry; INDST is 
industrials industry; CGOD is consumer goods industry; HCAR is health care industry; CSEV is 
consumer services industry; TELECOM is telecommunications industry; TECH is technology 
industry. 
 
Non-audit fees 
 The results of the three regressions in Table 7.7 are consistent, regardless of 
whether the author separates audit committee and board variables or not. From all 
audit committee and board variables, only ACM and BS are found to be significant 
and positively related to non-audit service fees at the 5% (0.131; t-stat=2.12) and 1% 
(0.108; t-stat=2.68) levels respectively (Reg. 3). These findings are not as predicted 
in hypothesis 12b and hypothesis 16b respectively, but are consistent with the similar 
UK study conducted by Basiruddin (2011) on a sample of 674 FTSE firms in the 
period from 2005 to 2008. They suggest that firms with large boards and audit 
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committees that meet more frequently are more likely to purchase higher levels of 
non-audit services. 
 Three of the control variables, namely, LEV, SIZE and ACQ, are found to be 
significantly related to non-audit service fees and have the predicted coefficient signs 
(Reg. 3). SIZE and ACQ are positively associated with non-audit service fees 
suggesting that large firms that undertake acquisition activities demand the purchase 
of higher levels of non-audit services to deal with their system complexities and 
wider range of activities (Abbott et al. 2003b).  
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Table 7.7 OLS with Robust Standard Errors (Dep.: Nat. Log. of Non-
Audit Fees) 
   
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 
 
Variables 
  
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 
      (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)   
       
INERCEPT 
 
3.662 4.086 4.316 
 
   
(3.01)*** (3.40)*** (3.30)*** 
 
ACM 
  
0.142 
 
0.131 
 
   
(2.29)** 
 
(2.12)** 
 
ACS 
  
0.151 
 
0.084 
 
   
(1.56) 
 
(0.81) 
 
ACI 
  
-0.043 
 
-0.086 
 
   
(-0.09) 
 
(-0.19) 
 
ACRX 
  
0.058 
 
0.152 
 
   
(0.18) 
 
(0.46) 
 
NEDs 
   
0.511 0.069 
 
    
(0.62) (0.08) 
 
DUAL 
   
-1.210 -1.279 
 
    
(-1.17) (-1.19) 
 
BM 
   
0.010 -0.008 
 
    
(0.26) (-0.20) 
 
BS 
   
0.137 0.108 
 
    
(3.48)*** (2.68)*** 
 
BLOCK 
  
-0.310 -0.338 -0.300 
 
   
(-0.56) (-0.63) (-0.53) 
 
LEV 
  
-1.480 -1.496 -1.418 
 
   
(-1.86)* (-1.90)* (-1.78)* 
 
SIZE 
  
0.557 0.501 0.471 
 
   
(6.48)*** (5.41)*** (4.72)*** 
 
LOSS 
  
-0.550 -0.625 -0.610 
 
   
(-1.44) (-1.63) (-1.59) 
 
ACQ 
  
0.654 0.661 0.670 
 
   
(2.53)*** (2.59)*** (2.60)*** 
 
BUSSEG 
  
0.088 0.066 0.0633 
 
   
(2.01)** (1.58) (1.50) 
 
O&G 
  
-0.288 -0.464 -0.411 
 
   
(-0.73) (-1.19) (-1.02) 
 
BMAT 
  
-0.719 -0.717 -0.626 
 
   
(-1.50) (-1.51) (-1.29) 
 
INDST 
  
-0.211 -0.230 -0.157 
 
   
(-0.61) (-0.67) (-0.45) 
 
CGOD 
  
-0.103 -0.149 -0.042 
 
   
(-0.24) (-0.36) (-0.10) 
 
HCAR 
      
       
CSEV 
  
-0.501 -0.604 -0.501 
 
   
(-1.32) (-1.63) (-1.32) 
 
TELECOM 
  
-1.205 -0.877 -0.800 
 
   
(-0.90) (-0.60) (-0.54) 
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Table 7.7 (Cont’d) 
TECH 
  
-0.459 -0.494 -0.457 
 
   
(-0.81) (-0.85) (-0.80) 
 
2008 
  
0.190 0.134 0.137 
 
   
(0.83) (0.58) (0.59) 
 
2009 
  
-0.0580 -0.067 -0.069 
 
   
(-0.24) (-0.27) (-0.28) 
 
2010 
      
       
       
R-square 
 
22.78% 22.06% 23.28% 
 
Observations 
 
619 619 619 
 
              
***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level or better, respectively. 
ACM is the number of audit committee meetings held in a given year; ACS is the total number of 
audit committee members; ACI is the percentage of independent directors in the audit committee; 
ACRX is the percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial expertise on the audit 
committee; NEDs is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board; DUAL is an indicator 
variable set to 1 when there is no separation between the roles of the CEO and the board chairman; 
BM is the frequency of board meetings held during the financial year; BS is the number of directors in 
the board; BLOCK is the percentage ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5 % or more of 
outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated with management; LEV is total long-term debt to 
total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at year end; LOSS is an indicator variable 
with 1 if a firm incurred losses in either one or both of the previous two years; ACQ is an indicator 
variable with a value of 1 if a firm made an acquisition during the year; BUSSEG is the number of a 
firm business segments; O&G is oil and gas industry; BMAT is basic materials industry; INDST is 
industrials industry; CGOD is consumer goods industry; HCAR is health care industry; CSEV is 
consumer services industry; TELECOM is telecommunications industry; TECH is technology 
industry. 
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7.5 Additional Analyses 
 A number of additional tests are conducted in this section to check the 
robustness of the results.  
 First, similar to what is done in the previous chapter additional analysis 
section and with the intention to compare the performance of governance 
mechanisms in regular vs. financially distressed periods, the author analyses the 
descriptive statistics of the main variables (dependent and hypotheses variables) 
surrounding the crisis and then examines the impact of audit committee and board 
characteristics in the pre-financial crisis period from 2005 to 2007. 
 Table 7.8 presents the descriptive statistics for audit fees and non-audit fees 
(Panel A) as well as corporate governance variables (Panel B) surrounding the crisis. 
Mean and median differences of audit committee and board variables in Table 7.7 
(Panel B) are qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 6.10 (Panel B) except 
for the weak significant changes for BM and BS. Interestingly, the results in Table 
7.7 (Panel A) indicate that the level of audit fees is significantly higher (mean and 
median differences statistically significant at 1%) after the crisis, at a time when 
there is a less significant decrease in the level of non-audit service fees (median 
difference significant at 10%). The significant increase in audit fees in the post-
financial crisis period is justified by the wider audit scope and therefore increased 
audit effort that the external auditor would exert for minimizing detection risk. On 
the other hand, the mild decrease in non-audit service fees in the post-crisis period 
could be attributed to sample firms demanding lower levels of non-audit services in 
response to the post-crisis regulatory calls for prohibitions of these services (e.g., 
HCTC 2009). 
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Table 7.8 Descriptive Statistics for Audit fees, Non-audit fees, Audit Committee, and Board Variables Surrounding Crisis 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for lnASF and lnNASF surrounding the crisis 
   
Pre-Crisis 
 
Post-Crisis 
 
Differences(a) 
   Mean Median 
 Mean Median  Mean Median 
          
lnASF 
  
13.540 13.459 
 
13.717 13.592 
 
-0.177*** -0.134*** 
lnNASF 
  
12.758 13.177 
 
12.727 13.113 
 
0.031 0.064* 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for governance variables surrounding the crisis 
Audit Committee 
Variables 
        ACM 
  
4.176 4.000 
 
4.134 4.000 
 
0.042 0.000 
ACS 
  
3.651 3.000 
 
3.620 3.000 
 
0.031 0.000 
ACI 
  
0.905 1.000 
 
0.907 1.000 
 
-0.002 0.000 
ACRX 
  
0.273 0.250 
 
0.321 0.333 
 
-0.048*** -0.083*** 
           Board Variables 
         NEDs 
  
0.620 0.625 
 
0.646 0.667 
 
-0.027*** -0.042*** 
DUAL 
  
0.054 0.000 
 
0.029 0.000 
 
0.024** 0.000** 
BM 
  
8.684 8.000 
 
8.995 8.000 
 
-0.311* 0.000 
BS 
  
9.473 9.000 
 
9.268 9.000 
 
0.205 0.000 
a) ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
ACM is the number of audit committee meetings held in a given year; ACS is the total number of audit committee members; ACI is the percentage of 
independent directors in the audit committee; ACRX is the percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial expertise on the audit committee; 
NEDs is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board; DUAL is an indicator variable set to 1 when there is no separation between the roles of the 
CEO and the board chairman; BM is the frequency of board meetings held during the financial year; BS is the number of directors in the board. 
Chapter 7: Findings and Discussion – Corporate Governance, Audit Fees and Non-Audit Fees 
 
247 
 In Table 7.9, Panel A and Panel B present the pre-crisis (2005-2007) 
regression results from the lnASF and lnNASF respectively. In each of these panels, 
the author presents three regression results, by which audit committee and board 
variables are regressed both together and separately.  
 The results of the audit fees regressions in Panel A are consistent regardless 
of whether the author separates audit committee and board variables or not. ACI is 
the only exception where it is found to be significant and positively related to lnASF 
only after combining both sets of variables in the same regression. Results in Reg.3, 
where both sets of governance variables are included, reveal a significant association 
between ACM, ACS, ACI, NEDs, BM, and BS on the one hand and lnASF on the 
other. These findings do not differ from those reported under the post-crisis period in 
the main model as all of the revealed associations hold except for the ACS one 
which holds only when board variables are excluded from the regression.  
 The non-audit service fees regressions reveal a significant and positive 
association with ACS and ACRX only when the board set of variables are excluded 
from the regression (Panel B, Reg.1). Boards’ results, however, are robust to the 
inclusion and exclusion of audit committee variables and reveal that lnNASF is 
positively related to NEDs and BS and negatively related to DUAL. These findings 
suggest that in regular time periods and in the presence of effective boards of 
directors, audit committees do not play an incremental role in determining the level 
of non-audit services to be purchased from the incumbent auditor56.  
 
 
                                                          
56 Carcello et al. (2002) use a sample of 258 firms for the year ended March 1993 and find that in the 
presence of the board the audit committee does not play an incremental role in determining the level 
of audit fees. 
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Table 7.9 OLS with Robust Standard Errors (2005-2007) 
   
Panel A: Natural logarithm of audit 
fees  
Panel B: Natural logarithm of non-
audit fees  
   
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 
 
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 
 Variables
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
       (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)   (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)   
INERCEPT 
 
3.666 4.322 4.197 
 
4.472 6.768 5.418 
 
   
(7.20)*** (8.93)*** (8.31)*** 
 
(2.22)** (2.90)*** (2.45)*** 
 ACM 
  
0.060 
 
0.053 
 
-0.188 
 
-0.228 
 
   
(2.71)*** 
 
(2.43)*** 
 
(-1.25) 
 
(-1.63) 
 ACS 
  
0.144 
 
0.082 
 
0.339 
 
0.174 
 
   
(4.23)*** 
 
(2.31)** 
 
(2.50)*** 
 
(1.36) 
 ACI 
  
0.301 
 
0.388 
 
0.311 
 
0.33 
 
   
(1.46) 
 
(2.03)** 
 
(0.44) 
 
(0.47) 
 ACRX 
 
0.046 
 
0.034 
 
0.659 
 
0.589 
 
   
(0.33) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(1.76)* 
 
(1.52) 
 NEDs 
  
1.257 0.945 
  
3.764 3.850 
 
    
(4.16)*** (2.97)*** 
  
(3.18)*** (3.26)*** 
 DUAL 
  
-0.216 -0.269 
  
-1.914 -1.792 
 
    
(-1.35) (-1.61) 
  
(-1.75)* (-1.76)* 
 BM 
   
-0.02 -0.029 
  
-0.028 0.000 
 
    
(-1.90)* (-2.62)*** 
  
(-0.79) (0.01) 
 BS 
   
0.089 0.075 
  
0.105 0.130 
 
    
(5.23)*** (4.05)*** 
  
(1.64)* (2.09)** 
 BLOCK 
 
0.316 -0.035 0.060 
 
0.572 -0.174 -0.129 
 
  
 
(1.51) (-0.17) (0.29) 
 
(0.82) (-0.26) (-0.19) 
 LEV 
 
 
-0.571 -0.455 -0.444 
 
-0.345 0.042 -0.117 
 
  
 
(-2.44)*** (-2.05)** (-1.95)** 
 
(-0.42) (0.05) (-0.14) 
 SIZE 
 
 
0.583 0.515 0.486 
 
0.458 0.161 0.217 
 
  
 
(17.98)*** (15.95)*** (13.92)*** 
 
(4.72)*** (1.18) (1.69)* 
 LOSS 
 
 
0.12 0.111 0.123 
 
0.004 -0.182 -0.125 
 
  
 
(1.45) (1.28) (1.41) 
 
(0.01) (-0.47) (-0.32) 
 ACQ 
 
 
0.345 0.344 0.339 
 
0.61 0.653 0.596 
 
  
 
(4.17)*** (4.19)*** (4.24)*** 
 
(2.15)** (2.31)** (2.12)** 
 BUSSEG 
 
0.093 0.092 0.093 
 
0.132 0.11 0.120 
 
  
 
(4.74)*** (4.67)*** (4.77)*** 
 
(1.82)* (1.63) (1.74)* 
 O&G 
 
-0.176 -0.259 -0.207 
 
0.584 0.488 0.493 
 
  
 
(-0.68) (-0.96) (-0.80) 
 
(0.70) (0.56) (0.56) 
 BMAT 
 
-0.213 -0.241 -0.189 
 
0.583 0.665 0.538 
 
  
 
(-0.80) (-0.89) (-0.72) 
 
(0.71) (0.79) (0.64) 
 INDST 
 
0.174 0.218 0.256 
 
0.187 0.207 0.116 
 
  
 
(0.70) (0.86) (1.04) 
 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.12) 
 CGOD 
 
-0.223 -0.248 -0.196 
 
0.331 0.423 0.17 
 
  
 
(-0.83) (-0.92) (-0.74) 
 
(0.42) (0.49) (0.20) 
 HCAR 
 
   
 
   
 
  
 
   
 
   
 CSEV 
 
-0.269 -0.298 -0.235 
 
-0.377 -0.431 -0.494 
 
  
 
(-1.07) (-1.17) (-0.96) 
 
(-0.43) (-0.48) (-0.54) 
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Table 7.9 (Cont’d) 
TELECOM 
 
-0.288 -0.296 -0.215 
 
0.433 1.264 0.719 
 
  
 
(-0.85) (-0.89) (-0.66) 
 
(0.51) (1.35) (0.82) 
 TECH 
 
0.437 0.35 0.393 
 
1.337 1.155 1.164 
 
  
 
(1.50) (1.19) (1.34) 
 
(1.54) (1.28) (1.30) 
 2005 
 
 
0.157 0.166 0.162 
 
-0.031 -0.01 0.015 
 
  
 
(1.93)* (2.08)** (2.04)** 
 
(-0.13) (-0.04) (0.06) 
 2006 
 
 
   
 
   
 
  
 
   
 
   
 2007 
 
 
0.038 0.063 0.049 
 
-0.568 -0.517 -0.582 
 
  
 
(0.50) (0.84) (0.64) 
 
(-1.84)* (-1.73)* (-1.90)* 
 
           R-square 64.07% 65.56% 66.37% 
 
12.32% 14.89% 16.38% 
 Observations 579 579 579 
 
579 579 579 
 ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level or better, respectively. 
ACM is the number of audit committee meetings held in a given year; ACS is the total number of audit 
committee members; ACI is the percentage of independent directors in the audit committee; ACRX is the 
percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial expertise on the audit committee; NEDs is 
the percentage of non-executive directors on the board; DUAL is an indicator variable set to 1 when there is 
no separation between the roles of the CEO and the board chairman; BM is the frequency of board meetings 
held during the financial year; BS is the number of directors in the board; BLOCK is the percentage 
ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5 % or more of outstanding common shares and are 
unaffiliated with management; LEV is total long-term debt to total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
total assets at year end; LOSS is an indicator variable with 1 if a firm incurred losses in either one or both 
of the previous two years; ACQ is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if a firm made an acquisition 
during the year; BUSSEG is the number of a firm business segments; O&G is oil and gas industry; BMAT 
is basic materials industry; INDST is industrials industry; CGOD is consumer goods industry; HCAR is 
health care industry; CSEV is consumer services industry; TELECOM is telecommunications industry; 
TECH is technology industry. 
 
Second, it has been suggested in the literature that the relationships between 
audit fees and non-audit service fees, on the one hand, and the determinants of these 
fees on the other are complex as some factors that affect audit fees also affect non-
audit service fees (Zaman et al. 2011). Following Zaman et al. (2011), and to control 
for the incremental effect of each of the audit fees and non-audit fees on the level of 
the other, this study incorporates the standardised residuals estimated from each of 
the fees’ models into the model of the other57. In other words, the incorporation of 
the standardized residuals in the regression model accounts for any omitted variables 
that may determine both audit fees and non-audit fees as well as for the randomness 
                                                          
57 Zaman et al. (2011) account only for the incremental effect of audit fees on the level of non-audit 
fees through incorporating the standardised residuals of the audit fees model into the non-audit fees 
model. 
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in the variation in some components of the dependent variables. Table 7.10 presents 
the results of each of the audit fees and non-audit fees models in Panel A (Reg.1) and 
Panel B (Reg.1) respectively, and reveals qualitatively identical findings to those 
obtained from the main models (Tables 7.6 and 7.7). 
Finally, the author introduces additional control variables into the audit fees 
and non-audit fees models to check whether the results are robust to the inclusion of 
other factors that are found to be influential determinants of audit fees and non-audit 
service fees. The control variables are restructuring (RESTR), return on assets (ROA) 
and the sum of receivables and inventory divided by total assets (RECINV). RESTR 
is sourced from DataStream. It is an indicator variable with a value of one if a firm 
undertakes operational restructuring during the year, and is included to account for 
the complexity in a firm that would require additional audit efforts and the purchase 
of more non-audit services. In addition to the LOSS variable, ROA is another control 
variable that is used to account for the client profitability. RECINV is used to control 
for the inherent risk in an engagement where specialized audit procedures are needed 
(Hay et al. 2006b; Simunic 1980). Table 7.10 reports the results of both audit fees 
(Panel A, Reg.2) and non-audit service fees (Panel B, Reg.2) models. The results are 
qualitatively similar and echo those obtained from the main model (Tables 7.6 and 
7.7). From among the added control variables, only RESTR is found to be significant 
and positively related to lnASF (0.214; t-stat=3.55) suggesting the increase in audit 
efforts because of the increase in the complexity of the engagement. 
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Table 7.10 OLS with Robust Standard Errors (Additional Tests) 
   
Panel A: Nat. log. of Audit 
fees 
  
Panel B: Nat. log. of Non-Audit 
fees  
   
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 
 
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 
 Variables 
  
Coeff. Coeff. 
 
Coeff. Coeff. 
       (t-stat) (t-stat)   (t-stat) (t-stat)   
INERCEPT 
 
4.427 4.451 
 
4.316 4.638 
 
   
(11.42)*** (8.79)*** 
 
(3.37)*** (3.20)*** 
 ACM 
  
0.089 0.093 
 
0.131 0.136 
 
   
(4.28)*** (4.26)*** 
 
(2.29)** (2.14)** 
 ACS 
  
0.043 0.04 
 
0.084 0.075 
 
   
(1.25) (1.13) 
 
(0.83) (0.70) 
 ACI 
  
0.327 0.337 
 
-0.086 -0.089 
 
   
(1.95)** (2.02)** 
 
(-0.19) (-0.19) 
 ACRX 
  
-0.117 -0.114 
 
0.152 0.143 
 
   
(-1.08) (-1.03) 
 
(0.48) (0.43) 
 NEDs 
  
1.214 1.032 
 
0.069 0.12 
 
   
(4.12)*** (3.35)*** 
 
(0.08) (0.13) 
 DUAL 
 
-0.078 -0.039 
 
-1.279 -1.264 
 
   
(-0.38) (-0.20) 
 
(-1.19) (-1.17) 
 BM 
  
-0.023 -0.023 
 
-0.008 -0.012 
 
   
(-2.18)** (-2.11)** 
 
(-0.20) (-0.30) 
 BS 
  
0.050 0.05 
 
0.108 0.116 
 
   
(3.34)*** (3.10)*** 
 
(2.74)*** (2.78)*** 
 BLOCK 
 
 
-0.354 -0.33 
 
-0.300 -0.341 
 
  
 
(-1.85)* (-1.60) 
 
(-0.55) (-0.59) 
 LEV 
 
 
-0.855 -0.965 
 
-1.418 -1.492 
 
  
 
(-4.73)*** (-5.10)*** 
 
(-1.82)* (-1.87)* 
 SIZE 
 
 
0.516 0.514 
 
0.471 0.442 
 
  
 
(17.22)*** (13.96)*** 
 
(4.78)*** (4.11)*** 
 LOSS 
 
 
-0.142 -0.128 
 
-0.61 -0.644 
 
  
 
(-1.58) (-1.45) 
 
(-1.60) (-1.62) 
 ACQ 
 
 
0.202 0.193 
 
0.67 0.642 
 
  
 
(3.02)*** (2.87)*** 
 
(2.68)*** (2.48)*** 
 BUSSEG 
 
 
0.097 0.088 
 
0.063 0.062 
 
  
 
(6.73)*** (5.93)*** 
 
(1.60) (1.42) 
 RESTR 
 
 
 
0.214 
 
 
0.149 
 
  
 
 
(3.55)*** 
 
 
(0.65) 
 ROA 
 
 
 
0.004 
 
 
-0.006 
 
  
 
 
(0.94) 
 
 
(-0.65) 
 RECINV 
 
 
 
-0.175 
 
 
0.092 
 
  
 
 
(-0.83) 
 
 
(0.14) 
 O&G 
 
 
-0.327 -0.243 
 
-0.411 -0.332 
 
  
 
(-2.42)** (-1.74)* 
 
(-1.03) (-0.79) 
 BMAT 
 
 
-0.515 -0.437 
 
-0.626 -0.541 
 
  
 
(-3.37)*** (-2.80)*** 
 
(-1.34) (-1.06) 
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Table 7.10 (Cont’d) 
INDST 
 
 
0.139 0.178 
 
-0.157 -0.135 
 
  
 
(1.46) (1.87) 
 
(-0.46) (-0.38) 
 CGOD 
 
 
-0.320 -0.278 
 
-0.042 -0.04 
 
  
 
(-2.51)*** (-2.26)** 
 
(-0.10) (-0.09) 
 HCAR 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 CSEV 
 
 
-0.374 -0.347 
 
-0.501 -0.455 
 
  
 
(-3.92)*** (-3.57)*** 
 
(-1.36) (-1.17) 
 TELECOM 
 
 
-0.360 -0.277 
 
-0.800 -0.663 
 
  
 
(-1.78)* (-1.16) 
 
(-0.58) (-0.44) 
 TECH 
 
 
0.077 0.081 
 
-0.457 -0.433 
 
  
 
(0.52) (0.56) 
 
(-0.79) (-0.76) 
 2008 
 
 
0.107 0.112 
 
0.137 0.127 
 
  
 
(1.50) (1.59) 
 
(0.59) (0.55) 
 2009 
 
 
0.05 0.045 
 
-0.069 -0.101 
 
  
 
(0.78) (0.68) 
 
(-0.29) (-0.41) 
 2010 
 
 
     
 
  
 
     
 Residuals 
 
 
0.063 
  
0.729 
 
 
  
 
(3.87)*** 
  
(4.72)*** 
 
 
         R-square 73.82% 73.19% 
 
26.78% 23.42% 
 Observations 619 619 
 
619 619 
 ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level or better, respectively. 
ACM is the number of audit committee meetings held in a given year; ACS is the total number of 
audit committee members; ACI is the percentage of independent directors in the audit committee; 
ACRX is the percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial expertise on the audit 
committee; NEDs is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board; DUAL is an indicator 
variable set to 1 when there is no separation between the roles of the CEO and the board chairman; 
BM is the frequency of board meetings held during the financial year; BS is the number of directors in 
the board; BLOCK is the percentage ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5 % or more of 
outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated with management; LEV is total long-term debt to 
total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at year end; LOSS is an indicator variable 
with 1 if a firm incurred losses in either one or both of the previous two years; ACQ is an indicator 
variable with a value of 1 if a firm made an acquisition during the year; BUSSEG is the number of a 
firm business segments; RESTR is an indicator variable of 1 if a firm undertakes restructuring during 
the year; ROA is return on assets; RECINV is the sum of inventory and receivables divided by total 
assets; O&G is a dummy variable for oil and gas firms; BMAT is a dummy variable for basic 
materials firms; INDST is a dummy variable for industrials firms; CGOD is a dummy variable for 
consumer goods firms; HCAR is a dummy variable for health care firms; CSEV is a dummy variable 
for consumer services firms; TELECOM is dummy variable for telecommunications firms; TECH is 
dummy variable for technology firms. 
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7.6 Summary 
 This chapter reports the empirical findings of the impact of audit committee 
and board characteristics on audit fees and non-audit service fees. Similar to chapter 
six, this chapter’s main analysis is focused on the post-financial crisis period 
between 2008 and 2010. Additional analysis for the pre-crisis period between 2005 
and 2007 is conducted to provide a comparison of the association between 
governance characteristics and both audit fees and non-audit fees during pre- and 
post-crisis periods. 
 Multivariate analysis of the association between audit committee variables 
and audit fees during the post-financial crisis period 2008 to 2010 supports the 
agency perspective argument and suggests that large audit committees that are 
independent and meet more frequently undertake an effective monitoring role that 
results in extensive audit testing and thus higher audit fees. Similarly, the agency 
perspective argument is supported by the positive and significant association 
between audit fees and both board size (BS) and non-executive directors on the 
board (NEDs). However, board meetings are found to be negatively related to audit 
fees, thus supporting the risk perspective argument that external auditor will exert 
higher audit efforts (i.e. higher audit fees) to mitigate risk in the presence of an 
inactive board that meets infrequently. 
 With respect to non-audit service fees, the main regression results reveal a 
positive association between non-audit service fees and each of ACM and BS. These 
findings do not support the author’s predictions in hypotheses 12b and 16b, and 
suggest that greater levels of non-audit services are purchased by firms of large 
boards whose audit committees meet more frequently. 
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 The additional multivariate analysis conducted on the pre-financial crisis 
period from 2005 to 2007, for both of the audit fees and non-audit fees models, 
reveals consistent findings with those from the main analysis for the post-crisis 
period 2008 to 2010. This suggests that in terms of determining the levels of audit 
fees and non-audit fees, there is no change in the performance of governance 
mechanisms between pre- and post-crisis periods. 
 Comparison of the mean and median of the dependent variables surrounding 
the financial crisis reveal a significant increase (at 1% level) in sample firms audit 
fees (mean and median differences statistically significant at 1%) after the crisis and 
a less significant decrease in the level of non-audit service fees (median significant at 
10%). This finding suggests that sample firms’ boards in general and audit 
committees in particular have responded to regulators’ calls for enhancing corporate 
governance effectiveness through exerting a better monitoring role. This in turn has 
led external auditors to increase audit efforts (to reduce detection risk) and limit the 
provision of non-audit services (to safeguard independence) resulting in higher audit 
fees and lower non-audit service fees. 
 A summary of the hypotheses related to the impact of audit committee and 
board characteristics on audit fees and non-audit service fees along with the relevant 
findings are presented in Table 7.11. 
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Table 7.11 Summary of Hypotheses and Relevant Findings 
Hypothesis 
Number 
Hypothesis Findings 
9a 
There is a positive relationship between audit 
committee independence and audit fees. 
Supported 
9b 
There is a negative relationship between 
audit committee independence and non-audit 
service fees. 
Not supported 
10a 
There is a positive relationship between audit 
committee relevant financial experience and 
audit fees. 
Not supported 
10b 
There is a negative relationship between 
audit committee relevant financial experience 
and non-audit service fees. 
Not supported 
11a 
There is a positive relationship between audit 
committee size and audit fees. 
Supported (when 
board variables are not 
included) 
11b 
There is a negative relationship between 
audit committee size and non-audit service 
fees. 
Not supported 
12a 
There is a positive relationship between audit 
committee meetings and audit fees. 
Supported 
12b 
There is a negative relationship between 
audit committee meetings and non-audit 
service fees. 
Not supported 
13a 
There is a positive relationship between Non-
Executive Directors and Audit fees. 
Supported 
13b 
There is a negative relationship between 
Non-executive directors and non-audit 
service fees. 
Not supported 
14a 
There is a positive relationship between CEO 
duality and audit fees. 
Not supported 
14b 
There is a positive relationship between CEO 
duality and non-audit service fees. 
Not supported 
15a 
There is a positive relationship between 
board meetings and audit fees. 
Not supported 
15b 
There is a negative relationship between 
board meetings and non-audit service fees. 
Not supported 
16a 
There is a positive relationship between 
board size and audit fees. 
Supported 
16b 
There is a negative relationship between 
board size and non-audit service fees. 
Not supported 
 
 
Chapter 8: Summary and Conclusions 
 
256 
Chapter 8. Summary and 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 8: Summary and Conclusions 
 
257 
Chapter 8 
Summary and Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
 Inspired by UK regulatory concerns about the integrity of corporate financial 
reporting and external audit processes in the post-financial crisis period from 2008 to 
2010, and the transparency enhancement roles that the board of directors in general 
and audit committees in particular could play in this regard, the author examines how 
effective these governance mechanisms are in: (1) ameliorating the quality of 
financial reporting and (2) determining proper levels of audit fees and non-audit 
service fees after the financial crisis.  
 Particularly, with respect to corporate financial reporting quality, this thesis 
sought to address the concerns raised by the FRRP and the FRC about misleading 
revenue recognition practices after the global financial crisis. The FRRP and FRC 
cast doubt on the criteria that firms used to recognize revenues after the crisis, 
arguing that insolvency problems during the recession would cause more difficulties 
to managers incentivising them to manipulate revenues to hide poor performance. 
Addressing these issues, they emphasize the crucial role that audit committees could 
play in overseeing the financial reporting process and recommend that audit 
committees should engage more closely in monitoring the truthfulness of key figures 
and judgements within the financial reports. 
 On the other hand, this thesis also sought to address the concerns raised by 
the HCTC and HOL about the objectivity and independence of external auditors 
during and after the financial crisis casting doubt on the transparency of the audit 
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process. Specifically, the HOL accused the Big Four British audit firms of 
complacency and “dereliction of duty” and emphasized the important role that audit 
committees could play in terms of external auditor selection, independence and 
remuneration.  
 The agency theory is used to shape the link between corporate governance 
and both financial reporting quality and auditor remuneration (audit fees and non-
audit fees). This theory provides superior justification and explanation for the 
motivations behind earnings management and the relationship between external 
auditors and their clients. Moreover, given the empirical nature of the studies in this 
thesis, the agency theory “model leads to a higher degree of mathematical tractability 
than do the competing theoretical perspectives” (Cohen et al. 2008, p.188). Based on 
the agency perspective, a vigilant oversight by the audit committee and the board of 
directors is expected to constrain earnings management and ensure a transparent 
audit process resulting in a reduction in agency costs.  
 In this pursuit, two empirical investigations are used to examine the 
association between corporate governance on the one hand and financial reporting 
quality and auditor remuneration on the other. Governance characteristics such as 
composition, size, activity, financial expertise, and CEO duality are used to surrogate 
for the effectiveness of the audit committee and the board of directors. With respect 
to the dependent variables, financial reporting quality and auditor remuneration are 
measured by earnings management and both audit fees and non-audit fees 
respectively. Specifically, financial reporting quality is measured by a discretionary 
revenue model, to address the concerns of regulators about misleading revenue 
recognition practices, and a performance adjusted accrual-based model to account 
for the possibility for firms to shift from one earnings management method to 
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another, especially in periods of unhealthy financial conditions (Zang 2011). 
Empirical models are tested using a sample of FTSE 350 firms listed in the LSE 
during the period from 2008 to 2010. An additional sample of FTSE 350 firms listed 
in the period between 2005 and 2007 is tested in the additional analysis to provide a 
comparison of the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms during regular 
and financially distressed periods. Regression analyses for the financial reporting 
quality models and auditor remuneration models are conducted using fixed effect 
and simple OLS regressions respectively. 
 In the following sections, this chapter presents a summary of the empirical 
findings followed by the implications for researchers and policy makers and 
concluding with the limitations of this research as well as avenues for future research.  
8.2 Summary of Findings 
 Empirical findings for the financial reporting quality and auditor 
remuneration models are presented and summarized in chapters six and seven 
respectively. This section provides a synthesis of the findings to answer the research 
questions. 
 Findings of the financial reporting quality empirical investigation reveal that 
some internal governance characteristics play a significant role in enhancing 
financial reporting quality after the financial crisis, through constraining revenue-
based earnings management but not accrual-based earnings management. 
Specifically, it is found that large independent audit committees and boards that 
include CEO duality cases are negatively associated with discretionary revenues. 
Board meetings, however, are found to be positively related to discretionary 
revenues suggesting that the board plays a reactive role in curbing revenue 
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management. Overall, these findings  suggest that, given the regulators’ and 
practitioners’ intense emphasis on audit committees and their crucial role in curbing 
expected revenue manipulations after the financial crisis, firms’ revenue recognition 
process and criteria were subject to increased monitoring by boards in general and 
audit committees in particular58, leading to a better financial reporting quality. The 
findings are robust to the inclusion of the lagged values of the dependent variables as 
explanatory variables to control for the omitted variables bias, and the inclusion of 
Big4 dummy variable to control for auditor quality. In estimating discretionary 
accruals, the results are also robust to the use of the Jones model as an alternative 
measure to the performance adjusted Modified Jones model. Additional analyses 
reveal that audit committees with a majority of independent directors are more likely 
to curb revenue manipulations than solely independent audit committees. 
 On the other hand, firms with independent audit committees that meet 
frequently and large boards that include a higher proportion of non-executive 
directors are associated with higher audit fees. These findings support the agency 
perspective and suggest that audit committees and boards having such characteristics 
are more concerned about audit quality where they demand wider external audit 
scope resulting in higher audit fees. Board meetings, however, are found to be 
negatively related to audit fees suggesting that the increase in the activity of the 
board will reduce risk and result in less audit efforts and in turn lower audit fees. 
Contrary to the author’s predictions, audit committee meetings and board size are 
found to be positively associated with non-audit fees after the financial crisis. These 
findings do not support the prohibition of non-audit services recommendations by 
UK regulatory bodies (e.g., HOL 2011; HCTC 2009), who argue that the provision 
                                                          
58 Refer to the introductory chapter for regulators’ reports on the revenue recognition key issues 
recommended to be taken in consideration by audit committees while discharging their financial 
reporting oversight role after the financial crisis.  
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of such services by the incumbent auditor would impair external auditors’ 
independence. However, they suggest that the simultaneous provision of audit and 
non-audit services by the incumbent auditor would facilitate a beneficial knowledge 
spill-over between the two services resulting in a better quality of audit (Simunic 
1984). The findings of the audit fees and non-audit fees models are robust to the 
inclusion of the standardized residuals estimated from each of the fees’ models into 
the model of the other to control for the incremental effect of each of the fees on the 
level of the other. Moreover, they are robust to the inclusion of additional control 
variables that are found in the literature to be influential determinants of audit fees 
and non-audit fees. 
 Comparisons of the samples of the pre- and post-financial crisis periods 
reveal the following. First, in the presence of unhealthy financial conditions, firms 
tend to use more accrual-based earnings management and less revenues management, 
especially when the latter is exposed to higher levels of monitoring from regulators. 
Second, regulators’ calls for corporate governance reforms after the financial crisis 
have led to more changes in the structure of boards than in that of audit committees. 
Specifically, the post-crisis findings reveal a significant decrease in CEO duality and 
board size, along with a significant increase in non-executive directors on boards, 
and the relevant financial experience of audit committees.  
 Additional regression results of the impact of audit committee and board 
characteristics on both of discretionary accruals and discretionary revenues during 
the pre-financial crisis period from 2005 to 2007 do not reveal significant 
associations except for board meetings which are found to be positively related to 
discretionary revenues suggesting that the board also performs a reactive role in 
constraining revenue management during regular periods. However, findings of the 
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audit fees and non-audit fees investigations are qualitatively similar to those reported 
during the post-financial crisis period, and suggest that the association between 
internal governance mechanisms and both audit fees and non-audit fees does not 
differ between regular and financially distressed periods. 
8.3 Research Implications 
 There are a very limited number of studies which have examined the impact 
of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management and auditor 
remuneration in the UK. Prior studies tackling the impact of corporate governance 
on financial reporting quality have only employed discretionary accrual models as 
proxies for earnings management and have revealed mixed results (e.g., Basiruddin 
2011; Habbash 2010). This thesis extends the literature through using discretionary 
revenues as a surrogate for earnings management and provides unique evidence on 
the effectiveness of audit committees and board of directors in curtailing revenue 
manipulation earnings management. Specifically, audit committees and board of 
directors are found to be effective in curtailing revenue manipulation earnings 
management but not accrual based earnings management.  
 Similarly, results of extant research on the association between corporate 
governance and both audit fees and non-audit fees are mostly inconsistent. The 
results of this thesis suggest that higher audit fees are associated with independent 
audit committees that meet more frequently. These findings confirm those of Zaman 
et al. (2011) and Basiruddin (2011), and support the agency perspective of audit fees. 
However, the negative relationship between the number of board meetings and audit 
fees support the risk perspective of audit fees. Therefore, unlike prior studies which 
have based their arguments on only one of these perspectives (e.g., Zaman et al. 
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2011; Basiruddin 2011; Boo and Sharma 2008), this thesis suggests that both 
perspectives should be taken in consideration while formulating the hypotheses.  
 The results of this study also have other implications for both researchers and 
policy makers. As far as researchers are concerned, this thesis provides evidence that 
CEO duality is associated with better financial reporting quality during recession 
periods. Moreover, board meetings are found to be negatively related to audit fees, 
suggesting that an increase in the activity of the board will lead to less audit effort 
from the external auditor resulting in lower audit fees. These two findings are 
inconsistent with the agency perspective, and imply that the effectiveness of internal 
governance mechanisms may depend “upon organizational and environmental 
circumstances” (Van Essen et al. 2013), while more than one theoretical perspective 
is needed to capture “the greater complexity” in organisations (Eisenhardt 1989).  
 Moreover, similar UK studies use discretionary accrual models (abnormal 
accruals) as constructs for earnings management (e.g., Basiruddin 2011; Habbash 
2010). The results of this thesis suggest that firms may use different earnings 
management methods to manipulate earnings. Therefore, different metrics should be 
employed by researchers to capture the highest possible level of earnings 
management. 
 With respect to auditor remuneration, extant UK research on the impact of 
corporate governance on audit fees examines both sets of audit committee and board 
variables in the same regression model (e.g., Zaman et al. 2011; Basiruddin 2011). 
This thesis regresses both sets of variables combined and separately, and find that the 
board and audit committee play a complementary role in determining audit fees. 
Specifically, the results reveal a negative and significant relationship between board 
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meetings and audit fees only when both audit committee and board sets of variables 
are regressed in the same model.  
  The findings of this thesis could be of potential interest to policy makers in 
several ways. First, the author has found that audit committees are not effective in 
enhancing financial reporting quality in regular periods. This finding is consistent 
with that of a similar UK study conducted by Basiruddin (2011) on a sample of 
FTSE 350 firms listed during the period 2005 to 2008, and implies that principles-
based accounting standards lessen the burden on audit committees to curtail the 
“management’s aggressive reporting choices” (Agoglia et al. 2011). Given the same 
standards during crisis periods, however, such governance mechanisms may operate 
differently (Van Essen et al. 2013), especially under higher levels of monitoring by 
regulators. 
 Second, UK corporate governance authorities could consider the findings 
while setting new governance reform recommendations. The investigations 
conducted in this thesis provide empirical evidence on the effectiveness of internal 
governance characteristics during the post-financial crisis period, a period in which 
such evidence still does not exist. For instance, audit committee members with 
relevant financial experience are not found to be associated with either of financial 
reporting quality or auditor remuneration. This finding is inconsistent with the UK 
Corporate Governance Code recommendation that audit committees should comprise 
at least one member with relevant financial expertise. Committee members with 
accounting qualifications and audit experience could be considered to deal with the 
accounting complexities and sophistications inherent in financial reporting (Defond 
et al. 2005). 
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 Third, the author finds that there is drastic decrease in the level of 
discretionary revenues after the financial crisis at a time when there is a mild 
increase in the level of discretionary accruals. Given the regulatory concerns about 
misleading revenue recognition practices after the financial crisis and the intense 
monitoring exerted thereafter, this finding implies that increasing the scrutiny 
activities and monitoring by regulators on a certain earnings management activity 
may lead up to a shift “in managers’ preference for different earnings management 
strategies” (Zang 2011, p.701). 
 Fourth, this thesis provides evidence that audit committee meetings and 
board size are positively associated with non-audit fees. This suggests that the joint 
provision of audit services and non-audit services rather enhance the quality of 
external audit than impair it. As such, this finding supports other UK empirical 
evidence (e.g., Zaman et al. 2011; Basiruddin 2011), and implies that regulators 
should take into consideration that the simultaneous provision of audit and non-audit 
services is not likely to be subject to financial failures. 
8.4 Research Limitations and Avenues for Future 
Research 
 Despite the unique and potential contributions that this thesis is providing to 
the literature, there are a number of caveats that should be taken into consideration.  
First, regarding the data tested in this research, the author uses a main sample of UK 
FTSE 350 unregulated firms listed during the period 2008 and 2010. The UK 
institutional, governance, and accounting systems are different from those of the US 
in which the vast majority of similar research has been conducted. Also FTSE 350 
firms are subject to a higher level of governance recommendations to comply with, 
in relation to smaller listed firms, and to greater focus and monitoring from 
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regulatory bodies. Having said that, the findings of this thesis should be cautiously 
generalized, taking into consideration the context and the period of the study as well 
as the nature of the examined firms.  
 Second, similar to the vast majority of relevant extant studies and given the 
empirical nature of this thesis, the author examines the effectiveness of the audit 
committee and the board of directors through their individual characteristics. As such, 
implications of the findings do not provide an explanation of how the audit 
committee and the board operate and behave especially in the presence of unhealthy 
financial conditions. 
 Third, with respect to discretionary revenues, it has been suggested that they 
should be estimated by separating revenues in the first three-quarters from those in 
the fourth as “revenues in the early part of the year are more likely to be collected in 
cash by the end of the year” and thus “these have different implications for year-end 
receivables than a change in fourth-quarter revenues” (Stubben 2010, p.696). 
However, discretionary revenues are estimated in this thesis based on annual 
revenues as quarterly revenue data are not available. 
 Finally, this research opens several avenues for future research. First, the 
main oversight responsibilities of audit committees lie within the areas of financial 
reporting, external audit and internal audit. This thesis contributed to the literature by 
examining the effectiveness of audit committees in discharging their oversight role 
over the first two areas. Future research should provide evidence on how effective 
audit committees are in monitoring the internal audit function. 
 Second, this thesis proposes the consideration of a multi-theoretical approach 
in accounting research, while keeping the agency theory as the theoretical base. Still 
the number of studies that have examined the integration of corporate governance 
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theories is very limited and the alignment of theories is still not clear (Christopher 
2010). Future research should explore holistic theoretical approaches which could 
better explain organizational complexities and their environmental circumstances.  
 Third, the main sample used in this thesis is for the three-year period between 
2008 and 2010. Data for the years following 2010 were not available at the data 
collection stage of this research. Therefore, future research could benefit from a 
larger sample size through extending the sample period and providing more robust 
results. 
 Fourth, this thesis examines audit fees and non-audit fees as an economic 
aspect of the relationship between external auditors and their clients. It provides 
implications that the simultaneous provision of audit services and non-audit services 
is not likely to harm auditors’ independence. Future research should use the post-
financial crisis period to further confirm the validity of these implications by 
examining the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the economic 
bonding between external auditors and their clients. One of the interesting economic 
bonding proxies used in the literature considers the percentage of a client’s audit fees 
relative to auditor audit revenues per office or country. 
 Lastly, given the substitutive relationship between real activities earnings 
management and accrual-based earnings management (Zang 2011), this thesis uses 
both the discretionary revenue model and the performance adjusted accrual model to 
account for firms shifting from one earnings management method to another. The 
employed discretionary revenue model does not only detect real activities 
manipulations; therefore future research could use pure real activity earnings 
management measures for more accurate consideration for the shift in earnings 
management measures. 
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